

**INDIAN PSYCHOLOGY**  
**Vol. III**  
**EPISTEMOLOGY OF PERCEPTION**



# INDIAN PSYCHOLOGY

Volume III

EPISTEMOLOGY OF PERCEPTION

JADUNATH SINHA

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Dedicated to  
**SRI AUROBINDO**

On February 2, 1959 I got a message from Sri Aurobindo in clear and distinct voice : 'Your total transformation is necessary for the uplift of humanity. You should recite the mantra I gave you in addition to what your Master gave you. I am Krishna. I am Chaitanya.'

—JADUNATH



## PREFACE

This book is a sequel to my *Indian Psychology: Perception* published by Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., London. It was written long ago. I was awarded Griffith Memorial Prize by the University of Calcutta for my thesis on *Indian Epistemology of Indeterminate and Determinate Perception* (Chapters I and II) in 1923. I was awarded the Mouart Medal by the same University in 1925 for the completion of research for Premchand Roychand Studentship for three years. *Indian Epistemology of Perception* was my thesis for 1925. It contained epistemology of indefinite perception, illusion, hallucination, recognition, supernormal perception and divine perception. The last chapter dealing with recollection, self, knowledge and object and general problems of Indian Epistemology has been added. The chapter on illusion has been revised.

My special thanks to my son Amiya Kumar Sinha, Executive Director, Jadunath Sinha Foundation in planning and giving shape to this third volume of *Indian Psychology*.

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Calcutta 700 026  
India

JADUNATH SINHA

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## ABBREVIATIONS

- ABS. = Advaitabrahmasiddhi (Sadānanda).  
ACK. = Advaitacintākaustubha, (Mahādeva),—BI., 1901.  
ATP. = Advaitatattvaprabodhinī, Amalner, 1932.  
AV. = Anuvyākhyāna (Madhva), a commentary on BS.  
BC. = Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi (Gāgābhaṭṭa), Ch. S. S., 1933  
BhP. = Bhāṣāpariccheda (Viśvanātha), N. S. P., Bombay, 1916.  
BI. = Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta).  
BS. = Brahmasūtra (Bādarāyaṇa).  
B.S.S. = Benaras Sanskrit Series (Varanasi).  
Ch. S.S. = Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series (Varanasi).  
CS. = Citsukhī (Tattvaprādīpikā) (Citsukha), N. S. P., 1915.  
GNS. = Nyāyasūtra (Gautama).  
HIP. = *History of Indian Philosophy* (Jadunath Sinha), SPH.,  
Calcutta-26.  
HNKS. = Haridāsa's gloss on NKS.  
IPC. = *Indian Psychology : Cognition* (Vol. I) ( , )  
IPK. = Īśvarapratyabhijñānākārikā (Utpaladeva) Srinagar, 1921.  
IPV. = Īśvarapratyabhijñānvṛtti (Utpaladeva).  
KRV., or KV. = Kiraṇāvalī (Udayana). Benares, Samvat, 1941.  
K.S S. = Kāśī Sanskrit Series, Benares.  
MBG. = Madhva's Gītābhāṣya  
MBS. = Madhvabhāṣya on Brahmasūtra, Mysore, 1911-15.  
NA. = Nyāyāvatāra, K. S. S., 1924.  
NB. = Nyāyabindu (Dharmakīrti).  
NBh. = Nyāyabhāṣya (Vātsyāyana), Calcutta, 1919.  
NBT. = Nyāyabinduṭīkā (Dharmottara) on NB., K.S.S., 1924.  
NK. = Nyāyakandalī (Śrīdhara), V. S. S., 1895.  
NKS. = Nyāyakusumāñjali (Udayana), Benares, 1912.  
NKSP. = Nyāyakusumāñjaliprakāśa (Vardhamāna), Benares,  
1912.  
NL. = Nyāyalīlāvatī (Vallabha), N.S.P., 1915.  
NM.—Nyāyamañjarī (Jayanta Bhaṭṭa), V. S. S., 1895.

- NNP.=Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa (Vardhamāna) on NVTP.,  
 BI., 1911.  
 NP.=Nyāyapariśuddhi (Veṅkaṭanātha), Ch. S. S., No. 249.  
 NPNS.=Nyāyasāra (Śrīnivāsa), a commentary on NP. ( , )  
 NS.=Nyāyasudhā (Jayatīrtha) on AV.  
 NSār.=Nyāyasāra (Bhāsarvajña), BI., 1910.  
 N.S.P.=Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay.  
 NTD.=Nyāyatātparyadīpikā (Jayaśiṃhasūri), a commentary  
 on NSār., BI., 1910.  
 NVTP.=Nyāyavārtikatātparyapariśuddhi (Udayana), a  
 commentary on NVTT, BI., 1911.  
 NVTT.=Nyāyavārtikatātparyāṭīkā (Vācaspati Miśra), V.S.S.,  
 1898.  
 PBH.=Prāśastapādabhāṣya (Padārthadharmaśaṃgraha),  
 V.S.S., 1895.  
 PKM.=Prameyacakalamārtanḍa, (Prabhācanādra), N.S.P.,  
 1912.  
 PMLV. or PMV.,=Parīksāmukhalaghuvṛtti (Anantavīrya),  
 BI., 1909.  
 PMS.=Parīksāmukhasūtra (Māṇikyanandī), BI, 1909.  
 PNT.=Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra (Śrī Vādideva Sūri).  
 PP.=Prakaraṇapañcikā (Śālikanātha), Ch. S. S., 1903-04.  
 PR.=Prasthānaratnākara (Puruṣottama) Ch. S. S., 1903-04.  
 PRP.=Pramāṇaparīkṣā (Vidyānandisvāmī), Benares, 1914.  
 PSAH.=Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus (Brojendra Nath  
 Seal); Longmans.  
 RBS.=Rāmānuja's Bhāṣya on B S. (Śrībhāṣya).  
 RV.=R̥juvimalā (Śālikanātha Miśra), a commentary on  
 Bṛhatī (Prabhākara), Ch.S.S., 1920-33.  
 SAS.=Sarvārthasiddhi (Veṅkaṭanātha), a commentary on  
 Tattvamuktākalāpa, Benares, 1909.  
 SBS.=Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on BS.  
 ŚD., or SD.,=Śāstradīpikā (Pārthasārathi Miśra), N. S., P.,  
 Bombay, 1915.  
 ŚDP.=Śāstradīpikāprakāśa (Sudarśanācārya), Benares, Śaṃvat,  
 1964.  
 SDS.=Sarvadarśanaśaṃgraha (Mādhavācārya),  
 Kalyan-Bombay, Śaṃvat.



- SM.=Siddhāntamuktāvalī (Viśvanātha), N. S. P., 1916.  
 SPB.=Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya (Vijñānabhikṣu),  
 a commentary on SPS, Benares, 1909.  
 SPH.=Sinha Publishing House, Calcutta-26.  
 SPS.=Sāṃkhyapravacanasūtra (Kapila), BI., 1889.  
 SS.=Sarvārthasiddhi (Pūjyapāda) on TAS., Kolahpur, Śaka  
 1839.  
 SSV.=Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti (Aniruddha) on SPS., BI, 1888.  
 STK.=Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī (Vācaspati Miśra).  
 ŚV.=Ślokavārtika (Kumārila), Ch. S. S., 1898-99.  
 TAS.=Tattvādhigamasūtra (Umāsvāmī), Kolahpur, Śaka 1839.  
 TBh.=Tarkabhāṣā (Keśavamīśra), Poona, 1924.  
 TCM.=Tattvacintāmaṇi (Gaṅgeśa), BI.  
 TMK.=Tattvamuktākālāpa (Veṅkaṭanātha) Benares, 1900.  
 TS.=Tarkasaṃgraha, Bombay, 1912.  
 TSD.=Tarkasaṃgrahadīpikā (Annaṃbhaṭṭa), Bombay, 1912.  
 TLV.=Tattvaślokavārtika (Vidyānandīśvāmī), N.S.P., 1918.  
 TV.=Tattvavaiśārādī (Vācaspati Miśra), a commentary on  
 YBh.  
 VP., or VPR.,=Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Dharmarājādharīndra),  
 Bombay, Saṃvat, 1968.  
 VPS.=Vivaraṇaprameyasaṃgraha (Vidyāraṇya), V.S.S., 1893.  
 VS.=Vaiśeṣikasūtra (Kaṇāda), Gujarati Press, 1913.  
 VSB.=Vaiśeṣikabhāṣya on VS. (Candrakānta).  
 VSS.=Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares.  
 VSU.=Upaskāra (Śaṃkara Miśra), Gujarati Press, 1913.  
 YBh.=Vyāsa's bhāṣya on YS, Benares, 1911.  
 YS.=Yogasūtra (Patañjali), Benares, 1911.  
 YMD.=Yatipatimatadīpikā (Śrīnivāsadāsa), B. S. S., 1906.  
 YV.=Yogavārtika (Vijñānabhikṣu) on YBh., Benares, 1884.  
 YSP.=Yuktisnehaprapūraṇī (Rāmakṛṣṇa), a commentary on  
 ŚD, Ch. S. S., No. 188.



## CHAPTER I

### *The General Problems of Indian Epistemology*

#### THE NATURE OF PRAMĀṆA

Indian Epistemology deals with four questions, viz., what is the nature of pramāṇa, what is the nature of pramā, what is the nature of pramātā, and what is the nature of prameya<sup>1</sup>. It deals with the last two questions in order to throw a light upon the nature of pramā and pramāṇa. They are rather strictly ontological questions which are necessarily connected with epistemology. But the most important question in Indian Epistemology is the question of prāmāṇya. How does the validity (prāmāṇya) of knowledge arise? Or what is the cause of valid knowledge? And how can we determine the validity of knowledge? Or how can the validity of knowledge be known? All the questions of Western Epistemology are involved in the above questions, though they do not present themselves to the Indian thinkers in the same way. Here we shall briefly consider the questions of pramāṇa, pramā, and prāmāṇya.

In this section we shall consider the nature of pramāṇa. Pramāṇa literally means the principal instrument (karaṇa) of valid knowledge (pramā). Vātsyāyana distinguishes pramāṇa from pramātā, prameya, and pramiti. Pramātā is the cognizer of valid knowledge, who is induced to exertion by the desire to acquire or discard the objects of knowledge. Prameya is the object of valid knowledge. Pramiti or pramā is the valid knowledge of the object. And pramāṇa is the principal instru-

<sup>1</sup>pramāṇaṁ pramātā prameyaṁ pramitiṁ iti caturvargenaiva vyavahāraḥ parisamāpyate. NVTT, i, I, I. NM., p. 15.

mental cause of valid knowledge. But what is the real nature of *pramāṇa*? Opinions differ as to this question. Some hold that it is of the nature of apprehension and non-apprehension. Others hold that it is of the nature of apprehension alone. We briefly consider below the different views of *pramāṇa*.

### THE NAIYĀYIKA VIEW

For the production of valid knowledge the cognizing agent (*pramātā*) and the cognized object (*prameya*) both are necessary. Should they be included, then, in *pramāṇa* or instrument of right cognition? They cannot be included in *pramāṇa*, because, in that case, there would not be the fourfold distinction of *pramātā*, or cognizer, *prameya* or cognized object, *pramiti* or valid cognition, and *pramāṇa* or instrument of valid cognition. So, the later Naiyāyikas have defined *pramāṇa* as the entire aggregate of conditions (*kāraṇasāmāgrī*), apart from the cognizing agent (*pramātā*) and the cognized object (*prameya*), which partaking of the nature of both apprehension and non-apprehension, bring about the cognition of an object, which is free from uncertainties and mistakes, and which apprehends the real nature of the object.<sup>1</sup> The earlier Naiyāyikas erroneously defined *pramāṇa* as the entire collocation of circumstances, which, being of the nature of apprehension and non-apprehension both, bring about the uncontradicted and undoubted cognition of an object.<sup>2</sup>

### THE SĀMĀKHYA VIEW

According to the Sāṃkhya, the function of the intellect (*buddhi*) which takes in the form of an object, when it has come into contact with a sense-organ, discriminated by the *manas*, and apperceived by the *ahaṃkāra* or empirical ego, is called *pramāṇa*. This unintelligent psychic mode casts its reflection upon the transcendental self (*puruṣa*) which, being

<sup>1</sup>*kartṛ-karma-vilakṣaṇā saṃśaya-viparyaya-rahitārtha-bodha-vidhāyini bodhā-bodha-svabhāva-sāmāgrī pramāṇam*. NM., p. 15.

<sup>2</sup>*avyabhicāriṇim asandighām arthopalabdhiṃ vidadhati bodhā-bodha-svabhāva-sāmāgrī pramāṇam*. Ibid, p. 12.

thus coloured by the psychic mode, becomes the spectator or seer of all objects. Thus the pure transcendental self is the cognizer (pramātā), the unconscious psychic mode is the instrument of valid cognition (pramāṇa), the reflection of the psychic mode transformed into the form of its object, upon the pure self is valid knowledge (pramā); the object that transforms the function of the intellect into its own form and is ultimately reflected on the conscious self (puruṣa) is called the object of valid knowledge (prameya)<sup>1</sup>.

#### THE NYĀYA CRITICISM OF THE SĀMKNHYA VIEW

The Naiyāyika criticizes this doctrine of pramāṇa from his own standpoint. According to the Sāmkhya that in which the cognition appears or that which is transformed into the form of an object is unintelligent and material buddhi, while that to which the object of knowledge is presented is the intelligent self (puruṣa); the former is the pramāṇa, while the consciousness of the puruṣa, which is due to the reflection of the unintelligent psychic mode on it, is valid knowledge (pramā); so that the pramāṇa and the pramā do not inhere in the same substratum.<sup>2</sup>

#### THE MĪMĀNSAKA VIEW

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka regards a cognition as a means (pramāṇa) and apprehendedness (jñātātā) in the object of cognition produced by the cognition as the result (phala) of pramāṇa. According to him cognition is of the nature of activity, and as activity is always inferred from its result (phala), the activity of cognition or cognitive activity is inferred from its result in the form of apprehendedness or manifestness (prākāṣya) in the nature of its object, and this inferable cognitive activity is the instrument of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). This is the view of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>viśyā-kāra parinatendriyādi-vṛttireva puruṣam anurañjayanti pramāṇam. Ibid, p. 26.

<sup>2</sup>jñānādi-dharmayogaḥ pramāṇaḥ pumsaḥ na vidyate tat-phalam. arthardurānaḥ buddhau nāstīti bhinnādhikaraṇatvaḥ pramāṇa-phalayoḥ. Ibid. <sup>3</sup>phalānumcya jñāna-vyāpāraḥ pramāṇam. Ibid, p. 17.

Pārthasārathimīśra, a Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka, defines *pramāṇa* as the cognition of an object which has not already been cognized, which is free from contradiction and the causes of which are free from defects.<sup>1</sup>

According to Prabhākara direct and immediate apprehension (*anubhūti*) is *pramāṇa*; and it is not inferred from its result in the form of apprehendedness; it is self-luminous. A cognition directly reveals itself and the cognizing self as the subject of cognition or cognizer. It sometimes directly reveals its object as in perception, and sometimes indirectly, as in inference and other kinds of knowledge<sup>2</sup>.

### THE JAINA VIEW

The Jaina also holds that cognition itself is a *pramāṇa*, which apprehends both itself and its object<sup>3</sup>. But the cognition must be of a definite character. According to the Bhāṭṭa, a cognition can be inferred from the apprehendedness (*jñātātā*) in its object. According to the Jaina, a cognition is self-luminous; it apprehends itself directly, and apprehends its object (*svaparaprākāśa*). According to the Naiyāyika, a cognition apprehends its object (*paraprakāśa*), but can never apprehend itself; it is apprehended by some other cognition (*anuvyavasāya*); it is not self-luminous or self-manifesting (*svaprakāśa*) but other-manifesting (*paraprakāśa*). According to Prabhākara, a cognition reveals itself, its object and the self; there is the triple consciousness of the object, the subject, and the cognition in a single cognition (*tripuṭīsamvit*).

### THE BUDDHIST VIEW

According to some Buddhists there is a parallelism between a cognition and its object which arise simultaneously from the same complement of conditions. According to them both objects and ideas, which are momentary, are produced by the same stuff, viz., the matter-stuff and the mind-stuff together.

<sup>1</sup>*kāraṇa-doṣa-bādhaka-jñāna-rahitam agrhita-grāhi-jñānam pramāṇam*. SD., p. 45. <sup>2</sup>*pramāṇam anubhūtiḥ*. PP. p. 42. <sup>3</sup>*sva-paravyavasāyi-jñānam pramāṇam*. PNT., i, 2. IPC., pp. 214-18.

In the production of a cognition the mind-stuff is the material cause (upādānakāraṇa) and the mind-stuff is the auxiliary cause (sahakārikāraṇa), while in the production of an object, the matter-stuff is the material cause, and the mind-stuff is the auxiliary cause. Thus a cognition is produced both by consciousness and by an object ; and an object also is produced both by an object and by consciousness. But the difference between an object and a cognition is due to the different rôles played by the matter-stuff and the mind-stuff in producing them. Thus a cognition simultaneously arising with its object from the same matter-stuff and mind-stuff becomes the apprehender (grāhaka) of the latter (grāhya), and, being in agreement with the object, is called pramāṇa. According to this doctrine neither a cognition is produced by its object, nor is the object produced by a cognition ; they are generated simultaneously out of the same stuff ; and the cognition, being in harmony with its object, is called pramāṇa<sup>1</sup>. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes this doctrine of pramāṇa from the Naiyāyika standpoint. If the object and the cognition are produced at the same moment out of the common stuff, why should the former manifest the latter, and why should they correspond with each other ? They cannot give any answer to it<sup>2</sup>.

According to the Buddhist subjective idealist the formless consciousness is the common stuff of all the determinate cognitions of blue, yellow, and so on ; and when this formless consciousness is modalized by various contents of blue, yellow, and so on, this modalized consciousness or the determinate cognition with a particular form is called pramāṇa.<sup>3</sup> According to this view there are no external objects ; nor is there any permanent self ; there are only ideas or momentary cognitions. How, then, can there be the fourfold distinction of pramātā, pramāṇa, pramiti, and prameya which are said to exhaust the whole of reality ? The Buddhist subjective idealist says that this distinction is possible

<sup>1</sup>anye tulya-sāmagry-adhīnāyor-jñānārthayor-grāhya-grāhaka-bhāvaṃ vadanto bodhaṃ pramāṇam abhyupagaman. NM., p. 15. <sup>2</sup>Ibid, p. 16.

<sup>3</sup>sākāra-vijñānaṃ pramāṇam. Ibid.

even within the stream of cognitions or ideas. A cognition that superimposes upon itself the form of an unreal external object (e.g., blue, yellow, etc.) is called *prameya*; the manifestation of this apparently external object is called *pramiti*; the power or capacity of manifesting it is called *pramāṇa*; and the substrate of this power of manifestation is called *pramātā*; and all these are in one and the same cognition. Hence the distinction among these four factors involved in knowledge is an ideal distinction within one and the same cognition.<sup>1</sup> Thus, according to the Buddhist subjective idealist, though the object of perception (*anubhava*), the agent of perception (*anubhavitā*) and the act of perception (*anubhavana*) are not different from perception itself, still the division of *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, *pramātā*, and *pramiti* is a creation of the imagination.<sup>2</sup> This is the view of a *Yogācāra* school of Buddhism. But the *Vaibhāṣikas* and *Sautrāntikas* are realists; they believe in the real existence of extra-mental objects; the former regard the extramental reality as the object of perception, while the latter regard it as the object of inference. According to the *Vaibhāṣika* an external object, which is perceptible, is the object of valid knowledge (*prameya*); the negation of non-manifestation of the object is valid knowledge (*pramiti*); and the negation of incapacity of manifesting the object is the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). According to the *Sautrāntika* an external object, which is inferred from its cognition, is the *prameya*; the correspondence of the cognition with its object is the *pramāṇa*, and the consciousness of that correspondence between the cognition and the cognized object is the *pramiti*<sup>3</sup>. *Dharmottara* defines right knowledge as the knowledge that is in harmony with its object. A cognition can be known to be in harmony with its object, if it can lead the

<sup>1</sup>*avarūpa-vijñānasyā-satyā-kāra-yuktaṁ prameyaṁ, prameya-prakāśanaṁ pramāṇa-phalaṁ, tat-prakāśana-śakatiḥ pramāṇam. Bhāmati* on SBS, ii, 2. 28. <sup>2</sup>*"nānyo' nūbhāvyo buddhyāsti tasyā nānubhavo' paraḥ. grāhya-grāhaka-vaidhuryāt svayaṁ saiva prakāśate"*. (SDS., ch. II.)

<sup>3</sup>*"ārtha-sārupyātmanā mānam avabhāsātmanā phalamiti" sautrāntikāḥ. anavabhāsa vyāvṛttyā phalaṁ tacca śaktyā mānamiti vaibhāṣikāḥ.*



cognizer to the actual attainment of the object. This harmony of a knowledge with its object is called *pramāṇa*, which consists in the capacity of leading to the actual attainment of the object<sup>1</sup>.

### THE ŚAMKARA-VEDĀNTIST VIEW

The Advaita Vedāntist also regards a cognition as the *pramāṇa*. In fact, according to the Śamkarite, the fourfold distinction of *pramātā*, *pramāṇa*, *pramiti*, and *prameya* is within the eternal consciousness modalized by different determinants. One and the same eternal consciousness or Brahman is differentiated into four kinds of consciousness by four different determinants or limiting conditions (*upādhi*). The cognizing self (*pramātā*) is the consciousness determined by the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) which is a modification of nescience. The instrument of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is the consciousness determined by the mental mode or function of the internal organ. The object of valid knowledge (*prameya*) is the consciousness determined by an empirical object. And the result of the act of valid knowledge (*pramiti*) is the consciousness manifested by the apprehending mental mode or function of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*).<sup>2</sup>

According to the Advaita Vedānta the translucent mobile internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) moves out through the channel of the external sense-organs to an object and is transformed into the form of the object. This moving out of the *antaḥkaraṇa* from the psycho-physical organism to the object is called the *vṛitti* or mode of the *antaḥkaraṇa*; it is an apprehending mental mode; it stands between the organism and the extra-organic object. The so-called object too veils the eternal consciousness. And this veil of nescience is broken by the apprehending mental mode which manifests the

<sup>1</sup>*avisamvādakam jñānam samyag-jñānam. jñānam arthaṁ prāpayat samvādakam ucyate. NBT., p. 3.* <sup>2</sup>*ekameva caitanyam upādhi-bhedāc-caturvidham. tatṛā-ntaḥkaraṇa-viśiṣṭa-caitanyam prāmāṇya-caitanyam. antaḥkaraṇa-vṛttya-vaccinna-caitanyam viśaya-caitanyam. antaḥkaraṇa-vṛttya-bhivyakta-caitanyam phala-caitanyam, ACK., pp. 180-33. VP., pp. 55-56.*

consciousness in the object. Now, the consciousness which is determined by the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa) is called the pramātā; it is confined within the organism. The consciousness determined by the apprehending mental mode standing between the organism and the extra-organic object is called the pramāṇa. The consciousness determined or veiled by the extra-organic empirical object is the prameya. And the consciousness manifested by the apprehending mental mode,—which was so long veiled by the empirical object,—is called the pramiti.<sup>1</sup>

#### THE NATURE OF VALID KNOWLEDGE (PRAMĀ OR PRAMITI)

Pramā means valid knowledge. What is the real nature of pramā? As to this question also there are different views in Indian Philosophy. There are different types of realism, idealism, and pragmatism in Indian Epistemology. These different types of thought define the nature of pramā in different ways. It is beyond the scope of our short treatise on Indian Epistemology to attempt an elaborate treatment of this vast subject. Here we shall simply refer to the different views in Indian Philosophy as regards the nature of valid knowledge (pramā).

#### THE NYĀYA VAIŚEŚIKA VIEW

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṃsaka, the Jaina, the Vaibhāṣika, the Sautrāntika, and the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala are realists, though they differ from one another in many respects. Some Yogācāras are subjective idealists. The Mādhyamika is an absolutist. The Śāṅkara-Vedāntist is an absolute idealist. Rāmānuja is an objective idealist. The Nyāya realism and the Jaina realism are affiliated to pragmatism, so that they may be called realistic pragmatism. The Buddhist realism and idealism both are of a pragmatic type, so that one may be called realistic pragmatism, and the other, subjectivistic or idealistic pragmatism. The

Śaṅkarite absolute idealism also is affiliated to empirical realism and empirical pragmatism. Rāmānuja's objective idealism also is pragmatistic, and it may be termed absolute pragmatism.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika advocates uncritical and naïve realism and believes in the correspondence theory of knowledge. We know the external objects with their qualities, actions, generalities, etc., by sense-perception. That knowledge is valid, which represents the real nature of its object. There is a correspondence between knowledge and its object. When there is a disagreement between the two, the knowledge is invalid. But how can this agreement or disagreement between knowledge and its object be known? Here the Nyāya realism offers a pragmatic test. According to the Nyāya, the validity or invalidity, in other words, the agreement or disagreement of knowledge with its object, can be known only by its practical efficiency or inefficiency. When a knowledge leads to fruitful activity it is valid. When it leads to fruitless activity it is invalid. Thus the Nyāya realism affiliates itself to pragmatism ; it is realistic pragmatism<sup>1</sup>. The problem of the test of truth or the criterion of the validity of knowledge is reserved for the next section. Here we give a few definitions of *pramā* or valid knowledge offered by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣiki realists. Vātsyāyana defines valid knowledge as the cognition of an object in something in which it is, that is, the cognition of an object as it really is.<sup>2</sup> Uddyotakara accepts the same definition. The later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika defines *pramā* as the knowledge of the generic nature as abiding in its own subject.<sup>3</sup> Śivāditya defines *pramā* as the apprehension of the real

<sup>1</sup>*pramāṇato* 'rtha-pratipattau pravṛtti-sāmarthyāt arthavat pramāṇam. NBh., i, 1. <sup>2</sup>*yād-atasmiṁś-tad-iti tad-vyabhicāri. yattu tasmisṁś-taditi tadavyavicāri pratyakṣamiti.* NBh., i, 1, 4. <sup>3</sup>*tadvati tat-prakāraḥ jñānam pramā. atadvati tat-prakāraḥ jñānam apramā. tadabhāvavati tat-prakāraḥ jñānam apramā.*

nature of an object. Udayana defines *pramā* as the true ascertainment of an object. Others define it as the true apprehension of an object.<sup>1</sup>

These Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realistic definitions of *pramā* are based upon dualistic metaphysics. They presuppose the existence of the knowing self and the known object. And they recognize the correspondence between the *pramā* and the object of *pramā* or *prameya*. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not define the exact nature of the correspondence between the two. It is a fact of experience and so cannot be challenged. It is proved by its practical usefulness. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism is practical in its attitude towards the problem of epistemology. The extra-mental reality is a fact of experience. It is real, and so cannot be idealised. It is exactly represented by valid knowledge. And this correspondence too between *pramā* and *prameya* is a fact of experience. It cannot be explained away. It is proved only by its pragmatic utility.

#### THE JAINA VIEW

The Jaina agrees with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in his theory of valid knowledge (*pramā*). He also advocates realistic pragmatism. For him, valid knowledge (*pramā*) is the determinate cognition of itself and its object, and invalid knowledge (*apramā*) is the determinate cognition of an object in something in which it is not, that is,—the determinate cognition of an object as different from what it really is<sup>2</sup>. And valid knowledge (*pramā*) is capable of practical efficiency in the form of the selection of good and the avoidance of evil.<sup>3</sup>

The validity of a cognition consists in its agreement with the object cognized, and the invalidity of a cognition consists in its disagreement with the object cognized. And both the validity and the invalidity of knowledge arise from extraneous

<sup>1</sup>tattvānubhavaḥ *pramā*. SP., 59. *mitiḥ samyak-paricchittiḥ*. NKS., iv, 5. *yathārtho'-nubhavaḥ pramā*. NVTP., i, 1, 1. NKS., iv, 1.  
<sup>2</sup>eva-para-vyavasāyi jñānaṁ *pramāṇam*, PNT., sūtras, 27. <sup>3</sup>hitāhita-prāpti-parihāra-samarthaṁ hi *pramāṇam* tato jñānam eva tat. PMS., sūtra 2. PNT., sūtra 3.

circumstances, viz., the special virtues (guṇa) and the defects and imperfections (doṣa) respectively in their originating causes. But they are self-evident or determined by themselves in the case of habituated cognitions, and they are known from extraneous circumstances, viz., the knowledge of harmony or disharmony, and the presence or absence of contradicting experience, in the case of unhabituated or initial cognitions.<sup>1</sup>

#### THE MIMĀMSAKA VIEW

The Prābhākara defines valid knowledge as direct and immediate apprehension, which is different from recollection (smṛti). Recollection is invalid as it depends upon the subconscious impression left by past experience. All cognitions *per se* are valid. Prabhākara says ; "It is strange indeed how a cognition can be said to apprehend an object, and yet be invalid"<sup>2</sup>. The inherent validity of a cognition is disproved only when it is found to be not in agreement with the real nature of its object<sup>3</sup>. Here Prabhākara means by pramāṇa valid cognition, not the means of valid cognition. He identifies the pramāṇa with pramā. According to him all cognitions as cognitions are valid ; their invalidity is due to their disagreement with the real nature of their objects, so that wrongness does not belong to the cognitions themselves but to the things cognized. Siddhasena, though a Jaina logician, accepts the same view. He says that perception is never wrong, since it is always recognized as valid ; to speak of it as valid, and at the same time, as wrong would be a contradiction in terms<sup>4</sup>. \*

Kumārila also accepts the view of Prabhākara as to the nature of valid knowledge. According to him the validity of a cognition consists in its being an apprehension ; this validity can be set aside only by such discrepancies as the disagreement of the cognition with the real nature of its object and so forth. Pārthasārathimiśra, though a follower of Kumārila, puts

<sup>1</sup>jñānasya prameyā-vyabhicāritvaṁ prāmāṇyam iti. tad-itarat-tvaprāmāṇyam iti tad-ubhayam utpattau parata eva jnaptau tu svataḥ parata-sceṭi. PNT, sūtras 18-20. <sup>2</sup>Bṛhatī. <sup>3</sup>pramāṇam anubhūtiḥ, sā smṛter anyathā, na sā smṛtiḥ. na pramāṇam smṛtiḥ pūrva-pratipatti-vyapekṣaṇāt. PP., p. 42. <sup>4</sup>NA., verse 5.

forward the following definition of valid knowledge. A valid cognition is the cognition of an object which has not already been apprehended, which is free from contradiction and which arises from causes free from imperfections.<sup>1</sup> A valid cognition is the cognition of an object which has not already been apprehended, truly representing the real nature of the object<sup>2</sup>. Thus, according to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka, knowledge, in order to be valid, must truly represent the real nature of its object, and must be characterised by novelty, and must be generated by causes which are untainted by imperfections. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka theory of valid knowledge (pramā) too is realistic.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka differs from the Naiyāyika in two respects. In the first place, according to the former, the validity of knowledge is self-evident, and the invalidity of knowledge is inferred from the knowledge of imperfections in its causes, and the knowledge of its disagreement with its object, while, according to the latter, both validity and invalidity of knowledge are inferred from fruitful and fruitless activity respectively. In the second place, the former does not appeal to the pragmatic test, while the latter applies the pragmatic criterion to knowledge. The former advocates realism, pure and simple, while the latter advocates realistic pragmatism. According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka, truth is its own criterion ; it is self-evident or self-validating ; it does not require any extraneous evidence for its validity ; it is its own light ; it cannot be shown by any other light of evidence (cf. Spinoza) ; but invalidity or falsity of knowledge cannot be known by itself ; it can be known through the knowledge of the discrepancy of the knowledge with its object, and the knowledge of imperfections in its originating causes, e. g., sense-organs, etc. According to the Naiyāyika, on the other hand, both truth and error can be proved only by fulfilled and unfulfilled activity respectively ; both validity and invalidity

<sup>1</sup>kāraṇa-doṣa-bādhaka-jñāna-rahitam agrhita-grāhi-jñānam pramāṇam. SD., p. 45. <sup>2</sup>yathārtham agrhita-grāhi-jñānam pramāṇam iti. Ibid. p. 45.

of knowledge are not inherent characteristics of knowledge : they are the adventitious marks of knowledge borrowed from extraneous circumstances<sup>1</sup>.

#### THE ADVAITA VEDĀNTIST VIEW

According to Śaṅkara Brahman alone is the ontological reality, and the other objects are superimposed on the eternal consciousness by nescience, and have only an empirical existence (*vyavahārikasattā*) as distinguished from ontological existence (*pāramārthikastā*). So the Advaita Vedāntist distinguishes between empirical validity and ontological validity. The knowledge of one undifferentiated consciousness or Brahman has ontological validity, and the knowledge of empirical objects or the world of appearance (*prapañca*) has empirical validity. A knowledge is empirically valid if it represents the nature of its object, and is not contradicted by any other valid cognition. The Advaita Vedāntist does not necessarily exclude recollection (*smṛti*) from valid knowledge. The above definition of valid knowledge is common to both apprehension (*anubhūti*) and recollection (*smṛti*). A valid apprehension (*anubhūti*) is the knowledge of an object, which has not already been apprehended by a previous cognition, —and which is not contradicted by a subsequent valid knowledge.<sup>2</sup>

The Advaita Vedāntist agrees with the Mīmāṃsaka, that the validity of knowledge is its inherent character, and that the invalidity of knowledge is an adventitious mark of knowledge due to extraneous circumstances. The validity of knowledge arises from itself, and is known by itself. But invalidity of knowledge arises from extraneous circumstances, and is known through them. The Advaita Vedāntist, however, differs from the Mīmāṃsaka in the fact that he also appeals to the pragmatic criterion. He defines validity of knowledge

<sup>1</sup>jñāna-svarasād eva viśayasya tathātvam adhyavasiyate, tadanyathā-  
tvaṁ tu kāraṇa-doṣa-jñānād arthā-nyathātva-jñānād vāvagantavyam.  
SD., p. 50. <sup>2</sup>pramā dvividhā, pāramārthikī vyavahārikī ceti. ACK.,  
p. 129. smṛiti-vyāvṛttaṁ pramātvam anadhigatā bādhita-rtha-viśaya-jñānat-  
vam, smṛiti-sādhāraṇantu abādhitā rtha-viśaya-jñānatvaṁ. VP., pp. 19-20.

as the character of a cognition of an object as it really is, which is conducive to fruitful activity.<sup>1</sup>

Thus the Advaita Vedāntist advocates the doctrine of empirical realism as opposed to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of ontological realism of a pragmatic type ; it may be termed pragmatic empirical realism or empirical realistic pragmatism. And this doctrine is affiliated to the main Vedāntist doctrine of absolute idealism, according to which, Brahman, the absolute, or the one eternal consciousness alone, is ultimately real. This absolute idealism of Śāṅkara is opposed to the objective idealism of Rāmānuja.

#### THE SĀMKNHYA VIEW

According to the Sāṅkhya valid knowledge is the consciousness of the self, which is due to the reflection on the self, of the mental mode, which has, for its object, something which has not already been apprehended, and which is free from doubts and discrepancies.<sup>2</sup>

According to this view both validity and invalidity of knowledge are the inherent characteristics of knowledge ; and they can be known by themselves. A cognition is either intrinsically valid or intrinsically invalid. Its validity or invalidity is not due to extraneous circumstances. The Sāṅkhya theory of knowledge too is realistic. It is based on metaphysical dualism. The validity of knowledge consists in the correspondence of knowledge-forms with the object-forms. But how can knowledge copy or represent the reality ? The Sāṅkhya holds that the transparent unintelligent intellect (buddhi), in which the sattva is the predominant factor and the tamas is in the minimum, is transformed into the form of an object which is conveyed to it through the medium of external sense-organs, the central sensory or the

<sup>1</sup>pramāṇānāṁ prāmāṇyaṁ syato evotpādyate jñāyate ca. smṛty-anubhava-sādhāraṇaṁ saṁvādi-pravṛtṭy-anukūlaṁ tadvaṁ tat-prakāra-kā-jñānatvaṁ prāmāṇyam. VP., pp. 332-33. viśaṁvādi-pravṛtṭyādi-līṅgākā-numityādi-viśaya itī parata evā-prāmāṇyam utpadyate jñāyate ca. VP., p. 338. <sup>2</sup>asandighā-viparītā-nadhigata-viśayā cittavṛtṭiḥ bodhasca pauruṣeya phalaṁ pramā, STK., 4.



mind (manas), and the empirical ego (ahaṁkāra), and is intelligized by the transcendental self (puruṣa) which comes to have a knowledge of the object owing to the reflection of the intelligized function of the intellect on itself.<sup>1</sup>

### THE BUDDHIST VIEW

The Buddhist identifies pramāṇa with pramā. According to the Buddhist realist a valid knowledge is a cognition which is in harmony with its object, and this harmony between a cognition and its object is known by fruitful activity or the actual attainment of the object. Thus the Buddhist realist advocates realistic pragmatism. But the Buddhist differs from the Naiyāyika in that only the validity of knowledge, according to him, is due to, and known by, fruitful activity, but that the invalidity of knowledge is inherent in itself, not being due to extraneous circumstances.<sup>2</sup>

According to the Buddhist subjective idealist also the validity of knowledge consists in the harmony of experience. Dr. B. N. Seal puts it thus : "The ultimate criterion of Truth is found, not in mere cognitive presentation, but in the correspondence between the cognitive and the practical activity of the self, which together are supposed to form the circuit of consciousness. That knowledge is valid which prompts an activity ending in fruition... Truth is not self-evidence, not the agreement between ideas, nor the agreement of the idea with the reality beyond, if any, for this cannot be attained direct, but the harmony of experience (saṁvāda), which is implied when the volitional reaction, that is prompted by a cognition, and that completes the circuit of consciousness, meets with fruition, i.e., realizes its immediate end".<sup>3</sup> This doctrine of pramā may be termed subjectivistic or idealistic pragmatism as distinguished from realistic pragmatism. This distinction also applies to the realistic pragmatism of the Buddhist realist, the Jaina, and the Naiyāyika, and the subjectivistic or idealistic pragmatism of the Buddhist subjective idealist.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>IPC., Ch. XII. <sup>2</sup>avisamvādakam jñānam samyag-jñānam. jñānam svayaṁ pradarśitam artham prāpayat samvādakam ucyate. p. 217 NBT., p. 3. <sup>3</sup>PSAH., pp. 244-45. <sup>4</sup>Perry, *The Present Philosophical Tendencies*.

## THE TESTS OF TRUTH : THE DIFFERENT THEORIES OF VALIDITY

The different theories of the test or truth or *prāmānya* may be grouped under four heads : (1) The *Sāṃkhya* holds that both the validity and invalidity of cognitions are inherent in themselves. (2) The *Naiyāyika* holds that both of them are adventitious, owing their origin to other extraneous circumstances. (3) The Buddhist holds that cognitions are intrinsically invalid, and that they owe their validity to other extraneous circumstances.

## CRITICISM OF THE SĀMKHYA DOCTRINE

(4) The *Mīmāṃsaka* and the *Advaita Vedāntist* hold that cognitions are intrinsically valid, but that their invalidity is due to other extrinsic circumstances.<sup>1</sup>

Does the *Sāṃkhya* mean that one and the same cognition is both valid and invalid ? Or does it mean that some cognitions are valid and others are invalid ? The first view is self-contradictory. The second view also is impossible. What determines the validity of some cognitions, and the invalidity of other cognitions ? Both of them are of the nature of consciousness ; and no other circumstance is admitted by the *Sāṃkhya* to determine the validity of some cognitions and the invalidity of others. Take, for instance, the cognition of silver in a nacre. Is it valid or invalid ? If it is cognized as valid, why does it not lead to the actual attainment of silver ? If it is cognized as invalid, why does it induce the cognizing agent to exert himself to get the silver ? Hence the *Sāṃkhya* doctrine of validity or invalidity of knowledge cannot be maintained.<sup>2</sup>

## CRITICISM OF THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, a *Naiyāyika*, refutes the Buddhist view in the following manner. It cannot be held that cognitions are inherently invalid, but that they derive their validity from

<sup>1</sup>*pramāṇatvā-pramāṇatve svataḥ sāmkyāḥ samāsritāḥ prathamam vedavādināḥ. naiyāikāste parataḥ saugatā-ścaramam svataḥ. pramāṇatvam svataḥ prāhuḥ parataḥ-cāpramāṇatām. SDS., p. 232 VPS., 100 ; SD., p. 20 ; NM., p. 160. <sup>2</sup>VPS., p. 100 ; NM., p. 160.*

extraneous circumstances. If cognitions were inherently invalid, they could not lead to exertion for the attainment of their objects. Moreover, the invalidity of a cognition depends, for its production, upon the defects of its causes, and it is recognised as such only when it is contradicted by another valid cognition. Thus the invalidity of a cognition depends, for its production, upon certain defects in its causes, and it depends, for its ascertainment, on the sublating cognition which contradicts it. So a cognition cannot be regarded as intrinsically invalid. It has been argued by some that the invalidity of a cognition is not due to the fact that it is produced by certain defects in its causes, but that it has no real object for its objective basis. But this argument is invalid. Many invalid cognitions such as doubtful and illusory perceptions have a reality for their objective basis. Hence, cognitions cannot, in themselves, be, invalid<sup>1</sup>.

#### CRITICISM OF THE NAIYĀYIKA DOCTRINE

The Mīmāṃsaka criticises the Nyāya view in the following manner. According to the Naiyāyika validity and invalidity do not belong to cognitions by their very nature, but they are due to extraneous circumstances. By the validity of a cognition he means the agreement of a cognition with its object, or the manifestation by a cognition of the real nature of its object. The Mīmāṃsaka asks: 'Does the validity of a cognition depend upon extraneous circumstances, (1) for its own origination, (2) or for the production of its effect, (3) or for the determination of its validity<sup>2</sup>? (1) On the first alternative, does the validity of a cognition depend, for its origination, merely upon the essential nature of its causes, or upon some special virtues (guṇa) inherent in its causes<sup>3</sup>? If the validity of a cognition is said to originate merely in the essential nature of its causes, then the Mīmāṃsaka has no objection to this view. He himself admits that a valid cognition arises from the

<sup>1</sup>artha-tathātva-prakāśakaṁ hi pramāṇam. tasya sva-prameyā-vyabhi-cāritvaṁ nāma prāmāṇyam. NM, p. 160. <sup>2</sup>parāpekṣā utpattau vā syāt sva-kārya-karaṇe vā prāmāṇya-niscaye vā. NM., p. 160. <sup>3</sup>utpattau kāraka-svarūpa-mātrāpekṣā tadatirikta-tad-gata-guṇā-pekṣā vā. NM., p. 160.

essential nature of its causes untainted by defects, whereas an invalid cognition arises from its causes impaired by certain defects ; otherwise there would be nothing to regulate the effectuation of valid and invalid cognitions. But this dependence of the validity of a cognition upon the causes of the cognition does not, in any way, stand in the way of its self-validity (*svataḥprāmāṇya*). But, if it be argued, as the Naiyāyika does, that the validity of a cognition not only depends upon the nature of its causes, but upon certain special virtues (*guṇa*) of its causes, then the Mīmāṃsaka objects to it. The so-called special virtues of the sense-organs and the like can never be known through any source of valid knowledge. The validity of perception depends merely upon the essential nature of the sense-organs, free from all taint of imperfection, but not upon any special virtues of the sense-organs. If there were three kinds of cognitions, viz., valid cognitions, invalid cognitions, and cognitions, which are neither valid nor invalid, then they would be accounted for by three kinds of causes. The valid cognitions would have for their origin certain special virtues (*guṇa*) in their causes ; the invalid cognitions would have for their origin certain defects (*doṣa*) in their causes ; and the epistemologically neutral cognitions would have for their origin merely the essential nature of their causes, which are neither endowed with special virtues nor tainted with any defects. But, in fact, we have not three kinds of knowledge, valid, invalid, and neutral. We find in our experience only two kinds of knowledge, valid and invalid. Invalid knowledge, no doubt, arises from causes impaired by certain defects. Valid knowledge, therefore, must be held to be produced by its cause free from all defects. It is needless to assume certain special virtues (*guṇa*) in the causes of a cognition to account for its validity. Hence cognitions owe their validity not to any special virtues (*guṇa*) in their causes but to their essential nature ; but they owe their invalidity to certain defects in their causes. Nor does the validity of a cognition depend upon any extraneous condition to produce its own effect. The effect of valid cognition is the manifestation of its object ;

practical activity or exertion for the attainment or avoidance of the object depends upon the desire of the cognizing self. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka holds that a cognition, in order to manifest its object, need not be cognized by itself as the Jaina and Prabhākara hold, nor by another cognition (*anuvyavasāya*) as the Naiyāyika holds. A valid cognition does not depend upon any condition to produce its effect in the shape of manifesting its object. Nor does the validity of a cognition depend upon any extraneous condition for its own ascertainment (*prāmāṇyaniscaya*), for no such condition is possible. If the ascertainment of the validity of a cognition depends upon an extraneous condition, does it depend upon the cognition of the special virtues of its causes (*kāraṇaguṇajñāna*), or does it depend upon the cognition of the absence of a contradictory cognition (*bādhakābhāvajñāna*), or does it depend upon the correspondence of the cognition with its object (*saṁvāda*)? There can be no knowledge of the special virtues of the causes of a cognition, because there are no special virtues in the causes of a cognition except their essential nature. Nor can the ascertainment of the validity of a knowledge depend upon the knowledge of the absence of a contradicting cognition. For, if it is so, is the absence of a contradicting cognition known just at the time of determining the validity of a knowledge or at a subsequent time? Very often a contradictory cognition does not arise at the time of the cognition which it contradicts, but afterwards. And, then, again, the absence of a contradictory cognition cannot be known exhaustively by us because we are not omniscient. Hence the validity of a knowledge cannot be ascertained by the cognition of the absence of a contradicting cognition. Nor can the validity of knowledge be determined by harmony of experience (*saṁvāda*). What is harmony? The Naiyāyika says that it is the agreement of a cognition with the cognition of fruitful activity initiated by it. It cannot be held that the validity of the first cognition of an object, which prompts activity, is determined by its agreement with the subsequent cognition of fruitful activity. For, unless the validity of the latter cognition is determined, how can it determine the validity of the first cognition? But how can

the validity of the cognition of fruitful activity be determined? Is it determined by another cognition of fruitful activity? If it were so, then the validity of that cognition too would be determined by another cognition of fruitful activity and so on to infinity. And, if the validity of the cognition of fruitful activity were said to be determined by the first cognition, then there would be a circular reasoning: the validity of the first cognition would be determined by the cognition of fruitful activity, and the validity of the cognition of fruitful activity would be determined by the first cognition that prompts activity. And if the validity of the cognition of fruitful activity is held to be determined by itself, then what is the harm of regarding the validity of the first cognition as self-valid? Hence, the Mīmāṃsaka concludes that the validity or invalidity of a cognition is not determined by its agreement or disagreement with the subsequent cognition of fruitful activity prompted by the initial cognition, but that the invalidity of a cognition is determined by the cognition of a contradictory cognition or of any defects in the causes of cognition, though the validity of a cognition is determined by itself, not by any other condition different from itself.

#### THE ADVAITA VEDĀNTIST VIEW

The Advaita Vedāntist agrees with the Mīmāṃsaka that, the validity of knowledge is self-evident, but that the invalidity of knowledge is due to extraneous circumstances. Dharmarājādhvarīndra defines valid knowledge as the cognition of an object as it really is, which is conducive to fruitful activity<sup>1</sup>. A valid cognition is produced by the general conditions of consciousness free from all defects; it does not depend upon any special virtues in excess of the general conditions of consciousness, because there is no special virtue common to different kinds of valid knowledge. The validity of a cognition is self-evident; its apprehension does not depend upon adventitious circumstances. By the self-evidence of the validity of

<sup>1</sup>samvādi-pravṛtṭy-anukūlaṁ tadvaṭi tatprakāra-jñānatvaṁ prāmāṇyam.  
VP., p. 333.

knowledge the Advaita Vedāntist means that in the absence of any defect in the conditions of knowledge the self apprehends the cognizing mental mode which is the substrate of its validity as well. But the invalidity of knowledge is not produced by the general conditions of consciousness, for, in that case, there would be no distinction between valid and invalid knowledge. Invalid knowledge is produced by certain defects in the causal conditions of knowledge, while valid knowledge is produced by the general conditions of knowledge, free from all defects. And though the validity of knowledge is self-evident, the invalidity of knowledge is inferred from unfruitful activity. Hence the invalidity of knowledge is both produced by adventitious conditions, viz., defects in the causes of cognitions and apprehended through the extraneous circumstances of unfruitful activity prompted by it<sup>1</sup>. Thus the Advaita Vedāntist differs from the Mīmāṃsaka only in his appeal to the pragmatic test.

#### THE NAIYĀYIKA DEFENCE OF HIS OWN POSITION

The Naiyāyika argues that the validity of a cognition is ascertained by fruitful activity (*pravṛttisāmarthyā*). What is *pravṛttisāmarthyā* which determines the validity of knowledge? Some hold that it means a subsequent cognition following upon the first cognition of an object<sup>2</sup>. Others hold that it means a detailed cognition of an object (*viśeṣadarśana*). But both these interpretations are wrong. Vātsyāyana explains it as the fulfilment of the activity prompted by a cognition. According to him, *pravṛtti* means effort or activity, and *sāmarthyā* means fulfilment of, or attainment of fruition by, activity; so *pravṛttisāmarthyā* means the cognition of activity ending in fruition, or fruitful activity<sup>3</sup>.

The Mīmāṃsaka has brought the charge of infinite regress against the Naiyāyika. What determines the validity of the cognition of fruitful activity? If it were determined by

<sup>1</sup>*doṣa-sahakṛta-jñāna-sāmāgari-mātra-grāhyatvaṃ jñaptau prāmāṇyasya svataṣṭvam. Śikhāmaṇi on VP., p. 338. <sup>2</sup>pūrva-pratyayā-pekṣottarā samvit pravṛttisāmarthyam. NM., p. 172. <sup>3</sup>arthakriyākhyā-phala-jñānameva pravṛttisāmarthyam. NM., p. 172.*

another cognition of fruitful activity, then the validity of that cognition too would be determined by another cognition of fruitful activity and so on to infinity. To this the Naiyāyika replies that the above argument is quite irrelevant. There is no need of examining the validity of the cognition of fruitful activity. All cognitions do not require an examination of their validity. In the cognition of fruitful activity the end has been realized ; and so there is no need of examining its validity. Thus there is no infinite regress<sup>1</sup>. Moreover, there is no doubt as to the cognition of fruitful activity, and, consequently, there is no need of determining its validity. When we perceive water in the rays of the sun, we have a doubt in our minds whether really there is water or not. Hence its validity or invalidity is determined by fruitful or unfruitful activity. But when we are in the midst of water and make use of it, we have no doubt at all as to the cognition of fruitful activity (e.g., drinking, bathing, etc.). And as the cognition of fruitful activity is undoubted, it does not depend upon any other condition for the determination of its validity. The Mīmāṃsaka has asked : wherein does the cognition of fruitful activity differ from the first cognition which prompts activity so that the former determines the validity of the latter? The Naiyāyika replies that the first cognition is doubtful ; and that there is no certainty in the first cognition whether it agrees with reality or not. But the cognition of fruitful activity is undoubted in character ; it unmistakably proves the correspondence of the cognition with its object. When we are in the midst of water, and drink it and bathe in it, there cannot be the least doubt in our minds as to the validity of the cognition of water ; for these actions are never possible if the cognition is invalid<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup>phalajñāne tu siddha-prayojanatvāt prāmāṇya-parīkṣaiva nāstīti kuto'navasthā. NM., p. 172. <sup>2</sup>Ibid.



## CHAPTER II

### *The Different Theories of the Value of Indeterminate and Determinate Perception*

The different Indian theories may be classed under four heads. According to the Buddhists indeterminate perception alone is valid, since it is a pure and immediate experience devoid of all forms and categories ; and all determinate cognitions are invalid, since they have for their objects unreal forms of imagination. According to the Jainas, on the other hand, determinate perception alone is valid, since it is determinate and certain ; and indeterminate perception is invalid, since it is not possible. According to the Neo-Nyāya Vaiśeṣika indeterminate perception is neither valid nor invalid,—it has no epistemological value at all,—since it is a pure, immediate, amorphous and non-relational experience ; and determinate perception alone is valid. According to the earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā (both Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara) and Advaita Vedānta both indeterminate perception and determinate perception are valid.

#### THE VALUE OF INDETERMINATE PERCEPTION (NIRVIKALPA PRATYKSHA)

##### THE BUDDHIST VIEW : INDETERMINATE PERCEPTION ALONE IS VALID.

The Buddhists define perception as a non-erroneous presentation devoid of all forms or determinations. Perception is the immediate apprehension of an object in its uniqueness, unassociated with names<sup>1</sup>. Thus the Buddhists regard indeterminate cognition alone as perception and deny the perceptual character of determinate cognition. According to them indeterminate cognition alone is valid, since it apprehends the uniqueness or individual physiognomy of an object (svalakṣaṇa), devoid of all qualifications and determinations.

<sup>1</sup>kalpanāpōḍham abhrāntam pratyakṣam. abhilāpa-saṃsarga-yogya-pratibhāsa-pratitih kalpanā tayā rahitam. tasya viśayaḥ svalakṣaṇam. NB., pp. 11, 13 & 21.

But determinate cognition as such is invalid, because determinations (vikalpa) are not real forms of objects but ideal constructions of the mind superimposed upon indeterminate and unqualified objects. Indeterminate cognition is purely presentative, while determinate cognition is presentative-representative. In indeterminate cognition an object is immediately presented to us through a sense-organ, as it really is in itself in its uniqueness and specific individuality. In determinate cognition an object is not only presented to us through a sense-organ, but also recognized and identified by us and it is also associated with a name. So in determinate cognition there is the presentative knowledge of an object together with the memory of its name. Hence it is not regarded by the Buddhists as perceptual or presentative in character. And it is not regarded as valid, since it manifests an object associated with its name, which does not enter into the real constitution of the object. The value of determinate cognition will be discussed later on.

#### THE JAINA VIEW : INDETERMINATE PERCEPTION IS INVALID AND NON-EXISTENT

The Jainas, unlike all other schools of Indian philosophers, deny the existence of indeterminate perception preceding the final stage of determinate perception. The Buddhists hold that an object is directly known in its uniqueness by indeterminate perception, and determinate perception is a categorized knowledge of the object involving the application of mental categories, and as such cannot truly manifest the presentative character of the object. The Jainas, on the other hand, hold, that an object is directly revealed with all its qualities and relations by determinate perception ; and that there is no need of indeterminate sense-materials to which mental categories are applied to develop determinate perception. According to the Jainas not only objects are revealed by perception but also their relations to one another. They believe with Herbert Spencer that there are not only feelings of objects but also the feelings of relations. Relations are not imported into the indeterminate sense-materials, or

in Kantian Language, 'the manifold of intuitions' from within, in the form of forms and categories. They are there from the very beginning embedded in the perception of objects. The Jainas regard determinate cognition and all other forms of cognition which represent the relations among objects as perceptual in character. According to them the bare indeterminate perception of an object devoid of all its relations to other things and qualities is a psychological myth,—a pure abstraction. Thus according to the Jainas determinate perception alone is valid, indeterminate perception being a psychological abstraction. The Jaina criticism of the Buddhist theory of indeterminate perception will be considered in detail in the next section<sup>1</sup>.

#### THE ŚĀBDIKA VIEW : NO INDETERMINATE PERCEPTION

Bhartrhari and other Śābdikas hold that an object is identical with its name, and that therefore when an object is apprehended, it is apprehended along with its name. There can be no thought without language. Even the dumb and children perceive objects along with their names known in their previous births. Hence there can be no nameless or indeterminate perceptions of objects unassociated with their names, as the Buddhists suppose<sup>2</sup>.

Thus the Jainas and the Śābdikas do not admit the possibility of indeterminate perception. Only they strike a discordant note. All other systems of Indian philosophy believe in the reality of indeterminate perception. Only the Neo-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards it as neither valid nor invalid. But all other schools of Indian thinkers recognize the validity of indeterminate perception.

#### THE NEO-NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA VIEW : INDETERMINATE PERCEPTION IS NEITHER VALID NOR INVALID

According to the Neo-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika indeterminate perception is the mere apprehension of an object with its qualifications without their mutual connection ; it does not

<sup>1</sup>PKM., pp. 8—11. 'naso'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdā-nugamādṛte. anuviddham iva jñānaṁ sarvaṁ śabdena gamyate. NVT., p. 83.

recognize its object as a qualified thing and its qualifications as qualifications and the relation between the two<sup>1</sup>. Indeterminate perception apprehends an object and its generic nature as separate from each other, (e. g., a mere "pot" and "mere potness") without any mutual connection; it is imperceptible<sup>2</sup>. Indeterminate perception is devoid of all connection with names, generic nature, etc; it involves no relations and categories. Determinate perception is the apprehension of the relations between the qualified object and its qualifications *viz*, name, genus, etc<sup>3</sup>. Thus indeterminate perception is an undifferentiated and nonrelational mode of apprehension, while determinate perception is a relational and synthetic apprehension of an object. In indeterminate perception we are merely conscious of the terms of relations in its object, *viz*, generic characters, specific characters and so forth; but we are not conscious of the relations among the terms. Indeterminate perception apprehends an object and its qualifications as mere *thats* and not as *whats* while determinate perception apprehends them not only as mere *thats* but also as *whats*. In the language of William James, in indeterminate perception we have a "knowledge of acquaintance" with the "bare immediate natures" without their relations, while in determinate perception we have a "knowledge about" them and their relations *inter se*.

The Buddhists regard indeterminate perception alone as valid, for it apprehends an object in its uniqueness. The Neo-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, however, regards it as neither valid nor invalid; it has no epistemological value at all; epistemologically it is blank or colourless. And the reason is this. Valid knowledge (*pramā*) consists in the knowledge of an object as it is; it is the knowledge of the generic nature as abiding in its own subject. For instance, to know a "pot" (*ghaṭa*) to be as such is valid knowledge inasmuch as "potness" (*ghaṭatva*) which is a generic nature really abides in the individual pot which is its subject. Invalid knowledge (*apramā*) consists in

<sup>1</sup>*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-sambandhā-navagāhī jñānam.* TSD., p. 42.

<sup>2</sup>SM., pp. 253—54.

<sup>3</sup>*nāma-jātyādi-viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-sambandhā-vagāhī jñānam.* Ibid.

the knowledge of an object as it is not ; it is the knowledge of the generic nature as abiding in the subject of another generic nature. For instance, to know a "pearl" to be a piece of "silver" is invalid knowledge inasmuch as this knowledge apprehends the generic nature "silverness" as abiding in a "pearl", which is not its subject<sup>1</sup>. Indeterminate perception is neither valid nor invalid inasmuch as it does not apprehend the relations among the 'object' and its 'generic nature'. A purely non-relational immediate experience can have no epistemological value at all, since it does not relate the terms it apprehends, and since validity or invalidity of knowledge consists in relating the terms apprehended rightly or wrongly. The Neo-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of indeterminate perception may be contrasted with the doctrine of pure immediate experience in the western philosophy. The western immediatism makes too much of immediate amorphous experience, which senses the reality in itself, and discredits the relational mediate experience. Truth or falsehood, according to the Neo-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, is a predicate of the relational structure of knowledge. It cannot be a predicate of direct, presentative, immediate experience which is purely nonrelational in character. In this matter the Neo-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine substantially differs from the Buddhist doctrine of immediatism, according to which, direct, immediate, indeterminate perception is valid, since it apprehends an object in its richness of individuality, while indirect, mediate, determinate perception is invalid, since it imports subjective forms and categories or mental concepts into the indeterminate sense-materials directly given by an object, and thus gives us a distorted, categorised or conceptual knowledge of the object. In the language of William James, indeterminate perception, according to the Buddhists, is a living or sympathetic acquaintance "with things, while determinate perception is a "knowledge about" them which "touches only the outer surface of reality". The Neo-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, however, does not postulate the non-existence of indeterminate per-

<sup>1</sup>na pramā nāpi bhramah syān nirvikalpakam.

BhP., i, 135.

ception as the Jaina does, but it simply deprives it of all epistemological value : it grants it a psychological existence but denies its validity or invalidity.

Gāgābhata, a Mīmāṃsaka philosopher, also recognizes the neutral character of indeterminate perception which is regarded as neither valid nor invalid.<sup>1</sup>

#### THE OLDER NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA DOCTRINE : INDETERMINATE PERCEPTION IS VALID

The older Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika differs from the Neo-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in the critical estimate of indeterminate perception. According to the former, indeterminate perception, like determinate perception, can be both valid and invalid ; it is valid when it is in agreement with the real nature of its object, and it is invalid when it is in disagreement with the real nature of its object<sup>2</sup>. But, according to the latter, indeterminate perception is neither valid nor invalid. *Prāśastapāda* avers that the indeterminate perception of an object with its generic and specific natures but without their mutual connection is a valid cognition ; it is the means (*pramāṇa*) of valid determinate cognition, but no other cognition is a means (*pramāṇa*) of valid indeterminate cognition, because it is not the result of any other cognition<sup>3</sup>. When indeterminate perception is regarded as valid knowledge (*pramā*), the intercourse between its object and a sense-organ is to be regarded as an instrument of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*), and when determinate perception is regarded as valid knowledge (*pramā*), indeterminate cognition is to be regarded as an instrument of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*)<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> *nirvikalpasya tu bhrama-pramo-bhaya-bahirbhūtatvam evākare vaktavyam. Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi, p. 11. Ch. S.S.* <sup>2</sup> *nirvikalpakam avikalpakam vā yad atasmiṁ tad iti jñānam utpadyate tad vyabhicāri. NM., p. 88.*

<sup>3</sup> *sāmānya-viśeṣa-jñānotpattau avibhaktam. ālocanamātraṁ pratyakṣaṁ pramāṇam aśmin nānyat pramāṇā-ntaram asti aphalarūpatvāt.*

PBH., p. 187 ; NK., pp. 198—99.

<sup>4</sup> *yadā nirvikalpaṁ sāmānya-viśeṣa-jñānaṁ phalaṁ tade-ndriyārtha-samnikarṣaṁ pramāṇam—yadā viśeṣa-jñānaṁ phalaṁ tadā sāmānya-viśeṣa-locanaṁ pramāṇam. NK., p. 199.*

THE MIMĀṂSAKA VIEW : INDETERMINATE PERCEPTION IS  
VALID AND SELF-EVIDENT

According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika indeterminate perception is imperceptible. But it must be regarded as valid since without it there can be no determinate perception. Determinate perception presupposes the perception of its object and its determinations which are apprehended by indeterminate perception, but not as related to each other.

The Prābhākara holds that a person has a direct and immediate cognition of an object in its pure unqualified form, when it comes into contact with his sense-organs, and when his mind is fixed on this object alone and not on other objects, and this direct and immediate apprehension is valid because it apprehends itself. Its validity is not proved by adventitious circumstances but by itself; it is self-luminous and consequently self-evident. This simple and indeterminate perception itself is the sole criterion of its own validity; it does not owe its validity to any extraneous circumstances, as the Naiyāika supposes<sup>1</sup>.

THE NEO-ŚĀṂKARITE DOCTRINE :  
INDETERMINATE PERCEPTION IS VALID

Dharmarājādharīndra holds that indeterminate perception is the immediate apprehension of an object without apprehending its relations; but that it may not be sensuous in character. For instance, the cognitions produced by such sentences as 'this is Devadatta', 'that thou art', etc., are indeterminate perceptions. According to the Neo-Śāṅkarite the perceptual character of a cognition does not lie in its sensuous origin, but in the identification of the apprehending mode (pramāṇa-caitanya) with the apprehended object (prameya-caitanya) which is capable of being perceived and present at the time of the cognition. And these characteristics of perception are found also in a cognition produced by such a sentence as 'this is Devadatta'. And

<sup>1</sup>prathamam hi svarūpa-mātra-jñānam utpadyate. tacca svānubhava-siddham. samāhita-manasko viśayāntarā-nusandhāna-śūnya indriya-samyuktam vastu sākṣād upalabhata iti svasamvid evātra prāmāṇam.

such an indeterminate perception is a valid cognition, since it apprehends an object which has not already been apprehended by some other cognition, and since it is not contradicted by any other valid cognition<sup>1</sup>.

#### THE OBJECTS OF INDETERMINATE PERCEPTION

As regards the objects of indeterminate perception opinions differ. The following are the different views.

(1) The Buddhist holds that the object of indeterminate perception is the specific individuality of an object as distinct from all other homogeneous and heterogeneous objects.<sup>1</sup> (2) The Śāṅkarite holds that the object of indeterminate perception is being or existence which is the *summum genus* devoid of all determinations<sup>2</sup>. (3) The Śābdika holds that the object of the so-called indeterminate perception is the word denoting the object so that the perception is deprived of indeterminateness<sup>3</sup>. In fact, he denies the possibility of indeterminate perception. (4) Others (e.g., the Mīmāṃsaka etc.) hold that the object of indeterminate perception is a multiform object qualified by the different forms of quality, action, substance, generality, etc.<sup>4</sup> (5) The earlier Naiyāyika holds that the object of indeterminate perception is essentially the same as that of determinate perception; the only difference between them lies in the fact that the former is devoid of all reference to a name, while the latter apprehends also the name of its object. Both of these types of perception apprehend generality, quality, action, etc.; but the former is not associated with a name, while the latter is associated with a name.<sup>5</sup> (6) The Neo-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that the object of indeterminate perception is an object and its qualifications (generic nature, etc.) without their mutual connection; that indeterminate perception does not recognize its

<sup>1</sup>nirvikalpakaṁ tu saṁsargā-navagāhi jñānam. yatha so'yaṁ devadattaḥ. VP., p. 89.

<sup>2</sup>sajātiya-vijātiya-parāvṛttaṁ svalakṣaṇam. NM., p. 97. <sup>3</sup>mahā-sāmānyamanye tu sattāṁ tad-viśayaṁ viduḥ. Ibid., p. 98. <sup>4</sup>kccid guṇa-kriyā-dravya-jāti-bhedādi rūṣitam. śabalaṁ vastu manyante nirvikalpaka-gocaram. Ibid. <sup>5</sup>tasmād ya eva vast-vātmā savikalpasya gocaraḥ, sa eva nirvikalpasya śabda-llekha-vivarjitaḥ. Ibid, 99.



object as a qualified thing, its qualifications as qualifications and the relation between the two<sup>1</sup>. (7) The Neo-Śaṅkarite also holds that the object of indeterminate perception is a thing and its characters but without their mutual relations<sup>2</sup>. (8) Rāmānuja holds that the object of indeterminate perception is a thing qualified by some difference or qualities (e.g., its generic character in the shape of a particular configuration of its parts); it can never be an absolutely undifferentenced being, as Śaṅkara holds<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup>viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-sambandhā-navagāhi jñānam.

TSD., p. 42.

<sup>2</sup>nirvikalpakaṁ tu saṁsargā-navagāhi jñānam.

VPR., p. 89.

<sup>3</sup>IPC., pp. 49—51.

## CHAPTER III

### *The Value of Determinate Perception (Savikalpa Pratyakṣa)*

#### THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE : DETERMINATE PERCEPTION IS INVALID.

The Buddhists deny the perceptual character of determinate cognition which is presentative-representative in nature. Indeterminate perception is purely presentative in nature. But determinate perception is an indirect or mediate experience which involves the application of categories such as genus, quality, substance, action and name. Especially, indeterminate perception is the direct, immediate, presentative apprehension of an object unassociated with its name. But determinate perception is an indirect, mediate, complex, presentative-representative knowledge of an object, in which not only the indeterminate sense-materials are directly given by the object but also certain categories or mental concepts (vikalpa) are imported into the indeterminate sense-materials to make them definite and determinate. Thus indeterminate perception is indefinite but valid, while determinate cognition is definite but invalid inasmuch as it involves the application of purely subjective categories. Vikalpas are not the real forms of objects as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds; but they are purely subjective categories not of *a priori* origin but of the nature of conceptual constructions. The categories of the mind invalidate determinate perception. For instance, the determinate cognition 'this is a jar' not only apprehends an object (this) but also refers it to a class and associates it with a name (jar). But names or words have no real objects for their signification. They do not denote ontological verities. All that exist are individuals. There are no universals. They are merely fictions of the mind (kalpanā). And individuals that are real are apprehended in their uniqueness by indeter-

minate perception. They can never be expressed by words. Words depend for the manifestation of their objects upon the cognition of the relation of uniqueness (*svalakṣaṇa*) or specific individuality to something different from it ; so the specific individuality of an object which is unique and *sui generis* and as such is quite different from anything other than itself can never be expressed by words, because no other object than specific individuality is ever perceived<sup>1</sup>.

#### THE JAINA DOCTRINE : DETERMINATE PERCEPTION IS VALID

Prabhācandra has put forward the following arguments for the validity of determinate perception. (1) It is in harmony or agreement with the real nature of its object. (2) It is the principal instrument of the definite apprehension of an object. (3) It ascertains the nature of an uncertain object. It gives us a certain and determinate cognition of an uncertain and indeterminate object. (4) It depends upon the cognizer of valid knowledge like inference which is valid. Indeterminate cognition is not valid, since it is exactly the reverse of determinate cognition and as such it possesses opposite characteristics<sup>2</sup>.

#### THE JAINA CRITICISM OF THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF THE INVALIDITY OF DETERMINATE PERCEPTION

Prabhācandra asks whether determinate cognition is invalid on any of the following grounds. (1) It is devoid of a distinct form ; it is an indistinct apprehension. (2) It apprehends an object which has already been apprehended by indeterminate perception. (3) It functions with regard to an unreal object.

The Buddhist holds that a determinate cognition does not apprehend the real nature of an object viz., its specific individuality (*svalakṣaṇa*) but an unreal form which is superimposed upon the indeterminate and unqualified

<sup>1</sup>*svalakṣaṇasya sajātiy-ētaṛa-vyāvṛttā-tmanah sambandhā-dhigama-savyapekṣa-vṛttinā śabdeṇa viṣayikartumaśakyatvāt. t ad-vyatirikta-vastuno' nupalambhāt. NM., p.92.* <sup>2</sup>*sādvādatvāt artha-paricchittau sādha-kata-matvāt anīcītārtha-nīcāyakatvāt prātipatra-pekṣa-niyatatvāt. tato vikalpaḥ pramāṇam. anumānavat na tu nirvikalpakaṁ tad-viparītatvāt. PKM., p. 10*

object. (4) It has no pragmatic value or practical utility ; it is incapable of leading to any effective practical activity in the form of the selection of good and the rejection of evil. (5) Sometimes it does not agree with the real nature of its object, as for instance, when we mistake a post for a man. (6) It cannot prevent the superimposition of an unreal form. (7) It does not serve any practical purpose ; we cannot make any practical use of determinate cognitions. (8) It cannot apprehend the specific individuality of an object, which constitutes its real nature. (9) It appears as the apprehension of an object capable of being associated with, and expressed by, a word. (10) It is produced by words. There are no other alternatives.

Prabhācandra criticizes all these arguments one by one and proves the validity of determinate perception. (1) Determinate perception cannot be regarded as invalid because it is an indistinct cognition ; for, in that case, also the indistinct perception of distant trees and objects hidden by glass, mica, etc., would be invalid. (2) It cannot be regarded as invalid because it apprehends an object which has already been apprehended by indeterminate perception ; for, in that case, inference too would be invalid inasmuch as it apprehends something which has already been apprehended by perception<sup>1</sup>. (3) It cannot be regarded as invalid because it operates upon a nonexistent object ; for though the past and future objects are nonexistent at the time of determinate cognition, they did exist in their own time. If still determinate perception be regarded as invalid, indeterminate perception too must be regarded as invalid inasmuch as its object, being momentary, does not exist at the time when it is apprehended by indeterminate perception. (4) Determinate perception cannot be regarded as invalid on the ground that it does not lead to fruitful activity viz., the selection of good and the rejection of evil. For an endeavour to get hold of a desirable object and the

<sup>1</sup>PMK., p. 10.  
nuṣaṅgāt. Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>nāpi gṛhīta-grāhitvād anumānasyāpy-apramāṇyā-

actual attainment of it always depend upon its determinate perception and also avoiding an undesirable object always follows from its determinate perception. Indeterminate perceptions being vague and indefinite can never lead to fruitful activity<sup>1</sup>. Sometimes even indeterminate perception does not lead to the actual attainment of an object, because the agent has no desire for the object and consequently does not make any effort to acquire it. So the absence of the actual attainment of a desirable object and the rejection of an undesirable object are sometimes common to both indeterminate perception and determinate perception. So determinate perception can never be regarded as invalid on the ground stated above. (5) Determinate perception is not invalid on the ground that sometimes it is not in harmony with the real nature of its object. For, in that case, indeterminate perception also would be invalid, for a man with diseased eye-sight desires to perceive an object even in the absence of it. In truth, the difference between a valid cognition and an illusory cognition is just the same both in indeterminate perception and in determinate perception<sup>2</sup>. (6) Determinate perception cannot be regarded as invalid on the ground that it does not prevent the superimposition of an unreal form upon its object. For, as a matter of fact, it is impossible to superimpose an unreal form on the object of determinate perception which is distinct and definite<sup>3</sup>. (7) Determinate perception cannot be regarded as invalid on the ground that it does not come to any practical use for all practical actions follow from determinate perceptions. They never follow from indeterminate perceptions<sup>4</sup>. (8) Determinate perception cannot be regarded as invalid on the ground that it cannot apprehend the specific individuality of an object, which is its real nature. For, in that case, inference too would be invalid, because it does not

<sup>1</sup>hitā-hitapṛāpti-pariharā-samarthatvād-ityasambhāvyaṁ vikalpād-evaṣṭārthapratipatti-pravṛtti-prāpti-darśanād anuṣṭārth-ācca nivr̥tti-pratītiḥ. Ibid. <sup>2</sup>pratyakṣe'py aprāmānya-prasaṅgāt. Ibid. <sup>3</sup>vikalpa-viśaye samāropa-sambhavāt. Ibid. <sup>4</sup>samkalpa-vyavahārānāṁ vikalpa-mūlatvāt. Ibid.

apprehend the specific individuality of an object. Inference too has for its object a genus or universal, like determinate perception, and not the specific individuality of an object. Inference cannot be said to be valid, because it leads a man to fruitful activity after he identifies the object of perception (dṛśya), viz., specific individuality with the object of ideal construction (vikalpa). For, in that case, determinate perception must be regarded as valid on the same ground<sup>1</sup>.

(9) Determinate perception cannot be said to be invalid because it apprehends an object capable of being expressed by words. For, in that case, inference too would be invalid, since it apprehends an object capable of being expressed by and associated with words<sup>2</sup>. (10) Determinate perception cannot be regarded as invalid because it is produced by words. For, in the case, verbal cognitions too would be invalid<sup>3</sup>. Determinate perceptions can never be produced by mere words without the apprehended objects. Determinate perceptions such as 'this is blue' etc., are always found in the presence of objects. Some determinate cognitions (e.g., the cognition of the child of a barren woman), however, appear in the absence of the corresponding objects. But this is common to both determinate and indeterminate cognitions. For instance, the indeterminate perception of the double moon appears even in the absence of the corresponding object. The difference between valid cognition and invalid cognition is common to both indeterminate and determinate perceptions<sup>4</sup>.

#### THE OLDER NAIYĀYIKA DOCTRINE :

#### DETERMINATE PERCEPTION IS VALID : THE NAIYĀYIKA CRITICISM OF THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticises the Buddhist doctrine of the invalidity of determinate perception. He asks for the reason of the invalidity of determinate perception. (1) Is it invalid because of its apprehension of an object which

<sup>1</sup>anumāne'pi tat-prasaktes-tadvat-tasyāpi sāmānya-gocaratvāt. Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>anumāne'pi samānatvāt. Ibid. <sup>3</sup>abdhā-dhyakṣasyā-prāmānya-praśṅgāt.

Ibid. <sup>4</sup>bhrāntād abhrāntasyā-nyatvam atrāpi samānam. Ibid.

is expressed by a word and has no real existence<sup>1</sup>. (2) Or is it invalid because it depends for its production upon the recollection of the denoting word, and not upon the contact of an object with a sense-organ? Is it invalid because it is not due to peripheral stimulation by an object but to the recollection of a word<sup>2</sup>? (3) Or is it invalid because it involves a great deal of effort on the part of the self in the form of complex process of deliberation of the qualified, the qualification etc., and of connecting them together by the synthetic act of apperception<sup>3</sup>? (4) Or is it invalid because it is deliberative in nature and as such different from indeterminate perception, which is devoid of the consciousness of the relation between the preceding and succeeding cognitions<sup>4</sup>? (5) Or is it invalid because it apprehends something which has already been apprehended by indeterminate perception? Is it invalid because it is devoid of any mark of novelty? Is it invalid because it does not give some new knowledge<sup>5</sup>? (6) Or is it invalid because it apprehends something as that which it is not, attributing difference to non-difference, and non-difference to difference?<sup>6</sup> (7) Or is it invalid because it is contradicted as shown by the fact that the genus cannot be perceived as existing either entirely or partly in the individual?<sup>7</sup>

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa offers the following criticisms of these arguments for the invalidity of determinate perception.

(1) First, determinate perception cannot be regarded as invalid because of its apprehension of an unreal object capable of being expressed by words. For, according to the Nyāya, the object expressed by a word (e.g., a genus) has a real existence, and it is apprehended by indeterminate perception. The universal is an object of both

<sup>1</sup>kiṁ śahdārthā-vabhāsitva-garbhikṛtam asadartha-vācitraṁ tad-aprāmānya-kāraṇam. NM., p. 94.

<sup>2</sup>uta saṁketa-smṛtyapekṣo-panatam anindriyārtha-sannikarṣajatvam. Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>uta viśeṣaṇa-grahaṇādy-avāptaṁ bahu-prayāsa-sādhyaṭvam. Ibid, p. 95.

<sup>4</sup>uta vicāraṭvam. Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>uta adhigatā-dhigantṛṭvam. Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>bhedā-bheda-samāropa-bhaṇitam atasmīns-taditi-grāhitvam. Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>uta vṛtti-vikalpādi-bādhita-sāmānya-grahaṇasūcitaṁ bādhyaṭvam eveti. Bbid.

indeterminate and determinate perception. The only difference between them, according to the ancient Nyāya, lies in that the former is not associated with the name of its object, while the latter is associated with the name of its object<sup>1</sup>.

Hence the last alternative also cannot be maintained, since the Buddhist considers the genus to be an unreal abstraction. The relation of the universal to the particular has been elaborately explained elsewhere<sup>2</sup>. The Nyāya considers the genus to be real and subsist in an individual entirely. (2) Secondly, determinate perception cannot be said to be invalid because it is not produced by sense-object-intercourse but by the recollection of the name of its object. Is it not produced by sense-object-intercourse simply because it depends for its appearance upon the recollection of the name of its object? No. The sense-object-contact is the principal cause of determinate perception, and the recollection of the name is its auxiliary cause; the principal cause cannot operate and effectuate until it is aided by the auxiliary causes. The sense-object-intercourse can bring about determinate perception only when it is aided by the auxiliary cause in the shape of the recollection of the name. Nor can it be argued that determinate cognition is invalid because it is of the nature of memory (smṛti) arising out of the recollection of the name of its object. For, in that case, the indeterminate taste-perception of an object arising out of the recollection of its colour would be invalid. (3) Thirdly, determinate perception cannot be regarded as invalid because it involves a great deal of effort on the part of the self in apprehending the qualifications, the qualified and so on. For, in that case, the perception of objects from the top of a mountain would be invalid because it involves a great deal of trouble in climbing the mountain. The argument is absurd on the face of it! (4) Fourthly, it is not right to assert

<sup>1</sup>ataḥ śabdānusandhāna-bandhyaṁ tad-anubandhi vā. jātyādi-viṣaya-grāhi-sarvaṁ pratyakṣam iṣyate. Ibid, p. 99. <sup>2</sup>IPC., ch. X.



that determinate cognitions are deprived of their validity by their deliberative character which is lacking in indeterminate perception inasmuch as it is devoid of the consciousness of the relation between the preceding and succeeding cognitions. For cognitions have never the power of deliberation; it is the self that deliberates; it is the self that perceives, remembers, recognises, deliberates, desires, hates, endeavours, accepts, rejects, and feels pleasure and pain. Even if determinate cognitions had the power of deliberation, they would not be deprived of their validity because they apprehend real objects<sup>1</sup>. (5) Fifthly, it is not right to hold that determinate cognition is invalid because it apprehends merely what has already been apprehended by indeterminate perception, since there is no novelty in it. For novelty is not the criterion of validity. Even the cognition of something already apprehended is valid<sup>2</sup>. (6) Lastly, it has been argued that *vikalpas* (*kalpanā*) have no metaphysical validity since they consist in the false ascription of difference to non-difference and of non-difference to difference, and as such apprehends something as what it is not. But this is false. The five forms of determinate cognition described by the Buddhists do not involve the cognition of something as that which it is not. If it were so, they would be contradicted by a sublating cognition. But, as a matter of fact, there is no cognition which sublates the so-called determinate forms, and illusions are known as illusions only when they are set aside by sublating cognitions. *Vikalpas* are real forms of the objects cognized.

Hence a determinate cognition does not lose its validity for its apprehending an object qualified by action, quality, substance, name and genus. Validity and invalidity are common to both indeterminate perception and determinate perception on the same grounds. Indeed those determinate cognitions which are of purely mental origin having no objective foundation in reality must be regarded as invalid.

<sup>1</sup> *artham sprāṣṭo vijñānasya vicārayato'pi katham aprāmnānyam syāt.* Ibid. p. 96. <sup>2</sup> *na hy-anadhigatā-dhigantṛtvaṁ prāmāṇyam ityuktam. gr̥hita-grahaṇe'pi pramāṇasya pramāṇātivr̥tteḥ.* Ibid.

But those determinate cognitions which are brought about by the intercourse of their objects with the sense-organs, and represent the real nature of their objects cannot but be regarded as valid. It cannot be argued that determinate cognitions represent the true nature of objects and lead the cognizer to attain them, only because they follow upon indeterminate perceptions which apprehend the real nature of objects, and thus come to represent the semblance of the objects; because consciousness which is purely transparent and formless in itself cannot assume particular forms without coming into contact with its objects; and because sometimes determinate cognition does not follow immediately upon indeterminate perception, since the factor of recollection intervenes between the two processes, and since it cannot represent the semblance of the object apprehended by indeterminate perception<sup>1</sup>.

#### THE VAIŚEṢIKA DOCTRINE : DETERMINATE PERCEPTION IS VALID.

Śrīdhara criticizes the Buddhist doctrine of the invalidity of determinate perception. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika urges that determinate perception is valid because it is in harmony with the real nature of its object. The Buddhists cannot assert that determinate perception is not valid, in the face of the fact that what is cognized by the determinate perception 'this is a jar' is a distinctly definite object with a peculiar neck and so forth.

(1) The Buddhists contend that a *vikalpa* is an ideal construction of the mind and has nothing to do with the real nature of an object, that it is only a misconception since it manifests an unreal object, and as such is not in keeping with the real nature of things, and that therefore determinate cognition cannot but be invalid. Śrīdhara rejects this contention because in actual practice a determinate cognition is found to be in agreement with the real state of things. (2) The Buddhists urge that

<sup>1</sup>na ca nirvikalpa-prṛtha-bhāvitva-kṛtam eṣām etad rūpam. viṣaya-samsparsam antareṇa svataḥ svaccha-rūpānām jñānānām evam ākāra-nupapattēḥ. Ibid, p. 99.

determinateness (vikalpa) is produced by perception,—and not directly by the object,—and that this determinateness born of perception imposing its semblance on the form of the object hides from our view the difference between the specific individuality (svalakṣaṇa) of the object and its mere semblance, makes the cognizer turn towards the point of space occupied by the specific individuality, and also brings about an agreement between the determinate cognition and the real nature of the object apprehended, even as the ray of a gem perceived by a man directs him towards the gem; and the real object is attained by reason of the indirect relationship between the semblance and the object through the specific individuality. Śrīdhara observes that if vikalpa did not represent the real nature of an object, it could never impose its semblance on the real form of the object. We never apprehend the semblance of water imposed upon the rays of the sun falling on a sandy surface, if they have not been already perceived<sup>1</sup>. (3) The Buddhists may argue that a determinate form (vikalpa) following in the wake of indeterminate perception takes up the function of an instrument of cognition (kāraṇa) and manifests the indeterminate object capable of some effective action; otherwise, one desiring some effective action could not be induced to act by a determinate cognition, as it has been said: “from a determinate cognition too follows the action towards an object”. If such be the case, a determinate form (vikalpa) must be regarded as valid, since it is found to give rise to a determinate cognition in agreement with the real nature of its objects<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup>anarthaja-pratibhāso vikalpaḥ. <sup>2</sup>vikalpo' vastunirbhāsād viśaṃvādād upaplavaḥ. na pravṛttau saṃvādāt. NK., p. 190. yadi vikalpo vastu na saṃspṛśati katham tad-ātmatayā svapratibhāsam aropayet. NK., p. 190.

<sup>3</sup>atha pratyakṣa-prajñā-bhāvi vikalpaḥ kāraṇavyāpāram upādādāno' rthakriyā-samarthaḥ vastu sāksātkaroti anyathā-rthakriyā-rthino vikalpayataḥ pravṛtty-ayogāt yathāha tato'pi vikalpād vastuny-eva pravṛttiriti-evaṃ tarhi vastuni pramāṇam tatā-visaṃvādi-pratiti-  
hetutvāt. NK., p. 190.

(4) The Buddhists may argue that the point of time that is apprehended by indeterminate perception is not apprehended by determinate cognition; that what is apprehended by determinate cognition is not acquired by the subsequent activity of the cognizing agent; and that thus there is no agreement in regard to the point of time, since the steps involved have only momentary existence like all things. So the truth is that the point of time that is apprehended by determinate cognition is similar to that which is apprehended by indeterminate perception, and that which is acquired by subsequent activity is similar to that apprehended by determinate cognition; and thus there is an agreement merely with regard to the exclusion of contraries without any regard to the differences of the points of time. And, in that case, determinate cognition cannot be regarded as valid since it apprehends that which has already been apprehended by indeterminate perception. This argument too is without a foundation. For what is apprehended by indeterminate perception is neither the exclusion of the contrary of the moment of time, which is negative in character, nor its unreal general form with regard to the exclusion of other things; because the characteristic feature of the object of a cognition is that it must be a cause of that cognition and must lead to effective action; and that which is a mere nonentity cannot lead to effective action. But the point of time itself is the object of indeterminate perception, since it is a real entity and as such is capable of effective action. And it has been argued that this point of time apprehended by indeterminate perception does not fall in with the point of time apprehended by determinate cognition. How, then, can indeterminate perception and determinate cognition be regarded as having one and the same object? And hence determinate cognition cannot be said to have an object that has already been cognized by indeterminate perception. Even if we grant, for argument's sake, that both the cognitions have one and the same object in the shape of something devoid of any definite form, which is capable of corresponding with the subsequent

activity of the cognizer, determinate cognition cannot but be regarded as a valid cognition, because like the serial cognition of an object it is independent of previous cognitions in the cognition of its own object, and also because it can lead the cognizer to obtain the object which is apprehended by it<sup>1</sup>. (5) The Buddhists contend that indeterminate perception is devoid of *kalpanā* which is nothing but an unreal form of imagination, while determinate perception involves the application of definite forms and categories which are purely of mental origin, and as such is invalid. The nature of *vikalpas* will be discussed in detail later in the next section. The *Vaiśeṣika* does not regard *vikalpas* as purely subjective forms of perception, but as real forms of the objects of knowledge. Thus on this ground too determinate cognition cannot be regarded as invalid<sup>2</sup>.

#### THE MĪMĀMSAKA DOCTRINE : DETERMINATE PERCEPTION IS VALID

Śalikānātha Mīśra, a follower of Prabhākara, proves the validity of determinate perception in the following manner. In determinate perception there are two elements, presentative and representative. The representative factor of the determinate perception has been held to invalidate it by some thinkers, for memory is not regarded as valid cognition by them. But the Prabhākara does not accept this view. According to him, though determinate perception follows in the wake of indeterminate perception and thus apprehends the same thing which has already been apprehended by indeterminate perception, it must be regarded as a valid cognition like a serial cognition (*dhārāvāhikajñāna*) inasmuch as it apprehends certain new factors which did not enter into indeterminate perception viz., the relation between the qualified object and its qualifying properties, both of which

<sup>1</sup>tathāpi vikalpaḥ pramāṇatvaṁ nātivartate dhārāvāhika-buddhivad artha-paricchede pūrvā-napekṣatvāt adhyavāita-prāpaṇa-yogyatvācca pramāṇatve cāvasthite pratyakṣam eva syāt. <sup>2</sup>NK., pp. 190-91. KV., pp. 78-79. <sup>3</sup>NK., p. 191 : KV., 178-79.

were indeed perceived by indeterminate cognition but not as related to each other. The representative factor in determinate perception does not pertain to the thing perceived but to the other things with which it has certain characters in common, and this cannot invalidate the cognition of the thing itself. Thus, according to the Prābhākara, determinate perception, though presentative-representative in character, is valid<sup>1</sup>.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka too accepts the validity of determinate perception. The Buddhists hold that directness or indirectness of a cognition is due to the nature of its object; that a cognition is direct if it apprehends the specific individuality of an object, and that a cognition is indirect if it fails to apprehend the specific individuality. If it were so, then generality (sāmānya) would always be known by an indirect cognition (inference etc), and specific individuality (svalakṣaṇa) would always be known by a direct cognition or perception. But, as a matter of fact, we know generality both by perception and by inference, and specific individuality also both by perception and by inference. Even the same object may be apprehended both by a direct cognition and by an indirect cognition. When it is known through the sense-organs, it is known by a direct cognition; and when it is known through marks of inference and so forth, it is known by an indirect cognition. Hence the directness or indirectness of a cognition is not due to the nature of its object, but to the instrument of the cognition. When the cognition of an object is brought about by peripheral stimulation, it is direct, and when it is produced by words, marks of inference and so forth, it is indirect. When a determinate cognition is produced by peripheral stimulation, we must regard it as a direct cognition or perception, just as an indeterminate cognition produced by peripheral stimulation is regarded as a direct cognition or

<sup>1</sup>ātmanah pramāṭṛtvāt nirvikalpaka-prajñābhāvināśca savikalpakasya gr̥hita-grāhitve'pi dhārāvāhika-nyāyena prāmāṇyaṃ veditavyaṃ viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāvātirekenā-gr̥hita-grāhitāpi sambhavatyeva savikalpasyā-bāhya-vastu-viśayatvaṃ nirṇītam. PP., p. 56.)

perception. Hence directness is not the special characteristic of indeterminate perception alone, but also of determinate perception, since both of them are produced by peripheral stimulation<sup>1</sup>.

Śalikānātha argues that recollection is invalid, since it depends upon a previous cognition and since it does not apprehend its object independently<sup>2</sup>.

Kumārila also holds that the validity of a cognition consists in its being a direct apprehension, and that the validity of a cognition can be set aside by such discrepancies as its disagreement with the real nature of its object and so forth<sup>3</sup>. Thus both the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka agree that directness of apprehension is a criterion of validity and that recollection is invalid because it is not a direct cognition of an object. Both agree that determinate perception is valid because its principal cause is the sense-object-intercourse which is aided by recollection which is its auxiliary cause.<sup>4</sup>

#### THE ADVAITA VEDĀNTIST VIEW : DETERMINATE PERCEPTION HAS EMPIRICAL VALIDITY

According to Śaṅkara there is a pure being which is an undifferentenced unity. This pure being can be apprehended by indeterminate perception. But the plurality of empirical objects can be apprehended by determinate perception. So it has empirical validity (vyavahārika prāmāṇyā) but no metaphysical validity. Determinate perception involves the application of forms and determinations which have no foundation in reality. In fact, determination is negation. Deter-

<sup>1</sup>na vaiśadyaṁ nirvikalpaka-niyataṁ kiṁ-tvīndriyaja-jñāna-niyataṁ tasmāt savikalpko'pi svabhāvenaiva viśadā-vabhāsaḥ SDP., p. 122.

<sup>2</sup>nā pramāṇaṁ smṛtiḥ pūrva-pratipatti-vyapekṣanāt. smṛtiḥ hi prācīn pratītiṁ anurudhyamānā na svātantryeṇārthaṁ paricchinattīti na pramāṇam. PP., p. 42.

<sup>3</sup>tasmād bodhā-tmakatvena prāptā buddheḥ pramāṇatā. arthā-nyathātva-hetūtha-doṣa-jñānād apodyate. ŚV., ii, 53. <sup>4</sup>tene-ndriyārtha-sambandhāt prāg-ūrdhvaṁ va'pi yat smṛteḥ. vijñānaṁ jāyate sarvaṁ pratyakṣam iti gamyatām. ŚV., iv, 136-37.

minations do not apply to the prius and substratum of all empirical being viz., one pure being. But within the limits of empirical knowledge determinate perception is valid. And determinate perception is the synthetic relational mode of apprehending empirical objects and qualities in relation to one another.

#### THE VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA VEDĀNTIST VIEW : DETERMINATE PERCEPTION IS VALID

According to Rāmānuja there is no pure being; and pure being can never be apprehended even by indeterminate perception as Śaṅkara holds. Indeterminate perception is the perception of an object endowed with some qualities at least. But these qualities are not apprehended by indeterminate perception as common qualities<sup>1</sup>. The only difference between indeterminate perception and determinate perception lies in the fact that the former is the perception of the first individual among a number of objects belonging to the same class, while the latter is the perception of the second individual, the third individual and so on. And both these kinds of perception are equally valid.<sup>2</sup> In fact, the indeterminate perception of Rāmānuja is not absolutely indeterminate. It apprehends some determinate qualities of its object. And determinations are not imposed by the mind upon the reality, but they are the inherent forms that constitute the reality. So determinate perception has not merely empirical validity as Śaṅkara holds, but it has metaphysical validity as well. In fact, the reality is determinate, and so it can be known by determinate perception.

#### THE MĀDHVA DOCTRINE : DETERMINATE PERCEPTION ALONE IS VALID

The Mādhva regards all perception as determinate as he regards the reality also as determinate (saviśeṣa). He defines

<sup>1</sup>nirvikalpakaṁ nāma kenacid viśeṣeṇa viyuktasya grahaṇaṁ, na sarva-viśeṣeṇa-rahitasya. nirvikalpakaṁ saviśeṣa-viṣayam eva, savikalpake svasminn-anubhūta-padārtha-viśiṣṭa-pratisandhāna-hetutvāt. RBS. i, i, i; p. 68. <sup>2</sup>nirvikalpakaṁ eka-jātiya-dravyeṣu prathamapiṇḍa grahaṇaṁ; dvitīyādi-piṇḍa-grahaṇaṁ savikalpakaṁ ucyate. RBS., i, i, i, p. 69. IPC., pp. 49-50.



perception as the concrete apprehension of a determinate object, and considers it to be always determinate. It is of eight kinds. It is the concrete apprehension of an object as qualified by a substance, or a quality, or an action or motion, or a name, or generality, or particularity, or inherence, or nonexistence. There is no indeterminate nonrelational apprehension<sup>1</sup>.

Madhva defines valid knowledge as that which corresponds to its object<sup>2</sup>. Jayatīrtha also defines valid knowledge as the knowledge of an object as it really is in the temporal order and the spatial order with its important qualities and relations to other things. Human knowledge is always limited and cannot exhaustibly apprehend all the relations and qualities of its object; but that does not make it invalid. Determinate perception is valid because it apprehends its object as it really is in the spatio-temporal order<sup>3</sup>.

#### THE VALLABHITE DOCTRINE : DETERMINATE PERCEPTION IS VALID

Puruṣottama, a follower of Vallabha, holds that all knowledge is determinate and is in the form of judgment involving a subject-predicate relation. So perception also is always determinate and of the nature of judgment and involves a subject-predicate relation. Determinate perception does not presuppose indeterminate perception of the terms of a relation. The perception of the terms of a relation is as determinate as the perception of the relation. For instance, determinate perception of a man with a stick does not presuppose indeterminate perception of the stick, but determinate perception of it. Otherwise, the stick cannot be known as a term of the relation<sup>4</sup>. 'A stick' is apprehended by determinate perception. 'A man qualified by a stick' also is apprehended by determinate perception. We have no indeterminate

<sup>1</sup>Pramāṇapaddhati, p. II quoted in Nyāya-kōśa (1893), pp. 896-97. IPC., p. 53. <sup>2</sup>yāthārtham eva mānatvam. AV., p. 178. <sup>3</sup>yathā-vasthitam api jñeyam viśayi-karoti, nānyathā. B. N. K. Sharma, *Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya*, pp. 83-84.

perception of a substance, a quality, an action, a name, etc., which are the terms of a relation. Both a substantive being, a qualification, a qualified substance, and the relations among them are apprehended by determinate perception. Thus both the followers of Madhva and Vallabha agree with the Jainas that determinate perception alone is valid.

#### THE SĀMKHYA THEORY : DETERMINATE PERCEPTION IS VALID

The Buddhists hold that indeterminate perception is valid, since it is devoid of unreal forms of imagination (*kalpanā*), such as a name, a genus, etc., and that determinate perception is invalid, because it contains these unreal forms. Aniruddha refutes this Buddhist doctrine. According to him both indeterminate perception and determinate perception are produced by a complement of causes which bring about a valid cognition in the shape of a direct cognition untainted by any defect. The only difference between the two kinds of perception lies in that in determinate perception there is the cognition of a name, a genus, etc., which are reproduced in memory by the resuscitation of the subconscious impressions left by past experience owing to similarity. Thus because an additional factor enters into determinate perception, it has a special name distinct from indeterminate perception. But this element of memory in determinate perception does not prevent the operation of the complement of causes which bring about valid perception, and consequently it does not invalidate determinate perception. The name remembered in determinate perception cannot deprive it of its perceptual character. The name is an adventitious mark of the objects which it denotes; so it cannot conceal the real nature of its object.

According to the Buddhists *vikalpas* or determinations in perception have no objective existence in reality. They are ideal constructions of the mind superimposed upon indeterminate and unqualified objects. These *vikalpas* are of

“*viśiṣṭa-jñānaṁ prati yad viśeṣaṇa-jñānasya kāraṇatvaṁ niyataṁ tad indriyaṇa gṛhyamāṇasyaiva tasya. anyathā danḍa-nirvikalpā-ntaraṁ danḍīti buddhiḥ syāt.* PR., p. 9. IPC., p. 54.

two kinds. Some *vikalpas* are purely mental constructs. Others consist in the apprehension of 'thisness' (e.g., 'this is blue' and so on) of objects<sup>1</sup>. Of these, the former kind of determinations, which are of purely mental origin and as such quite independent of objects, can have no metaphysical validity. But the latter are invariably connected with objects and apprehend 'thisness' of objects. Why should not, then, they be regarded as valid? The Buddhists urge that the latter determinations too are equally invalid, for no determination (*vikalpa*) can touch the ontological reality which is apprehended only by indeterminate perception. But if they are equally invalid, why should they have the characteristics of apprehension of 'thisness' (*idantā*) and distinctness which the others lack? The Buddhists account for it in this way. These determinations derive the characteristics of 'thisness'-apprehension and distinctness from their contact with the semblance of objects, because they immediately follow upon the indeterminate perception which is invariably connected with objects. They can never apprehend the metaphysical reality, which is only apprehended by indeterminate perception. Hence *vikalpas* (*kalpanā*) never appear in the form of real objects; nor can they apprehend real objects, because they embody only unreal forms superimposed on objects by ideation<sup>2</sup>.

#### DIFFERENT KINDS OF VIKALPAS

There are five categories (*kalpanā*, *vikalpa*) or determinations, according to the Buddhists, viz., genus, quality, action, name, and substance. They are called *kalpanās* or ideal constructions, since they consist in the attribution of non-difference to difference<sup>3</sup>. For instance, in reality there is no difference between the individual and the genus,—the particular and the universal, for no one has ever perceived the genus of the cow (*gotva*) as different from a particular

<sup>1</sup>*dvividhā vikalpāḥ chātra-manoratha-viracitāḥ idantā-grāhinaśca nilam ityādayaḥ. NM., p. 93.*

<sup>2</sup>*'sarva evāmi vikalpāḥ paramārthato' rthaṁ na sprśanty-eva sa hi nirvikalpakenaiva sarvātmanā paricchinnāḥ. NM., p. 93.*

<sup>3</sup>*tāśca kvacidabhede' pi bheda-kalpanāt kvacit bhede' pi abheda-kalpanāt kalpanā ucyate. NM., p. 93. SSV., i, 89.*

cow ; consequently, the category of genus (*jātika*panā) consists in the ascription of difference to nondifference. Individuals or particulars alone are real; there is no universal. . The category of quality too consists in the false ascription of difference to what are nondifferent. There is no real difference between quality and substance. A substance is merely a group of qualities. It has no existence apart from qualities. A substance is never perceived as different from qualities; it is always perceived as a collection of qualities. Hence it is curious to suppose that substance and qualities are different from each other. Thus the category of quality apart from substance is a mental abstraction. Likewise, the category of action too consists in the attribution of difference to what are nondifferent, for action has not a separate existence from that of a substance. It is nothing more than the nature of a substance. For example, the movement of Devadatta is never perceived as anything more or less than Devadatta himself; it is never perceived apart from him. The category of name consists in the attribution of nondifference or identity to what are really different. The name or sign is different from the signate or that which is a name. But they are supposed to be identical with each other, as for instance, when we say 'this' for an object. How, then, can they co-inhere in the same substance? Likewise, the category of substance consists in the ascription of co-inherence or nondifference to objects that are entirely different from each other. For instance, in the cognition 'this is the man with a stick' 'man' and 'stick' which are quite different from each other are supposed to inhere in the same substratum<sup>1</sup>.

#### THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN VIKALPAS AND ILLUSIONS

A *vikalpa* is only a misconception, since it is an unreal form of ideal construction, and as such it is not in keeping with the real nature of things. From its very nature it cannot but be invalid<sup>2</sup>. But if a *vikalpa* is nothing but a false ascription of difference to nondifference and of nondifference to difference,

<sup>1</sup>NM., p. 94.

<sup>2</sup>*vikalpo* vastu-nirbhāsād visamvādād upaplavaḥ.

NK., p. 190.

—if it consists in false abstraction or superimposition, why is it not contradicted by some sublating cognition, just as an illusory perception of silver in a shell is contradicted by a subsequent sublating perception of the shell as a shell? Is a *vikalpa* quite the same as an illusion? If not, what is the difference between the two? The Buddhists hold that when one object having a real existence appears to consciousness as another, this illusory cognition can be contradicted by the perception of the object as such. For example, when the rays of the sun appear to consciousness as water, this illusory perception of water can be contradicted by the perception of the rays of the sun as such. But the categories of genus, quality, action, name, and substance have no real existence. Therefore they cannot be apprehended as other objects. All the *vikalpas* or categories in the form of ideation of non-difference have particulars for their objects. And because these particular objects can never appear as other than particular,—in reality there being no objects other than particulars,—there cannot be any contradicting or sublating perception. Hence the *vikalpas* or categories are not of the nature of illusions. Nor are they valid forms of cognition, for genus, quality etc., to which they refer have no ontological existence. Thus the *vikalpas* are the forms of cognition which are neither metaphysically valid nor illusory. They cannot be valid, since they have no real existence. Nor are they illusions, since illusions are not wholly without a foundation; the objects of illusion have a real existence in another setting; but genus, quality, etc., as such have no real existence anywhere apart from the individual objects to which they are ascribed. These five categories (*vikalpas*) are merely ideal constructions; they arise out of purely mental impressions and dispositions, and manifest themselves in the form of false ideation of difference in nondifference and of nondifference in difference, and consequently they have no metaphysical validity<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> *yatra vastu vastv-antarātmanā' vabhāsate tatra bādhako bhavati iha tu na jātyādi-vastv-antaram asti yato vastv-antarā-tmanā' sya graho bhavet, tasman na viparyayā-tmano vikalpāḥ. na caite pramāṇam. jātyāder apāramāṛthikatvāt. NM., p. 94. NK., p. 190.*

The *vikalpas* or *kalpanās* of the Buddhists may be compared with the forms and categories of Kant, which are neither valid nor illusory,—which are “empirically real” but “transcendentally ideal”. The Buddhists hold with Kant that the categories are not imbedded in reality, but that they are purely subjective forms of perception, which are superimposed upon indeterminate and unqualified objects. They are not in the framework of nature, but in the framework of our mind. They are not real but ideal. The Buddhists, however, do not distinguish, like Kant, between the forms of sensibility and the categories of the understanding. They regard the five categories of genus, quality, action, name, and substance as forms of perception, having no foundation in reality. They have no metaphysical validity. Moreover, the *vikalpas* of the Buddhists are mental constructs or abstractions, while the forms and categories of Kant are purely of *a priori* origin.

#### THE NAIYĀYIKA CRITICISM OF THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF VIKALPA

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the Buddhist doctrine of *vikalpa* by pointing out that *vikalpa* does not consist in the false ascription of difference to nondifference, or of non-difference to difference, and that knowledge does not consist in the superimposition of ideal forms and categories on the ‘given’ facts of experience. Knowledge is real; it represents the reality in its true form. The so-called forms and categories viz, substance, quality, genus, action, and name are not ideal constructions of the human mind as the Buddhists hold, but they are the real forms of the reality,—they constitute the framework of reality,—which are known by us as they are; they are not our own creations, but the real aspects of the world of reality. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is purely realistic in its epistemology and metaphysics. There is no touch of subjective, objective, or absolute idealism in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa points out that the universal is actually perceived as different from the particulars, and substance,

from qualities, and action, from the acting substance, or motion, from the moving body ; so that we should not ascribe difference to nondifference in these things. They *are* different, and are perceived *as* different ; so we have a valid knowledge of them, and there is no scope for false attribution of difference to non-difference, or ideal superimposition. An object is perceived as different from its name; they are never perceived as identical with each other; so there is no scope for false ascription of nondifference to difference. Likewise, two objects existing in the same thing are perceived as different from each other, so that here also there is no scope for false ascription of non-difference to difference. So the determinate perception of an object qualified by action, quality, substance, name and genus cannot be regarded as invalid, as the Buddhists suppose<sup>1</sup>.

#### THE VAIŚEṢIKA'S CRITICISM OF THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF VIKALPA OR KALPANĀ

Śrīdhara offers the following criticisms of the Buddhist theory of vikalpa or kalpanā. What is kalpanā? The Buddhists may say that there are two kinds of kalpanā apprehending a qualified object : (1) verbal kalpanā consisting in the connection of the object with a word, and (2) objective kalpanā consisting in the connection of the object with other objects. But this cannot be maintained as none of the alternative forms of this theory is tenable. For instance, as for the cognition of the connection of the object with a word (a) either the cognition connects the word with the object; (b) or the cognition itself becomes connected with the word. On the former alternative, (1) either the cognition reduces the object to the character of the word; (2) or the cognition cognises the object as coloured by the form of the word; (3) or the cognition calls the object by the name of the word. (1) The first of these alternatives is not tenable. A cognition cannot reduce its object to the character of the word, because in determinate cognition also the object appears

<sup>1</sup>tena kriyā-guṇa-dravya-nāma-jāty-uparañjītam. viśayaṁ darśy-  
neti vikalpo nāpramāṇatām. NM., p. 97.

exactly in the same form as in indeterminate cognition, and also because the object brings about an effective action which could not be done by a mere word. If the objects of both indeterminate and determinate cognitions were not the same, then there could not be simultaneous activity, with regard to the object, of the person knowing the meaning of the word and another who does not know it. (2) The second alternative also cannot be maintained. It is wrong to hold that determinate cognition apprehends its object as tainted by the form of the word, because what actually happens is not that the object is apprehended as tainted by the form of the word, even as a crystal is tainted with the blue colour of the object placed near it, but that when the object has been apprehended by indeterminate cognition, the already known word denoting the object is remembered at the sight of the object; and the familiar word being remembered qualifies the object with regard to its own denotation. As a matter of fact, it is the object only that is apprehended by determinate perception as such a thing by name, just as in the case of indeterminate perception. Nor is it that when the word is remembered, the form of the object is impaired, and so the contact of the object with a sense-organ being present, the mere remembrance of the name cannot deprive the determinate cognition of its perceptual character. The name, even though remembered, does not set aside the sensuousness of the object to which the name belongs, because the name is absolutely indifferent to the form or character of the object, and is not capable of concealing it. (3) The third alternative too cannot be proved. It cannot be held that a cognition calls its object by a name with which it is connected. It is the intelligent self which remembers the name of the object through its power of recalling impressions, and then calls the object by that name, *e.g.*, 'this is a jar'. This cannot be done by a cognition which, being unintelligent, is devoid of the power of recalling impressions. Hence a cognition cannot connect its object with the denoting word. Nor does the cognition by itself become connected with the word, because the cognition as well as its form



which is indistinguishable from it, being momentary, is each unique, and hence no word can belong to a number of these cognitions and their forms in common, consequently they are incapable of any convention; and also because the word which denotes the object cannot be used to express either the object or the cognition of it, which is wholly different from it.

The Buddhists may urge that determinate cognition has for its object an object connected with a word; and the object becoming connected with the word comes to be spoken of by that word; and it is with reference to this that we have the conventional denotation of the word. This convention too pertains to that which is nonmomentary in its character, and is common to many things; and neither the specific individuality, nor the cognition of the specific individuality, nor the form of the cognition is either common or nonmomentary. Even the externality of the form of the cognition is nondifferent from the form of the cognition, and is something wholly uncommon or unique. As for generality, there is no such real entity. Consequently, there being no cognition of difference among the particular forms of the cognition, each of which in its external character is imposed upon it by the determinate cognitions, and singleness also being imposed upon it through the exclusion of all that is other than that cognition,—there follows the convention with regard to the word. This is proved by sufficient evidence and so cannot be denied. Thus the determinate cognition functioning towards the unreal object connected with the word, brings about the cognition of an object that has no existence; and this is what is meant by *kalpanājñāna*. If the nature of *kalpanā* lies in the apprehension of something qualified by generality, though, as a matter of fact, there is no such real entity as generality by itself, then it will consist in the apprehension of something that has no real existence, and not in the apprehension of the object connected with the word. But generality is not an unreal fiction; it has a real existence. Hence

even though determinate cognition might apprehend an object connected with a word, it could not but be regarded as perceptual in character inasmuch as it is produced by the contact of the object with a sense-organ, and as such is a valid form of cognition. Thus kalpanā cannot be a cognition connecting an object with a word, or itself being connected with the object; nor can kalpanā be the cognition of a qualified object and consist in the connection of its object with other objects; because the qualification, the qualified, and the relation between the two, are all real, and as such cannot be called kalpanā which by its very nature must be unreal.

The Buddhists may urge that a perceptual cognition consists in the direct apprehension of an object, and that it appears exactly in the same form as that of the object as it presents itself at first sight just after its contact with a sense-organ; and that it does not operate after any deliberation. A determinate cognition, however, is deliberate in its character involving many such deliberations such as 'this is the qualification,' 'this is the qualified,' 'this is the relation between them,' and after these deliberations arrives at the determinate cognition such as 'this is a man with a stick.' If the qualified character of the object were real, then at the very first sight it would be apprehended as such. And because it is not so apprehended at first sight, its qualified nature cannot be regarded as real; it must, therefore, be an unreal fiction superimposed upon the object by ideation. Hence the cognition of the qualified character of an object or determinate cognition is kalpanā.

This argument is absurd. It is the intelligent self which apprehends each one of the qualifications, the qualified, and the relation between them, considers all these facts, brings them together by a synthetic act of apperception, and apprehends the qualified character of the object through the sense-organs. These acts of deliberation and apperception cannot be done by an unintelligent cognition, as the Buddhists suppose. As for the object, it is always qualified

on account of its connection with qualifications ; but the object is not perceived as qualified at first through the sense-organs, because the necessary aids or subsidiary causes in the form of the apprehension of the qualifications is not present at first in the stage of indeterminate perception. And as soon as these qualifications are apprehended, the object comes to be apprehended as qualified. Thus the object itself is always qualified and determinate ; and consequently the determinate cognition of the qualified object cannot but be regarded as a valid cognition<sup>1</sup>.

According to the Vaiśeṣika, substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, inherence and negation are the seven kinds of reality. Time, space, and ether (ākāśa) are infinite and eternal substances. All these are real and not subjective forms and categories of the mind, as the Buddhists think. They are independent, self-subsisting entities. But, according to the Vaiśeṣika, all numbers, from duality upwards, are the creations of the discriminative intellect (apekṣābuddhi); unity alone exists in things themselves.

#### THE SĀMĀNYA-YOGA DOCTRINE OF VIKALPA

According to the Sāmkhya-Yoga theory, time, space, and causality are constructions of the understanding or intellect, which are imposed upon the indeterminate knowledge of an object to convert it into a coherent order of intelligible experience. So this theory may be compared with that of Kant, according to whom, time, space, causality etc., are the forms and categories of the mind, which are imposed upon the manifold of intuitions to convert it into intelligible knowledge. But, according to the Sāmkhya-Yoga view, time, space, and causality all are categories of the understanding (buddhinirmāṇa), while, according to Kant, time and space are the forms of sensibility, and causality, substantiality, community, unity, plurality, totality etc., are the categories of the understanding.

Dr. B. N. Seal states the Sāmkhya-Yoga view clearly.

<sup>1</sup>NK., pp. 190-94.

An infra-atomic particle of matter (tanmātra) is conceived by the intellect (buddhi) to occupy a particular position in space (deśa), a particular position in time (kāla), and a particular position in the causal series (nimitta). "These three relations are the work of the intuitive stage of knowledge (nirvikalpa prajñā) as opposed to conceptual (savikalpa prajñā). But this is not the pure relationless intuition of Reality (nirvicārā nirvikalpa prajñā), which may be termed intellectual intuition, but the intuition that imposes its forms on the real substrate (savicārā nirvikalpa prajñā) or in other words empirical intuition"<sup>1</sup>

Infinite time is not a real objective entity. It is only a construction of the intellect (buddhinirmāṇa) based on the relation of antecedence and sequence, in which phenomena are perceived to stand to one another. The changes of phenomena are perceived by the intellect as order in time. The temporal order is a *schema* of the intellect for representing the course of evolution. The time series appears to have an objective reality because the *schema* of the intellect supervenes on the phenomena as order in time, which is nothing but the relation of antecedence and sequence between the present moment and the immediately antecedent moment. But only the present moment exists. The future is the potential phenomenon, and the past is the sublatent phenomenon. The universe evolves in the present moment only which is actual. Time series has no existence apart from the moment, which is real and identical with the unit of change in phenomena. But even this is real for our empirical intuition (savicārā nirvikalpa-prajñā) only. The reals as they are are apprehended by our intellectual intuition (nirvicārā nirvikalpa-prajñā) without the empirical relations of space, time, and causality.

Space is distinguished as locus (deśa) in a spatical order and an order of coexistent points (dik). The order of coexistent points (dik) is entirely relative to the intellect, like the

<sup>1</sup>The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, p. 18.

order in time, and is constructed on the basis of relations of position perceived by our empirical intuition. Space as locus of a finite body (deśa) has an ultimate unit, which can be analyzed into the infinitesimal extensive quantity inherent in sattva, rajas and tamas of prakṛti.

The category of causality is mediated through the *schema* of temporal order. The empirical intuition first superimposes relations of antecedence and sequence on the modifications of sattva, rajas and tamas of prakṛti. Then the intellect creates temporal order out of them. Then the empirical intuition imports the relation of cause and effect into the course of nature and intuits the series of transformations of the reals as causes and effects—the former preceding the latter.<sup>1</sup>

Vyāsa says, "A moment is the time which is taken by an atom to move from one point of space to the next point of space. Time-series is the uninterrupted stream of moments. There is no collection of moments because they are not coexistent and synchronous. Time as an uninterrupted series appears to be real to empirical consciousness. But really it is an intellectual construction. Only moments are real and actual. Two moments are not coexistent. The series of two moments is not possible, for they are not coexistent. The occurrence of the next moment after the preceding moment is called the series. So only the present moment exists. The preceding moment and the succeeding moment do not exist. So there is no collection of moments. The past and the future moments are known from the modifications of sattva, rajas and tamas. The future exists as the potential at the present moment. The past exists as the sublatent at the present moment"<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Ibid, pp. 18-22.

<sup>2</sup>YBh., iii, 52. yāvata samayena calitaḥ paramāṇuḥ pūrva-deśaṁ jahyād-uttaradeśaṁ upasampadyeta sa kālāḥ kṣaṇaḥ, tat-pravāhā-vicchedaḥ tu kramāḥ, kṣaṇa-tat-kramayor nāsti vastu-samāhāra iti buddhi-samāhāraḥ. sa khalu kālo vastu-śūnyo buddhi-nirmāṇaḥ vyutthita-darśanānāṁ vastu svarūpa ivā-vabhāsate. YBh., iii, 52. iii, 13-15.

Vyāsa further avers that all things are of the nature of all other things, since they are collocations of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, but that the former are not always manifested as the latter owing to the limitation of space, time, form, and causality. Space, time and causality are constructions of the intellect, because space-continuity, time-continuity, and cause-effect-continuity are never perceived<sup>1</sup>.

Thus the Sāṃkhya-Yoga theory of time, space and causality is idealistic, while the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view is realistic. But though the former view is idealistic, it is not identical with the Buddhist view, according to which, a *vikalpa* consists in false ascription of difference to nondifference, and of nondifference to difference.

#### THE ADVAITA VEDĀNTIST THEORY OF VIKALPA

According to the Advaita Vedānta, Brahman is the only reality characterized by being (*sat*), consciousness (*cit*) and bliss (*ānanda*). But these three characteristics of Brahman are not to be understood in terms of our experience. In an empirical sense Brahman is not-being, subject-objectless pure consciousness, pure bliss, like that in dreamless sleep<sup>2</sup>. According to Śaṅkara, the reality is one undifferentenced being called Brahman; we perceive difference and plurality until we attain the intuitive knowledge of Brahman. Space, time, causality, etc., are the categories of the mind and have validity only within the limits of our empirical knowledge. Here Śaṅkara agrees with the Sāṃkhya-Yoga. When we transcend the limits of empirical knowledge and have an intuition of Brahman without even perceiving the difference between the finite self and Brahman,—the finite self also being an empirical product of nescience, all the categories of knowledge with the categorized empirical knowledge vanish. But these categories have validity within the limits of empirical knowledge; they have no ontological existence.

<sup>1</sup>*sarvaṃ sarvātmakam. deśa-kālā-kāra-nimittā-pabandhān na khalu samānakālam ātmanām abhivyaktiḥ.* YBh., iii, 14. YV., TV., iii, 52.

<sup>2</sup>Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, pp. 146-47 & 150.

Thus Śaṅkara agrees with Kant that the categories are "empirically real", and that they can never give us a knowledge of the reality or *ding-an-sich*. But Śaṅkara differs from Kant in that, according to him, the *ding-an-sich* is Brahman which is pure being, pure consciousness, and pure bliss, which are not the predicates of Brahman but constitute the very essence of Brahman and which can be known by a flash of supra-intellectual pure intuition. Thus, according to Śaṅkara, the seeming differences of the world are mere names (*nāma*) and forms (*rūpa*) projected upon the empirical world by nescience. Śaṅkara agrees with the Buddhist idealist that the categories of space, time, substance, quality, genus, *etc.*, are ideal in nature, but he is not landed in subjectivism or mentalism like the Buddhist idealist; he posits the existence of Brahman which is the only absolute Reality and which cannot be known through the empirical forms and categories of time, space, causality, *etc.*, but only through direct and immediate intuition. Both Śaṅkara and the Buddhist are immediatists inasmuch as both of them think that immediate experience enables us to apprehend the reality. But they differ in that the former regards the higher supra-intellectual intuition or higher immediacy as the organ of the true knowledge of Brahman, while the latter regards the lower sense-intuition or lower immediacy as the organ of the true knowledge of the reality which is an unbroken series of individual moments, real or ideal.

But even within the limits of empirical knowledge there is a difference between Śaṅkara and the Buddhist. According to the Buddhist there is no difference at all between the universal and the particular, substance and qualities, substance and action, but we wrongly attribute difference to these; and there is a difference between an object and its name, and between two substances which accompany each other, but we erroneously attribute non-difference to difference. According to him, *kalpanā* or *vikalpa* is nothing but the false ascription of difference to nondifference, and of nondifference to difference; it is of

the nature of conceptual construction or ideal abstraction. But, according to Śaṅkara, there is the relation of identity-in-difference (bhedābheda) between the universal and the particular, substance and qualities, action and acting substance, cause and effect, etc. There is apparent difference between these pairs of categories due to nescience (avidyā) which infects the intellect which imposes these categories on the undifferentiated Brahman which is the only reality underlying them. There is the identity of Brahman, which is their reality. There is empirical difference but ontological identity between them. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, however, substance and qualities, the universal and the particular, action and acting substance, name and the thing, cause and effect—all these are different from each other. Thus the Buddhist categories appear to be of the mental origin, being of the nature of mental (*a posteriori*) constructions while the Śaṅkarite categories are not of the mental origin, but of the nature of the Kantian (*a priori*) categories of the understanding. Śaṅkara is a transcendental or absolute idealist, while the Buddhist idealist is a subjective idealist or mentalist. The later sceptical Vedāntists of the type of Śrīharṣa and Chit-sukha, however, describe all these categories as undefinable so that they belong to the world of 'appearance', in the language of Bradley, and not to the world of 'reality'.

#### PERCEPTION IN RELATION TO THE SENSE AND THE UNDERSTANDING OR INTELLECT

##### THE SĀMKHYA-YOGA VIEW

According to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, at first the sensibility comes into contact with sensible objects and supplies us with the rudiments of experience. The sense-organs, however, supply us with simple apprehension. What they apprehend is a mere manifold, a congeries of discrete impressions, though each apprehends a manifold of a particular kind. Upon this manifold of intuitions the manas as the central sensory organ operates, breaks up the undifferentiated manifold of simple apprehension into its component factors, and



synthesize them into a compact whole. Vācaspati Miśra explains it thus : "the manas carefully reflects upon the object intuitively apprehended by a sense-organ and determines it as like this and unlike this, and thus discriminates it by its condition of the predicate and the predicable". Vijñānabhikṣu says, "First apprehension is simple and immediate, like the apprehension of a child, a dumb person and the like; it is produced by the mere thing ; but when, after this, the thing is recognized by its properties, *viz.*, the genus and the like, that process of determination is the function of the buddhi". Thus the function of the manas, according to the Śāṅkhya, may be interpreted as the power of selective attention which, by its analytico-synthetic function of dissociation and association, breaks up the manifold of intuitions, brings out all the relations involved in it, and thus renders it definite and determinate by assimilation and discrimination. The sensibility furnishes us with discrete impressions either simultaneously or successively, and with nothing more. But these discrete sensations are not yet objects; they will have to be grouped together into distinct aggregates before there can be any perception of them as *things*. It is the function of the manas to form these groups and thereby to transform a certain number of stimuli into one distinct percept. But the process of perception is not yet complete. When the buddhi renders the immediate apprehension of sensibility definite and determinate, the empirical ego (ahaṁkāra) appropriates it by its unity of apperception, and thus transforms the impersonal determinate perception of an object into a personal cognition. Vijñānabhikṣu defines the function of ahaṁkāra as self-appropriation. Vācaspati Miśra explains the function of ahaṁkāra as follows : "I alone preside over the object that is immediately apprehended by a sense-organ and definitely recognized by the mind, and I have the power over all that is perceived and known, and all these sensible objects are for my use. There is no other supreme except 'I'; *I am*. This self-appropriation is called ahaṁkāra". When the empirical ego appropriates the determinate apprehension of the mind by its unity of

apperception, the intellect (buddhi) assumes a conative attitude towards it, and resolves what is to be done towards it. The function of the intellect is the ascertainment of its duty towards the object known. This explanation has been offered by Vācaspati Miśra who observes, "Every one who deals with an object first intuitively it, then reflects upon it, then appropriates it, and then resolves or determines, this is to be done by me, and then he proceeds to act." This will be clear from another example of Vācaspati Miśra, which illustrates the successive operations of the external and internal organs in perception. "In dim light a person at first apprehends the mere object as a manifold of impressions, then attentively reflects upon it, and determines it to be a terrible thief by his bow and arrow, then thinks him with reference to himself (*e.g.*, 'he is running towards me'), and then resolves or determines 'I must fly from this place'. Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha also gives the same explanation of adhyavāsāya<sup>1</sup>. Vijñānabhikṣu, however, interprets the function of intellect (buddhi) as ascertainment or determination of the object. And when the intellect, having received the sensations conveyed through the sense-organs and the manas, and referred to the statical unity of the empirical ego, constructs them into a definite and determinate object of perception, it presents this definite and determinate knowledge to the self (puruṣa). It is the function of the intellect (buddhi) to define and ascertain objects by recognizing that they realize a certain type. When the percept has been fully determined in this way, it is presented by the intellect to the self in order that the principle of intelligence may have a view of it. This is illustrated by an example of Vācaspati Miśra. 'Just as the headmen of villages collect the taxes from the villagers and pay them to the governor of the province, and the local governor hands them over to the minister, and the minister, to the king, so the external sense-organs having an immediate apprehension of the objects communicate the discrete impressions to the manas, and the manas reflects upon them and

<sup>1</sup> Ānkhyaacandrikā.

gives them over to the empirical ego which appropriates them by its empirical unity of apperception and gives these self-appropriated apperceived impressions to the intellect, which converts them into the definite and determinate knowledge of objects realizing a distinct type and presents them to the self for its enjoyment"<sup>1</sup>. Thus perception involves the functions of the external sense-organs, the internal organs or the manas, empirical ego (ahamkāra) and the intellect (buddhi). Generally the word "manas" is translated as mind, which is not self. Perception presupposes the existence of two metaphysical entities, viz., an extramental object and the self. The Sāṃkhya doctrine of perception is based upon metaphysical dualism.

The Sāṃkhya theory of perception may be compared with the theory of Kant. According to Kant there can be no perception without synthesis. Sensibility gives us merely a manifold of intuitions or sensations which are discrete and isolated from one another ; but they must be synthesized by the understanding into intelligible knowledge with the help of its forms and categories. The understanding must co-operate with sensibility in order to give us knowledge. According to Kant mere manifold of impressions is all that we get from sensibility ; the unity of the manifold is contributed entirely by the understanding. According to the Sāṃkhya also, synthesis proceeds from the three internal organs, viz., mind or central sensory (manas), self-apperception (ahamkāra), and the intellect (buddhi).

According to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, time, space, and causality are the categories or constructions of the intellect, which are imposed on the relationless, discrete, sensations given by experience ; and the buddhi constructs them into a temporal, spatial, and causal order, which is valid only for our empirical consciousness. Kant's view of time, space, and causality is nearly the same. According to Kant time and space are the forms of sensibility, and causality is a category of the understanding, while,

<sup>1</sup>STK.

according to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, time, space, and causality all are the categories of the understading (buddhi). Both the Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Kantian theories of knowledge are based on dualistic metaphysics. But we cannot push the analogy too far. The Sāṃkhya posits the transcendental self (puruṣa) over against the world of reality which is made up of ultimate reals (guṇas), viz., matter-stuff (tamas), energy-stuff (rajas), and intelligence-stuff (sattva), and which is not unknown and unknowable, while Kant sets up a dualism between the empirical self with its phenomenal and empirical knowledge and the *ding-an-sich* which is unknown and unknowable. According to the Sāṃkhya, the transcendental intelligent principle (puruṣa) is the fundamental presupposition of all knowledge, because it is puruṣa alone which intelligises the determinate, apprehended, knowledge of the nonintelligent intellect. The Sāṃkhya theory of knowledge is based upon the dualism of transcendental self (puruṣa) as distinguished from ahaṃkāra or empirical ego and the transempirical world of reals, but it does not end in phenomenalism or agnosticism, on the one hand, or in subjectivism or mentalism, on the other, though it believes in the categorized knowledge of the empirical world in time and space.

#### THE VAIŚEṢIKA DOCTRINE OF APEKṢĀBUDDHI

According to the Vaiśeṣika, substance, quality, action or motion, inherence, community, particularity, and negation are the seven kinds of existents; time and space are infinite and eternal substances; they are independently real and self-subsistent entities. So the Vaiśeṣika does not regard all these as the forms and categories of the mind but as self-subsistent entities which are objects of our experience. In this sense, the Vaiśeṣika doctrine is entirely realistic. But the Vaiśeṣika strikes an idealistic note in the doctrine of apekṣābuddhi. All numbers, from duality (dvitva) upwards, are artificial, i. e., they are creations of our minds; unity (ekatva) alone exists in things themselves—each being one; and they become two, etc., as we

join them in our thought and choose to regard them as two, three, etc., At first, there is the contact of an object with a sense-organ ; then there arises the knowledge of the genus 'unity' (ekatva) ; then the discriminative intellect (apekṣābuddhi) apprehends things as 'this is one', 'this is one', etc. ; then duality (dvitva) is produced in the object by the discriminative intellect ; then arises the knowledge of the genus of duality (dvitvatva) ; then arises the knowledge of the quality 'duality' as it exists in two things<sup>1</sup>.

We must note one thing here. According to the Vaiśeṣika discriminative intellect (apekṣābuddhi) does not merely apprehend number (duality, etc.) in the objects perceived, but produces duality, etc., in the objects of knowledge. Number, from duality upwards, is a creation of the mind<sup>2</sup>. But what is the proof of duality being produced by apekṣābuddhi ? Udayana argues that apekṣābuddhi must produce duality, etc., because duality in objects can never be found apart from apekṣābuddhi, and because we cannot hold that apekṣābuddhi is the cause only of its being known. It may be proved in another way. We cannot hold that duality is made known by noneternal apekṣābuddhi whose object is two or more individual unities, because these qualities reside in a plurality of objects. Therefore apekṣābuddhi is not what makes duality and other numbers known (jñāpaka) ; but it must be their cause<sup>3</sup>.

Thus we cannot perceive duality, etc., in the objects of perception through our senses, but our discriminative intellect (apekṣābuddhi) creates them in the objects of perception. Thus the understanding also makes a contribution to the building up of our knowledge of the external world. The senses can give us the knowledge of unity (ekatva), but they can never give us the knowledge of duality, etc., which are created by the intellect in the objects of knowledge.

<sup>1</sup>SDS., pp., 191-93.

<sup>2</sup>dvitvādayaḥ parārdhāntā apekṣābuddhijā matāḥ. BhP., 107.

<sup>3</sup>apekṣābuddhir eva dvitvāder utpādikā niyānikā ca tad-vināśaśca tad-vināśakaḥ. KV., p. 196.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF RECOGNITION

#### THE EPISTEMIC VALUE OF RECOGNITION

The process of recognition has been analysed by all the schools of Indian thinkers from both the standpoints of psychology and epistemology. We have discussed the psychology of recognition elsewhere<sup>1</sup>. Here we shall mainly confine our attention to the epistemological problem.

For the Buddhist, recognition is not a single unitary psychosis, but a mechanical composition of two psychoses, presentative and representative. For the Mīmāṃsaka, the Vedāntist, and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, recognition is a single psychosis of the nature of perception ; it is a qualified perception. For the Jaina, recognition is a single psychosis, but it is not a kind of perception ; it is a unique psychosis ; it is neither presentative nor representative, nor both but *sui generis* ; it is a chemical compound, as it were, of presentation and representation, different from both.

In recognition we have such a consciousness as 'this is that pot'. According to the Buddhists recognition involves two discrete psychoses, presentative and representative, mechanically associated with each other, of which the former apprehends 'thisness' or the present character, and the latter apprehends 'thatness' or the past character, of its object we have no single psychosis to apprehend the identity of an object in the past and the present. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, recognition is a single unitary psychosis which apprehends both the past condition or 'thatness' and its present condition 'thisness', of an object by a synthetic act of apperception ; the object of recognition is something existing at present but also qualified by the

<sup>1</sup>Indian Psychology : Cognition, Vol. I, 1958, Ch. VI.

past time ; the past is apprehended as 'past' and the present is apprehended as 'present' by recognition, the object of recognition being one and the same, being qualified both by the past and by the present. The Mīmāṃsaka also accepts this view. The Advaita Vedāntist agrees with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsaka that recognition is a single, unitary psychosis of a perceptual character modified by the sub-conscious impressions of past experience. But he differs from them in laying stress on the identity of the self which is apprehended by recognition while the Naiyāyika and others lay stress on the identity of the object, which is apprehended by recognition. According to the Advaita Vedāntist, in recognition we perceive not only the identity of its object, but also the identity of the self. But Prabhākara contends that in recognition there is not the consciousness of personal identity, but the consciousness of the identity of the object. There is no direct recognition of a permanent identical self; but personal identity is proved indirectly by the fact of the permanent objects of thought. For Prabhākara, the permanent self is not the *object* of recognition, as for the Advaita Vedāntist, but the substrate of recognition; the self cannot be perceived as an object, but it is inferred from the facts of previous perception and present recollection which are involved in recognition. Both the Advaita Vedāntist and Prabhākara regard consciousness as self-luminous. But the former regards the self as nothing but consciousness itself while the latter regards the self as the substrate of consciousness. According to the former the identity of the self is directly perceived by recognition while according to the latter it is inferred from recognition. The Jaina regards recognition as a unique single psychosis. It is a chemical compound, as it were, of perception and recollection. But is it not self-contradictory to say that one and the same psychosis has two temporal marks, *viz.*, the past and the present? The Jaina replies that it is not self-contradictory, because the manifoldness of one and the same object of knowledge is usual as monifoldness constitutes the very essence of reality<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup>IPC, Ch., Vi ; HIP, Vol II, pp. 197-205.

Let us now pass on to the epistemological problem. Of all the schools of Indian philosophers, the Buddhists alone totally deny the possibility of recognition as a unitary psychosis. According to them one and the same cognition cannot apprehend both the past and the present; perception can apprehend only the present, and recollection can apprehend only the past; there cannot be a fusion of the two psychoses, which can apprehend both the past and the present condition of an object; there cannot be a new psychosis called recognition which apprehends the identity of an object; in fact, there is no identity at all,—no identity of an object in the past and the present,—all objects and ideas being momentary. The Buddhists, therefore, are compelled to deny the possibility and validity of recognition in order to keep intact his doctrine of momentariness. Recognition, according to them, is a mechanical composition of two distinct psychoses, presentative and representative, of which the former apprehends the present and the latter apprehends the past condition of an object, and none of them apprehends the identity of an object in the past and the present. Therefore the so-called recognition is invalid.

The Jaina, on the other hand, holds that recognition is a new psychosis produced by perception and recollection, which apprehends the identity of an object in the past and the present, and that it is an obvious fact of experience, which cannot be denied. It cannot be argued that recollection apprehends an object both in the past and in the present, for recollection apprehends the past alone. Nor can perception apprehend it, for perception apprehends the present alone. If it be argued that determinate cognition produced by the subconscious impressions of both perception and recollection apprehends the past and the present both, then that is called recognition by the Jaina. The Buddhist does not admit the possibility or validity of recognition because that will contradict his doctrine of momentariness. But the Jaina contends that unless the Buddhist recognizes the validity of recognition,



his inference of the doctrine of momentariness that whatever exists is momentary will be impossible. For the Buddhist, the test of truth of a cognition lies in its harmony with its object. How can the Buddhist determine the harmony of a cognition with its object? If the cognition of an object, the Buddhist argues, leads to the actual attainment of the latter, it is known to be in harmony with the latter<sup>1</sup>. But in the absence of recognition the Buddhist cannot know that the object of perception or inference is actually attained since recognition alone apprehends the identity of an object in the past and the present. So the Buddhist doctrine of the test of truth becomes impossible in the absence of recognition<sup>2</sup>. Hence the Jaina concludes that recognition is a valid cognition, since it is in harmony with the object apprehended by it, *viz.*, the identity of its object in the past and the present<sup>3</sup>. The Jaina asks whether recognition is invalid, because it apprehends what has already been apprehended, or because it is produced after recollection, or because it is associated with the form of a word denoting the object, or because it is contradicted by a valid cognition<sup>4</sup>. The first alternative is not tenable. Recognition, indeed, does not apprehend entirely a new object, because the object of recognition has been apprehended by perception and recollection both,—perception apprehending the present character of the object and recollection apprehending its past character. But still recognition apprehends the identity of its object in the past and the present, which can be apprehended neither by perception nor by recollection. In this sense, the object of

<sup>1</sup>avisamvādaḥ jñānaṁ samyagjñānam. loka ca pūrvam upadarśitam arthaṁ prāpayan samvāda ucyate. tad-vajūnam api pradarśitam arthaṁ prāpayat samvādakam ucyate. NBT., p. 5.

<sup>2</sup>PKM., p. 97.

<sup>3</sup>pramāṇaṁ pratyabhihñā svagrhitārthā-visamvāditvāt pratyakṣādivat. Ibid, p. 98.

<sup>4</sup>tad-apramāṇyaṁ hi grhīta-grāhitvāt smaraṇāntarabhāvitvāt śabdā kāra-dhāritvād bādhyamānatvād vā syāt. PKM., p. 98.

recognition is partially new. So recognition is not invalid on the ground that it apprehends an object which has already been apprehended. Further, if the apprehension of an entirely new object is the criterion of its validity, then inference too cannot be regarded as valid by the Buddhist, since the object of inference also is not entirely new<sup>1</sup>. Hence recognition is not invalid because it apprehends something already apprehended by some other cognition. The second alternative also cannot be maintained. If the production of a cognition after recollection invalidates it, then the cognition of taste in the presence of a juice after the recollection of its colour will be invalid, and inference also which is regarded by the Buddhist as valid, will be invalid since it is produced after the recollection of the relation between the mark of inference (liṅga) and the subject of inference (liṅgī) or otherwise there will be no necessity of mentioning a homogeneous example<sup>2</sup>. The third alternative also does not stand to reason. This argument has already been refuted by the Jaina in connection with the validity of determinate perception. The last alternative also cannot be proved. Perception cannot contradict recognition because it cannot lead to a reaction upon the object of recognition, and because that cognition, which cannot lead to a reaction upon the object of another cognition either ending in fruition or the reverse, can neither establish it nor contradict it. Inference also cannot contradict it, because it also cannot lead to a reaction upon the object of recognition<sup>3</sup>. Hence recognition is valid because it is not contradicted by any kind of valid cognition.

The Nyāya regards recognition as a kind of qualified perception in which the perception of an object is modified by the subconscious impression of a past perception of it. And as a kind of perception it is valid. It does not mistake one object for another owing to certain defects. It apprehends an object as it really is. It is not produced by the external

<sup>1</sup>PKM., p. 98.   <sup>2</sup>Ibid, P. 98.   <sup>3</sup>Ibid, p. 98.

<sup>4</sup>tataḥ pramāṇam pratyabhijñā sakala-bādhaka-rहितatvāt. pratyabhijñāna-viśaye tasyāpy-apravṛtteḥ. Ibid, p 98.

sense-organs or the internal organ (manas) impaired by certain defects. So it should be regarded as valid. We are not to interpret, the Nyāya asserts, a determinate, direct, and immediate cognition ; it must be accepted as certain. There is no use of representative fictions in such a determinate, direct and immediate cognition. When there is a clear, distinct, and determinate cognition, it must be taken as valid. The Buddhist regards the process of recognition as invalid because it does not fit in with his hypothesis of momentariness. But he should base his hypothesis on the facts of experience. He should not alter or misinterpret the facts of experience to suit them to his hypothesis. He should base his theory on facts. He should not base facts on his theory. Recognition is the determinate, direct, and immediate cognition of an object modified by the subconscious impression of a past perception. So it must be regarded as valid<sup>1</sup>.

Prabhākara regards direct and immediate apprehension as valid, and recollection as invalid. He agrees with the Nyāya that all recollection is invalid, but he differs from the latter which divides apprehension into valid apprehension (pramā) and invalid apprehension (apramā). Prabhākara identifies all apprehension with valid knowledge (pramā). He means by pramāṇa valid cognition and not the means of valid cognition as the Nyāya holds. For him, apprehension (anubhūti) alone is valid knowledge, which is different from recollection (smṛti) ; recollection is invalid because it depends upon a previous perception<sup>2</sup>. But though recollection is invalid, recognition is a valid cognition, because the former is produced by subconscious impressions alone

<sup>1</sup>atikrānta-kāla-viśeṣita pūrvavartī-stambhādi-padārtha-viśayam. indriyādi-sannikarṣotpannamevedam pratyabhijñānam iti siddham. NM., p. 461.

<sup>2</sup>pramāṇam anubhūtiḥ, sā smṛter anyathā. na pramāṇam smṛtiḥ pūrva-pratipatti-vyapekṣaṇāt. PP., p. 42.

without the co-operation of the sense-organs, and as such, is mediate cognition while recognition is produced by subconscious impressions in co-operation with the sense-organs, and, consequently, it is a direct and immediate cognition<sup>1</sup>. Pārthasārathi Mīśra gives this account of Prabhākara's doctrine.

Veñkaṭanātha, a follower of Rāmānuja, gives the following account of recognition. Some maintain that there are two cognitions—perception and recollection—in recognition. Veñkaṭanātha cites the authority of Viṣṇucitta, a Viśiṣṭādvaitavādin, who holds that if recognition apprehends two objects, then only it consists of two cognitions, but who holds that recognition which is a kind of perception apprehends identity which is partless<sup>2</sup>. But how can a subconscious impression (saṁskāra) produce perception? Veñkaṭanātha replies that a subconscious impression aided by sensory contact with an object produces a perception which apprehends the identity of its object in the form 'this is that'. Recognitive perception apprehends the identity of its object in the past and at present<sup>3</sup>. It is not recollection, for it is not produced by mere subconscious impression. It is valid knowledge, since it apprehends the real nature of its object<sup>4</sup>.

Recognition does not apprehend a momentary object but a permanent object existing in the past and at present, which remains identical with itself. It is a single perception which apprehends a single object qualified by the past and the present. It cannot be argued that 'thatness' is cognized by recollection and that 'thisness' is cognized by perception because of the absence of sensory contact with a past object, since a single perception called recognition apprehends the

<sup>1</sup>smṛti-vyatirikṭā ca pratītiḥ anubhūtiḥ. smṛtiś ca saṁskāra-mātra-jāṇ jñānam abhidhiyate. mātra-grahaṇam ca saṁskāra-sadhrīcīnēndriyajasya pratyabhijñānasya smṛtīva-prasaṅgēnā-prāmāṇyam māprasāṅkīd ityēvam artham, tadevaṁ saṁskāra-tirikṭa-kāraṇa-janyaṁ jñānam pramāṇam. SD., N.S.P., p. 45.

<sup>2</sup>aikyam eva hi niramśam pratyabhijñā-pratyakṣa-viśayaḥ. NP. p., 488.

<sup>3</sup>aparokṣārth-aikya-sādhikā. Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>saṁskāra mātra-janyatvān na smṛtiḥ mānam eva tat. Ibid.

identity of an object in the form 'this is that'<sup>1</sup>. Sensory contact with an object aided by the subconscious impression of a past perception produces recognitive perception.

Viṣṇucitta holds that a single cognition apprehends itself and apprehends its object<sup>2</sup>. All cognitions are of the nature of perception inasmuch as they immediately apprehend themselves. But they are immediate or mediate knowledge according as they directly or indirectly apprehend their objects. Inference is mediate knowledge, for it apprehends its object indirectly through the medium of the knowledge of the mark (liṅga) of inference. Recollection is mediate knowledge, since it apprehends its object indirectly through the medium of a subconscious impression. Recognition is a single perceptual cognition, and yet of the nature of both immediate knowledge, and mediate knowledge because 'thisness' is directly known and 'thatness' is indirectly known<sup>3</sup>. Recognition is valid like determinate perception<sup>4</sup>. Determinate perception is valid, because it apprehends a determinate object with its qualities and relations and a name partly perceived and partly remembered as it really is. Similarly, recognitive perception also is valid, because it apprehends the identity of an object in the past and the present as it really is.

Recognition apprehends the identity of the self also. Recognition which apprehends the identity of the self is a distinct kind of recognition<sup>5</sup>. 'I who saw the object am the same person who touches it now'. This recognition apprehends the identity of the self in the past and the present. Some maintain that recognition of the identity of the self is

<sup>1</sup>tad-idam iti sāmānādhikarānyena grahaṇasy-aikatva-sphuraṇāt. Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>sva-prakāśakaṁ viśaya-prakāśakaṁ caikam eva jñānam. Ibid. p., 489.

<sup>3</sup>sarvatra viśaya-pekṣayaivā-parikṣatvā-numititva-smṛtit-vādi-vibhāgaḥ, tad-evam pratyabhijñāpy-ubhayātimiketi. Ibid, p. 489.

<sup>4</sup>pratyabhijñānam pramāṇam savikalpavat. Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>pratisandhānam apy-ātma-gocaraṁ pratyabhijñā-viśeṣa eva. Ibid, p. 490.

nothing but the cognition of the identity of two objects, viz ; 'thatness' or the past condition and 'thisness' or the present condition of an object. Venkṭaṇātha adds that this kind of recognition also involves the cognition of the identity of the self, which apprehends 'thisness' and 'thatness' of an object<sup>1</sup>. This kind of recognition also is valid, since it apprehends the identity of the self in the past and the present as it is.

## CHAPTER V

### THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF INDEFINITE PERCEPTIONS

There are certain perceptions which are uncertain and indefinite ; there are others, again, which are definite and certain. We have discussed the psychological nature of different types of indefinite perceptions elsewhere<sup>2</sup>. Here we shall discuss their epistemic value.

#### THE EPISTEMIC VALUE OF DOUBTFUL PERCEPTION ( SAMSAYA )

It is admitted almost by all schools of Indian thinkers, except the Buddhists, that valid knowledge must be definite and determinate, and that all indefinite perceptions are invalid. We have a doubtful perception when our mind oscillates between two alternatives. We have a doubtful perception when we have such a cognition as 'Is it a post or a man ?' In a doubtful perception, the perception of a common quality (e.g., tallness) simultaneously revives in memory the subconscious impressions of the peculiar characters of two objects (e.g., a post and a man) perceived in the past, and the mind oscillates between these conflicting ideas revived in memory, and cannot come to a definite decision whether the object of perception is one or the other.

<sup>1</sup>pratisandhir artha-dvaya-viṣay-aika buddhir ityēke. tatpāpi pṛthag anubhūta-nekāṛtha-gocar-aika-kartṛk-aika-buddhir iti pūraṇīyam. Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>IPC., pp. 262-72.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa avers that doubtful perceptions are invalid, but that they are not to be regarded as illusions for two reasons. In the first place, they are different in their psychological nature, and in the second place, their causes are different. Illusions are definite perceptions. The definite perception of a post in a man or that of a man in a post is an illusory perception. This is an instance of misperception, but it is definite because the mind does not oscillate between conflicting alternatives. A doubtful perception, on the other hand, is indefinite. In a doubtful perception the mind oscillates between two conflicting objects. So there is a difference in their psychological nature. There is a difference in their causes too. In an illusory perception there is the recollection of the peculiar character of one object which is different from the object that really excites the illusion. In the perception of silver in a naere there is the recollection of the peculiar character of silver after perceiving the common quality of both (viz., brightness). But in the doubtful perception 'Is this a man or a post', the perception of the common quality (tallness) brings about the recollection of the peculiar features of both (e.g., distinctive characters of a man and a post both). But they are equally invalid as they are not in keeping with the real nature of their objects<sup>1</sup>.

Bhāsarvajña defines *pramāṇa* as the instrument of right apprehension. But what is meant by rightness of a cognition? If it means that the cognition exists in its own essential nature, then doubtful perception and illusory perception also are valid because they exist in their essential nature. If it means that the cognition is not in disagreement with its object, then also doubtful perceptions and illusory perceptions are valid, because they also manifest their objects; if they did not manifest their objects, they would not exist. If it means that the cognition of the object is not contradicted by another cognition, then it may be asked when the cognition is contradicted. Either it is contradicted

at the moment when they exist. Or, it is contradicted at another moment. The former alternative is not tenable, because even doubtful perceptions and illusory perceptions are not contradicted at the moment when they exist. Nor is the cognition contradicted at another moment, because even a right cognition is contradicted by some other cognition<sup>1</sup>. Hence Jayasimhasūri concludes that rightness of a cognition means that it apprehends the real nature of a determinate and definite object<sup>2</sup>. So a doubtful perception is invalid, because it apprehends an indefinite object, and an illusory perception is invalid, because it apprehends a false object or misapprehends one object for another<sup>3</sup>.

Some doubt the invalidity of doubtful perceptions and illusory perceptions. They hold that the peculiar quality of a post and the peculiar quality of a man apprehended by the doubtful perception 'Is this a post or a man', and a nacre which is mistaken for a piece of silver and silver which is manifested in consciousness in the illusory perception of silver in a nacre, are real at their own moments, and do exist in some other place. But Jayasimhasūri asks whether those cognitions are certain or uncertain. If they are certain, they cannot be contradicted by some other cognition. If they are uncertain, they cannot be regarded as valid<sup>4</sup>.

There are some who doubt the very possibility of doubtful perceptions. It is asked whether a doubtful perception apprehends a substance or a quality. If it apprehends a substance, that substance is either real or unreal. If it is real, the cognition is not doubtful. If it is unreal, the cognition is illusory and not doubtful. If a doubtful perception apprehends a quality as distinguished from a substance, it apprehends the quality of one object (e.g., the quality of a post) or

<sup>1</sup>satya-jñānasyāpi jñānāntareṇa bādhyamānatvāt. NTD., p. 56.

<sup>2</sup>viśiṣṭa-vastu-svarūpa-paricchedakatvaṁ samyaktvam. NTD., p. 56.

<sup>3</sup>tena ca saśāyasya nirviśiṣṭa-viśayatayā viparyayasya ca mithyārūpa-viśayatayā vyapohah siddhah. NTD., p. 56.

<sup>4</sup>ad jñānaṁ kiṁ nīcitam anīcitam vā. ādye katham jñānāntareṇa bādhaḥ. dvitīye katham satyatā syād anīcitatvād iu. NTD., p. 57.



the quality of the other object (e.g., the quality of man), or the qualities of both. All these alternatives involve the same difficulties as described above. These qualities apprehended by a doubtful perception are either real or unreal. If they are real, it is valid. If they are unreal, it is an illusion and not a doubtful perception. If it be argued that one of these qualities is real and the other unreal, then the perception of the former is valid, and that of the latter is illusory. Jayasimhasuri gives this reply. A doubtful perception is apprehended by all as an uncertain and indefinite cognition, and it cannot be ascertained if a doubtful perception apprehends a substance or a quality. It can be ascertained by a valid cognition<sup>1</sup>.

#### THE EPISTEMIC VALUE OF UHA AND ANADHYAVASAYA.

In a doubtful perception we have a distinct consciousness of the two alternatives reproduced in memory by the perception of their common quality. But sometimes one of these alternatives is suppressed and the other is manifest, and sometimes both the alternatives are unmanifested. Thus we have two other kinds of indefinite perceptions.

Uha is an indefinite perception in which the mind does not oscillate between two equally distinct alternatives as in doubtful perceptions, but in which the mind is conscious of one of the alternatives, the other being suppressed. Śivāditya defines ūha as an indefinite perception in which only one of the suggested alternatives is manifest to consciousness<sup>2</sup>. When we perceive a tall object from a distance in a field of corns in which posts are not generally found, but only men, we have an indefinite perception such as 'that may be a tall man in the field'<sup>3</sup>.

Sometimes an indefinite perception takes the form of anadhyavasāya which is defined by Śivāditya as an indefinite

<sup>1</sup>NTD., p. 59.

<sup>2</sup>utkaṭaika-koṭikah saṁśayaḥ ūhaḥ. SP., 69.

<sup>3</sup>bāhyāli-pradeśe puruṣenā-nena bhavitavyam ityūha-jñānam. MB. p. 25 ; NSar., p. 2 ; NTD., p. 65.

perception of an object in which both the alternatives are not manifested to consciousness<sup>1</sup>. Sometimes when we perceive a tree, but do not remember its name, we have an indefinite perception of the tree in the form 'what may be the name of the tree<sup>2</sup>'. Or when a person walks barefooted on a lawn, he has indefinite perception of grass<sup>3</sup>.

Both ūha and anadhyavasāya are indefinite cognitions. They are not definite and certain because they do not give us a definite knowledge of their objects. In this sense, they are on a par with doubtful perceptions, and equally invalid. They do not, of course, apprehend one object as another like illusions. But they do not apprehend the real nature of their objects. So they are invalid but not illusory<sup>4</sup>.

Veñkāṭanātha does not recognize ūha and anadhyavasāya as distinct cognitions. Uha (e.g., 'that object may be probably a man') in which one alternative is cognized with its many qualities and the other alternative is not manifested, may be included in perception or inference. Uha, which is of the nature of inference, is called tarka. The cognition 'that may probably be a man' is an inference of the nature of conjecture. The cognition 'that is indeed a man' is of the nature of perception. Some hold that anadhyavasāya is a distinct kind of knowledge. It is a cognition of the form 'what may be the name of the tree'. Venkāṭanātha rejects this view and regards anadhyavasāya as of the nature of a desire to know the particular characteristics of an object after doubting its name or as doubtful perception in which the alternatives are not definitely known owing to the non-perception of their distinguishing features<sup>5</sup>. Both are invalid because they are indefinite.

<sup>1</sup>anālīṅgito-bhaya-koṭy-anavadhāraṇa-jñānam anadhyavasāyah.

SP., p. 69.

<sup>2</sup>kim-samjñāko' yaṁ vṛkṣa ity-anadhyavasāya-jñānam. MB., p. 25, NTD., p. 66.

<sup>3</sup>kim ityālocana-mātram anadhyavasāyah, yathā gacchat-tṛṇa-sparśa-jñānam. PNT., I, 13.

<sup>4</sup>ūhā-nadhyavasāyau samśayān na prthak anavadhāraṇa-rūpaika-  
lekṣaṇā-kṛāntatvāt. NTD., p. 65. RKA., I, 13.

<sup>5</sup>tadaśaram tasya samjñādi-viśeṣa-sandeha-samapantara bhāvi-tad.

cognition and a valid cognition, and, consequently, there would be neither a sublating cognition nor a sublated cognition. If, again, the forms of illusory cognitions such as silver and the like were not those of external objects, but mere subjective forms of cognitions, then they would be apprehended as such, like the forms of pleasure and pain, and not as something external, and a person would exert himself to get the object of illusion, as if it were a subjective cognition. But, in fact, an illusion appears to apprehend an external object, and a person under illusion exerts himself to get hold of an external object. If the Yogācāra argues that an internal subjective cognition is mistaken for an external objective fact owing to the potency of nescience (avidyā), then the doctrine of Ātmakhyāti implies Anyathākhyāti, since an internal momentary cognition is apprehended as an external permanent object<sup>1</sup>.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa offers the following criticisms of the doctrine of Ātmakhyāti. According to the Yogācāra a mere subjective cognition appears to be a cognizer, a cognized object, and a cognition. If in an illusion a mere cognition were manifested in consciousness,—and not an external object,—then we should have such a cognition as '*I am silver*', and not as '*this is silver*'. Further, the doctrine of Ātmakhyāti implies Anyathākhyāti as shown above. Furthermore, it implies Asatkhyāti too, since the cognition of externality has no real objective basis—inasmuch as the Yogācāra denies the existence of external objects<sup>2</sup>.

Vācaspati Miśra offers the following criticisms of the doctrine of Ātmakhyāti. 1. An illusion is the misperception of an

<sup>1</sup>jñānasyaivāyam ākāro' nādyavidyo-paplava-sāmarthyād bahir iva pratibhāsate, anādi-vicitra-vāsanāśca krama—vipākavatyah puṁsām santi tenā-nekā-kārāṇi jñānāni svākāra-mātra-saṁvedyāni kramena bhavantīty-ātmakhyātir eveti. PKM., p. 13.

<sup>2</sup>kim ca yad antarjñeyarūpaṁ hi bahirvad avabhāsate ity-abhyupagamād iyam api viparītakhyātir eva syāt. asatkhyātir api ceyam bhavatyeva bahirbuddher asattvāt. NM., p. 178.

object as a different object. It does not apprehend an internal form of cognition as an external object. 2. The illusory silver being a form of cognition is established either by apprehension or by inference. The apprehension is either the cognition of silver or a sublating cognition. It is not the cognition of silver because it cognizes 'this is silver', which is of the nature of 'not—I', and because it does not cognize 'I am silver'. The Yogācāra maintains that a cognizer is identical with cognition. 3. The Yogācāra may argue that an illusory cognition cognizes its internal form as external, and that, consequently, though its object is the form of a cognition, it is cognized as not of the nature of 'I' or internal cognition, and that its being an internal form of cognition is known by a sublating cognition. This argument is wrong because a sublating cognition denies the existence of the form of an external object (e.g., silver) present to a sense-organ, and because it does not prove that the illusory object (e.g., silver) is the internal form of a cognition. 4. The illusory object being an internal form of cognition was never perceived before. How, then, can it be known? It cannot be known by inference. Hence the doctrine of Ātmakhyāti is not tenable<sup>1</sup>.

Udayana criticizes the doctrine of Ātmakhyāti in the following manner. The sublating cognition 'this is not silver' merely denies 'silverness' of 'this' but does not prove that 'silver' is a form of cognition. 'Silver' as an internal form of cognition was never perceived before; so it cannot be inferred from the sublating cognition 'this is not silver'. Even if it were perceived before, it could not be inferred from the sublating cognition. If it could, then the sublating cognition 'this is not silver' would affirm 'silverness' of the ground and the like because of its relation to the same cognition. But it does not affirm 'silverness' of the ground and the like. Why does it not affirm 'silverness' of the ground and the like? It does not do so because the ground was never perceived

<sup>1</sup>NVTT., p. 54.

to be silver before even in dream. It may be argued that in the cognition of real silver a cognition is cognized to assume the form of silver. But in an illusion 'this' is perceived to be 'silver'. How, then, can it be proved that a cognition assumes the form of 'silver?' There is no evidence to prove that an internal form of consciousness is external. As the sublating cognition 'this is not silver' denies 'silverness' of 'this', so it clearly denies 'silverness' of 'I' or a cognition. If this is said to be an illusion, then 'silverness' is not attributed to an external object, but externality is attributed to an internal cognition which is of the nature of 'I'<sup>1</sup>. Then the sublating cognition denies the externality of an internal cognition or 'I'. Then it affirms that 'I am silver'. Then what is the meaning of 'this is silver?' It means 'I am not silver'. Hence 'this is not silver' and 'I am not silver' being opposed to each other, there cannot be false identification of the one with the other, just as 'this is' and 'this is not' and 'I am' and 'I am not' being opposed to each other, there cannot be false identification of the one with the other. But there is false identification of 'I' with 'this'—of an internal cognition with an external object. Therefore both 'I' and 'this' are not 'silver', but another object existing elsewhere is 'silver'. Thus the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti is established. This is an unassailable argument which cannot be set aside by any flimsy argument of the Yogācāra. Udayana regards his criticisms as unchallengeable<sup>2</sup>.

#### THE MĀDHYAMIKA DOCTRINE OF ASATKHYĀTI

The Buddhist Nihilist, the Mādhyamika, holds that an illusion is the apprehension of a nonexistent object. In the illusion of silver in a nacre there is the apprehension of nonexistent silver as real. Though silver does not exist, it is perceived as real<sup>3</sup>. An illusion is the perception of a nonexistent

<sup>1</sup>tasmin-nevāhamāspade bāhyatvam āropyate. NVTP., i, 1, 2 ; p. 411.

<sup>2</sup>tasmād ubhayorapi rajatatva-pratiṣedho' nyasya rajatatvaṁ vyavasthāpayatīti pāṣāṇa-rekheyaṁ na apanctum śakyate. Ibid, p. 412.

<sup>3</sup>bauddhāstu asat eva rajataṁ khyāyate ity-asatkhyātim āhuḥ. P.R., p. 17.

(asat) object as existent. In illusion an object is manifested to consciousness as real, though it is proved to be unreal by philosophical speculation<sup>1</sup>.

Prabhācandra, a Jaina, offers the following criticisms of the doctrine of Asatkhyāti. 1. According to the Mādhyamika, neither external things nor internal cognitions are ontologically real, and, consequently, there is neither variety in external things nor variety in cognitions. So he cannot account for a variety of illusions, which we actually experience<sup>2</sup>. 2. Further, there is the illusion of silver in a nacre. Why does not a sky-flower appear in consciousness here? Why is there no illusion of a sky-flower in a nacre? The Mādhyamika cannot account for it.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa offers the following criticisms of the doctrine of Asatkhyāti. 1. What does the apprehension of a non-existent object mean? Is it an absolutely nonexistent object like a sky-flower? Or is it an object existing in some other time and place? If the latter, then Asatkhyāti is nothing but Anyathākhyāti, according to which, silver existing at some other time and in some other place appears in the illusion of silver in a nacre, but not existing at that time and in that place. If the former, then there will be an illusion of sky-flower also. But an absolutely nonexistent object never appears in consciousness in an illusion. So it can never be an object of illusion. 2. It may be argued that a non-existent object appears in consciousness through the intensity of a subconscious impression. But a subconscious impression (vāsanā) presupposes the existence of a real object, because it is a psychic trace left by the previous perception of a real object. Such an impression cannot produce the illusion of an absolutely nonexistent object. If some other kind of impression be supposed to be the cause of the illusory cognition of a non-existent object, then why should it produce the illusion of silver and not that of a sky-

<sup>1</sup>pratibhāsamāno' rthaḥ sadrūpo vicāryamāno nāsti-ty-asatkhyātir—  
evāsau. PKM, p. 13.

<sup>2</sup>na hy-asatkhyāti-vādinō' rthagataṁ jñānagataṁ vā vaicitryam asti  
yenā-neka-prakāra bhrāntiḥ'syāt. Ibid, p. 13.

flower? The Mādhyamika cannot account for it. An absolutely nonexistent object can never appear in consciousness in an illusion; nor can it induce a person to exert himself to acquire it. Hence the doctrine of Asatkhyāti is not tenable<sup>1</sup>.

Vācaspati Miśra gives the following exposition of the doctrine of Asatkhyāti. An illusion apprehends a nonexistent object on the strength of the sublating cognition 'this is not silver'. The sublating cognition denies the existence of silver. Hence the illusion, which is contradicted by the sublating cognition, apprehends the nonexistence of silver. It cannot be argued that a nonexistent entity cannot be the object of an illusion, because the object of a cognition is not its cause so that a nonexistent entity may not produce a cognition. But a cognition arising from its cause has a peculiar power of manifesting or cognizing an object, whether it be an existent entity or whether it be a nonexistent entity, and its power of cognizing such an entity depends upon its cause. Here a nonexistent entity does not produce an illusory cognition; but an illusory cognition by dint of its own power cognizes a nonexistent object<sup>2</sup>.

Vācaspati Miśra asks whether an illusion cognizes a nonexistent entity as existent and therefore is said to cognize a nonexistent entity or whether an illusion cognizes an existent entity as another existent entity and therefore is said to cognize a nonexistent entity, since an existent entity cannot exist as another existent entity. He urges that if an illusion cognizes a nonexistent entity as silver, and that if it does not cognize an existent naṅre as silver, then the Mādhyamika cannot explain why a person exerts himself to pick up a naṅre as silver, and also why his sublating cognition 'this is not silver' denies the existence of silver of 'this' before him, at which he points with his finger, if his illusion did not

<sup>1</sup>NM, pp. 177-78.

<sup>2</sup>kintu sva-kāraṇādhiṅaṅ sāmāthyātisayaṅ sa tādrśo jñānasya yena santam iva asantam api gocarayati. NVTT., i, 1, 2; p. 54.

falsely ascribe silver to 'this'. Therefore an illusion does not cognize a nonexistent entity as another existent entity (e.g., silver). He further urges that if an illusion cognizes an existent entity (e.g., a nacre) as another existent entity (e.g., silver), he agrees with the Mādhvamika who abandons his doctrine and embraces the Naiyāyika doctrine of Anyathākhyāti<sup>1</sup>.

A subconscious impression (vāsanā) also cannot produce the cognition of a nonexistent entity. It depends upon the previous perception of an existent object. So it can produce the recollection of the object that was existent in the past. It can never produce the cognition of an absolutely nonexistent entity. If it could produce the cognition of an absolutely nonexistent entity independently of the previous perception of an existent object, it would always produce illusory cognitions of nonexistent entities. If it depends upon the previous perception of an existent object, then the doctrine of Asatkhyāti is undermined. In fact, an illusion is the misapprehension of an existent object (e.g., a nacre) as another existent object (e.g., silver) which is remembered. In the illusion 'this is silver' both 'this' and 'silver' are existent, and there is false ascription of the latter to the former. An illusion is the apprehension of a qualification in an object in which it does not exist. The illusion 'this is silver' is the false attribution of 'silverness' to 'this' or a nacre<sup>2</sup>.

Udayana criticizes the doctrine of Asatkhyāti in the following manner. A responsive action follows upon the apprehension of an existent object (e.g., 'this'). It does not follow upon the apprehension of an existent object as nonexistent. It cannot be argued that nonexistent silver is manifested in consciousness and that responsive action to appropriate illusory silver is due to nonapprehension of distinction between 'this' and nonexistent silver. This assumption is criticized by Udayana while he refutes Prabhākara's doctrine of Vivekākhyāti<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup>Ibid, pp. 54-55.

<sup>2</sup>NNP., i, 1, 2 ; p. 414.

<sup>3</sup>NVTP., i, 1, 2 ; p. 413.



Vardhamāna criticizes the doctrine of Asatkhyāti thus. A single nonexistent entity alone cannot be manifested in consciousness because it has no cause. A nonexistent entity tinged with, or qualified by, an existent entity, can be manifested in consciousness. The sense-organs cannot produce the cognition of a nonexistent entity; they can produce the cognitions of existent objects only with which they have intercourse. The marks of inference (liṅga) can produce the cognitions of existent objects which are uniformly related to them. They cannot produce the cognition of a nonexistent entity. Invariable concomitance of a mark of inference (sādhana) and an inferred property (sādhya) cannot produce the cognition of a nonexistent entity.

#### THE SĀMĀKHYA DOCTRINE OF SADASATKHYĀTI

The "Sāmkhyapravācanasūtra", which is rightly regarded by scholars as of much later date than the aphorisms of the other schools, is attributed to Kapila. It expounds the doctrine of Sadasatkhyāti. The Sāmkhya holds that an illusion apprehends something real (sat) and something unreal (asat) because of its being uncontradicted and contradicted<sup>1</sup>. In the illusion 'this is silver' 'this' is existent because it is not contradicted, and 'silver' is nonexistent because it is contradicted. The sublating cognition 'this is not silver' sublates the cognition of 'silver'. The Mādhyamika holds that in the illusion of silver in a nacre something nonexistent, e.g., the identity of a nacre with a piece of silver, appears in consciousness. This view is wrong, since a nonexistent object (e.g., a sky-flower) can neither evoke a response in a person to acquire it nor produce a cognition. Prabhākara holds that the illusion of silver in a nacre consists of the perception of 'this' and the recollection of 'silver', and that non-apprehension of distinction between them (bhedāgraha) prompts a person to exert himself to appropriate the illusory silver. This view is wrong, since apprehension of nondifference

<sup>1</sup>sad-asat-khyātir bādhā-bādhāt. SPS., V, 56.

(abhedagrahaṇa) evokes a response and since the illusion 'this is silver' is sublated by the valid cognition 'this is not silver'. Prabhākara regards all apprehension *que* apprehension as valid. But this view is wrong, for a valid cognition cannot be contradicted<sup>1</sup>. According to the Advaita Vedāntist, the object of an illusion is neither real, nor unreal, nor both, but indefinable. If it were real, it would not be contradicted by a sublating cognition. If it were unreal, it would not produce a perception. If it were both real and unreal, it would involve self-contradiction. Hence it is indefinable (anirvacanīya). This view is wrong, since there is no indefinable object.<sup>2</sup> The illusion, in the present case, is defined as 'this is silver'. The Naiyāyika holds that an illusion is the apprehension of an object as a different one, and that in the illusion of silver in a nacre a nacre is manifested to consciousness as silver. This view is wrong, for that one thing appears in consciousness as another thing is contradicted by experience. The Śāṅkhya concludes that an illusion is the apprehension of an existent entity and a nonexistent entity (sadasatkhyāti). In the illusion 'this is silver' the element 'this'—the given substratum—is existent because it is present to the visual organ and because its cognition is not contradicted, and the element 'silver' is nonexistent because its cognition is not contradicted<sup>3</sup>. This is Aniruddha's interpretation. But Vijñānabhikṣu interprets the aphorism in another way. In the illusion 'this is silver' the silver that appears in consciousness is real (sat) because it exists in a jeweller's shop, and it is unreal (asat) because it is wrongly ascribed to a nacre<sup>4</sup>. Both the interpretations of the Śāṅkhya doctrine do not differ much from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of Anyathākhyāti which will be explained later.

<sup>1</sup>na, mato bādha-darjanāt. SPB., V, 58.

<sup>2</sup>nā-nirvacanīyasya, tad-abhāvāt. SPB., V, 54.

<sup>3</sup>idam rajatam iti pūrovariti-viśayatayā sat, abhēdhanāt. rajata-viśayatayā tvasat, bādhat. SSV., V, 56

<sup>4</sup>rajatam vapig-vithistha-rūpeṇ sat śukty-adhyasta-rūpeṇ cā-sat. SPB., V, 56.

## THE VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA VEDĀNTIST'S DOCTRINE OF SATKHYĀTI

Rāmānuja holds that all cognitions are valid according to those who are proficient in the Vedas<sup>1</sup>. He maintains that an illusion apprehends a real (sat) object. The illusion 'this is silver' apprehends real silver. He proves his doctrine of Satkhyāti by appealing to the doctrine of triplication (trivṛtkaraṇa) of the elements of light, water and earth, according to which all physical things are composed of them in different proportions so that a nacre contains silver in a small proportion while a piece of silver contains silver in a larger proportion. All physical things contain other things in small proportions according to the Śruti<sup>2</sup>. A nacre is similar to a piece of silver, because it contains a part of silver.<sup>3</sup> If the illusion 'this is silver' apprehends real silver, why is it contradicted by the sublating cognition 'this is not silver'? When a nacre is not perceived as a nacre owing to some defect of the visual organ and when only the small part of silver in it is perceived, a person exerts himself to pick up the piece of silver. When the defect of the visual organ is removed, and, consequently, when a nacre is perceived as a nacre, he abstains from picking up the piece of silver. When a nacre is perceived as containing a large part of it, i.e., as a nacre, the sublating cognition 'this is not silver' contradicts the illusion 'this is silver'.<sup>4</sup> The sublating cognition does not contradict the illusion because the latter apprehends an unreal object. When the small part of silver is perceived in a nacre, its cognition is called an illusion, and when the large part of nacre is perceived in the nacre, its cognition is called a sublating cognition. The distinction between a sublated cognition or illusion and a sublating cognition does not depend upon the fact that the former apprehends an unreal object while the

<sup>1</sup>yathārthaṁ sarva-vijñānam iti vedavidān matam. RBS., i, 1, 1.

<sup>2</sup>śrutyaiḥ darśitā, tasmāt sarve sarvatra saṅgatāḥ. Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>tadeva sadṛśaṁ tasya yat tad-dravyaika-deśa-bhāk. śuktyādeu rajatā-deśa bhāvaḥ śrutyaiḥ coditaḥ. Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>ete yathārthaṁ rūpyādi-vijñānaṁ śuktikādiṣu. bādhya-bādhaka-bhāvo'pi bhūyastveno-papadyate. Ibid.

latter apprehends a real object. Though all physical things contain all other physical things in different proportions, the distinction between an illusion and a contradicting perception depends upon the fact that the former apprehends an incomplete part (*e.g.*, silver) of its object (*e.g.*, a nacre) while the latter apprehends its complete part (*e.g.*, a large part of a nacre).<sup>1</sup> Hence Rāmānuja concludes that all cognitions apprehend real objects, and that illusory cognitions are not capable of leading to fruitful actions while valid cognitions are capable of leading to fruitful actions.<sup>2</sup>

Śrīnivāsa, a follower of Rāmānuja, advocates the doctrine of Satkhyāti by appealing to the doctrine of quintuplication of the elements of ether, air, light, water and earth. The illusion 'this is silver' is a valid cognition, because silver exists in a nacre in small parts. It is contradicted by the sublating cognition 'this is not silver', because the nacre does not contain a large part of silver.<sup>3</sup> The illusion is due to the absence of apprehension of the relation of the nacre to a large part of it. It may be argued that silver cannot be apprehended because of its non-intercourse with the visual organ and because perception is always due to the intercourse of an object with a sense-organ. This argument is wrong, because even an object not present to a sense-organ can be perceived owing to the power of some defects. Silver can be perceived owing to some defects of the eyes. Hence perceptual illusion apprehends a real object; the object of an illusion is real; an illusion is so called because it cannot produce a successful action.<sup>4</sup>

Rāmānuja criticizes the other doctrines of illusion by showing that they involve the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti. The doctrine of Asatkhyāti involves Anyathākhyāti, since it regards an illusion as the apprehension of a nonexistent object

<sup>1</sup> nāto mithyārtha-satyārtha-viśayatva-nibandhanah. evam sarvasya sarvate vyavahāra-vyavasthitiḥ. Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> ataḥ sarvaṁ vijñāna-jātaṁ yathārtham iti siddham. Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> kṛti-rajata-jñānādāsvapi vaidika-paścīkaraṇa-prakriyayā rajatādya-vyavahāraṁ satvāt tatra rajatajñānam api pamiṣam, NPNS., p. 37.

<sup>4</sup> bhramādi-pratyakṣa-jñānaṁ yathārtham eva. viśaya-vyavahāra-bādhād bhramatvam. YMD., pp. 4-5.

as existent. The doctrine of Ātmakhyāti involves Anyathākhyāti, for it regards an illusion as the apprehension of an internal cognition as an external object. The doctrine of Akhyāti or Vivekākhyāti involves Anyathākhyāti, because a composite cognition composed of a percept and a memory-image is apprehended as a single cognition in an illusion.<sup>1</sup> Rāmānuja's criticism of Śaṅkara's Anirvacanīyavāda will be given later.

### THE CRITICISM OF SĀTKHYĀTI

The Advaitavādin criticizes the doctrine of Satkhyāti. Rāmānuja argues that the element of silver is perceived in a nacre owing to a certain defect of the visual organ. Silver consists of the element of light (tejas) mostly. Rāmānuja cannot explain why the sun, lightning, and other fiery objects are not perceived in a nacre, though fire or light is common to them all. Further, Rāmānuja assumes that one thing is similar to another, for the former contains a part of the latter and does not prove this assumption. A nacre is similar to a piece of silver because it is endued with brightness, etc., which are the common qualities of both, and not because it contains a part of silver. If the ornaments of Caitra are similar to those of Maitra because the former contain a part of the latter, then Caitra will mistake Maitra's ornaments for his own. Hence the doctrine of Satkhyāti is groundless<sup>2</sup>.

Jayātīrtha, a Dvaitavādin Vedāntist, a follower of Madhva, offers the following criticisms of Satkhyāti in addition to what is stated above. It cannot satisfactorily explain the cause of responsive activity. Why does a person under illusion exert himself to acquire illusory silver? The nonperception of a large part of a nacre cannot be the cause of his action, because, in that case, even a person in sleep would act likewise. If the perception of a small part of silver is the

<sup>1</sup>khyātyantara-vādināñca anyāthā-vabhāso' vadyā-irayānīyaḥ, asatkhyāti-pakṣe sad-ātmanā, ātmakhyāti-pakṣe cātrihātmanā, akhyāti-pakṣe pi jñāna-dvayam ekatvena. RBS., I, I, 1.

<sup>2</sup>Advaitamāda ; IPC., pp. 296-97.

cause of action, then it is either the perception of a small part of silver as *such*, or the perception of a small part of silver as a large part of it, or mere perception. On the first view, there will never be responsive action. On the second view, one thing will be perceived as a different thing (*anyathākhyāti*). On the third view, every other object, which is similar to silver, will evoke the responsive action. Further, if the perception of a small part of silver in a nacre be considered to be an illusion, it is because of its apprehending a partial truth or because of its not apprehending all the elements of a given object. In that case, even the best devotees' knowledge of God would be false because of its comprehending a partial truth<sup>1</sup>.

#### THE DOCTRINE OF PRASIDDHĀRTHAKYĀTI

Jayasīmha Sūri mentions the doctrine of Prasiddhārthakhyāti, but does not mention who the advocate of it is and does not give an exposition of it<sup>2</sup>. Prabhācandra also mentions this doctrine and criticizes it but does not mention the advocate's name. According to this doctrine, an illusion apprehends an object established by knowledge. The illusion of water in the rays of the sun in a desert is real, because it is presented to consciousness as a jar is.

Prabhācandra offers the following criticisms of this doctrine.

1. If the illusory perception of water (e.g., mirage) apprehended real water, and if the sublating cognition 'this is not water but rays of the sun' apprehended real rays of the sun, then there would be no distinction between a valid perception and an illusion, and all perceptions would be equally valid<sup>3</sup>.
2. If the facts stated above were true, then a person having the illusory perception of water and acting upon it would feel the wetness of the ground, etc., which are the effects of water,—though water itself might be absent,—because the

<sup>1</sup>Nyāyasudhā, p. 53. *The Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya*, pp. 121-22.

<sup>2</sup>NTD., p. 67.

<sup>3</sup>Yathāvaśhīkā-rtha-grhītvā-viśeṣe hi bhrāntā-bhrānta-vyavahāri-bhāvaḥ. sūtr. PKM., p. 13.

effects of water are not momentary like a flash of a lightning. 3. And if all perceptions were equally valid, then no perception would be contradicted by another cognition<sup>1</sup>. Hence the doctrine of Prasiddhārthahyāti is untenable.

This doctrine resembles the doctrine of Satkhyāti which regards an illusion as the apprehension of a real object. But it differs from the latter in that it does not seek to prove it by appealing to the metaphysical doctrine of triplication or quintuplication of the elements. It also partly resembles the Sāṃkhya doctrine of Sadasatkhyāti which regards an illusion 'this is silver' as the apprehension of 'this' which is real (sat) and of 'silver' which is unreal (asat). The doctrine of Prasiddhārthakhyāti does not regard the illusion as apprehension of unreal silver. It agrees with Prabhākara and the Advaita Vedāntist that what is presented to consciousness in an illusion must be its objective substrate. Silver is presented to consciousness in the illusion 'this is silver', and, consequently, it must be the object of the illusion. The annotator of the "Prameyakamalamārṭṇḍa" ascribes the doctrine of Prasiddhārthakhyāti to Bhāskara.

#### PRABHĀKARA'S DOCTRINE OF VIVEKĀKHYĀTI OR AKHYĀTI

Prabhākara regards an illusion as due to nondiscrimination<sup>2</sup>. Śālikanātha Miśra explains nondiscrimination as nondistinction of perception and recollection<sup>3</sup>. In the illusion 'this is silver' 'this' is perceived and 'silver' is remembered. An illusion is a composite cognition consisting of a percept and a memory-image—a presentative element and a representative element—which are not distinguished from each other. The nondiscrimination of these two elements is the cause of responsive action for the appropriation of the illusory object (e.g., silver). A sublating cognition (bādhakajñāna) does not contradict an illusion but simply distinguishes the presentative

<sup>1</sup> bādhyā-bādhaka-bhāvaśca na prāpnoti, sarva-jñānānām avitathārtha-  
viśayaivā-vimūṣāt. PKM., p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> katham tathā viparyayaḥ? agrahaṣād eva. Bṛhasi, I, 1, 5.

<sup>3</sup> vivekāgrahaṣāt grahaṇa-smaraṇayor-bhedaś ca manyate.

Ujainmā, I, 1 5.

element and the representative element from each other. They are not discriminated from each other so long as an illusion lasts, because the representative element does not appear in consciousness as representation owing to lapse of memory (*smṛtipramoṣa*).<sup>1</sup> Memory is the apprehension of something perceived in the past. Owing to lapse of memory representation appears to be perception.<sup>2</sup>

Prabhākara explains some illusions by nondiscrimination of two percepts or presntative elements. The illusion of the double moon is due to the nondiscrimination of the two percepts of the same moon, which are produced by the divided rays of the visual organ. The illusion of a yellow conchshell is due to the nondiscrimination of the percept of the yellow colour of the bile that vitiates the jaundiced eyes and the perception of a conchshell. The nonperception of its white colour is due to the defect of the visual organ. Similarly, the illusion of bitter sugar is due to the nondiscrimination of the bitter taste of the bile that vitiates the tongue and the percept of sugar. The nonperception of the sweet taste of sugar is due to the vitiated tongue. The illusion of a circular light produced by a firebrand whirled around is due to nondiscrimination of the discrete percepts of the firebrand<sup>3</sup>. Prabhākara's doctrine of illusion is also called Akhyāti or nonapprehension.

Prabhākara offers the following criticism of the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti. What is the object of the illusion of silver in a nacre according to this doctrine? It is either silver existing in some other time and place, or a nacre which conceals its own form and assumes the form of silver, or a nacre itself in its true form. The first alternative implies Asatkhyāti, for silver existing in some other time and place is nonexistent here and now and perceived as existent. The second alternative is unintelligible. On the second alternative, is there an apprehension of a nacre or an apprehension of

<sup>1</sup>PP., p. 43.

<sup>2</sup>*grahaṇāyā viśeṣo hi gṛhīta-grahāṇaṁ smṛtiḥ. gṛhītābhāva-moṣeṇa gṛhītiriti tiṣṭhati.* PP., p. 35. RV., i, 1, 5, p. 52.

<sup>3</sup>PP., pp. 35-36.



silver? If the former, then there is no illusion. If the latter, then there is no proof for the existence of a nacre there, since silver is manifested in consciousness. The existence of a nacre cannot be known by the sublating cognition 'this is not silver', since the object of an illusion cannot be established by some other cognition. The sublating cognition merely proves the nonexistence of 'silver' but does not ascertain the real nature of its object (*e.g.*, a nacre). The third alternative also is not tenable, since what is manifested in consciousness is its object. If a present nacre were an object of the illusion of silver, the proximate piece of land, etc., would be the object of the illusion. Hence Prabhākara concludes that an illusion is not the apprehension of an object as a different one<sup>1</sup>. He regards an illusion as a negative cognition, nonapprehension of distinction of two elements, or nondiscrimination, and not a positive misapprehension. He regards it as an omission and not as a commission.

#### THE DOCTRINE OF AKHYĀTI

Prabhācandra discusses the doctrine of Akhyāti but does not mention who the proponent of it is. The annotator of his work ascribes it to the Cārvāka. According to this doctrine, an illusion has no objective substrate; but it is entirely objectless or purely subjective. In the illusion of water (mirage) in the rays of the sun in a desert, its object is either water, or the absence of water, or the rays of the sun, or something else. Water cannot be the object of the illusory perception, for, in that case, the perception would be valid and not illusory. The absence of water cannot be the object of the illusory perception, since the cognition of water induces the person under illusion to get water. The rays of the sun cannot be the object of the illusory perception, because, in that case, the perception would not be illusory but valid inasmuch as it would represent the real nature of the external stimulus. The rays of the sun cannot be perceived as water, for one thing cannot be

<sup>1</sup>NM., pp. 176-77; HIF., Vol. I, pp. 905-09; IPC, p. 300.

perceived as a different thing ; for instance, a cloth cannot be perceived as a jar. Hence an illusion is objectless<sup>1</sup>.

#### CRITICISM OF THE DOCTRINE OF AKHYĀTI

Prabhācandra offers the following criticisms of the doctrine of Akhyāti. 1. If illusions have no objects, they are indistinguishable from one another. For instance, the illusion of water in the rays of the sun cannot be distinguished from the illusion of silver in a nacre. 2. If an illusion is not produced by an external object, it cannot be distinguished from dreamless sleep. It may be argued that there is no difference between them, except for the fact that there is consciousness in an illusion while in dreamless sleep there is no consciousness at all ; and that they agree in having no external stimulus. But Prabhācandra contends that at least the object that appears in consciousness in an illusion must be regarded as its object. Hence an illusion can never be regarded as a nonapprehension of an object.<sup>2</sup> It should be carefully noted that the doctrine of Akhyāti ascribed to the Cārvāka is different from Prabhākara's doctrine of Vivekākhyāti which is also called Akhyāti. Prabhākara means by Akhyāti nonapprehension of distinction or nondiscrimination (vivekākhyāti) whereas the Cārvāka means by Akhyāti nonapprehension of an object. We have not been able to find the treatment of the Cārvāka doctrine of Akhyāti in any other Sanskrit work. Prabhācandra calls Prabhākara's doctrine Vevekākhyāti.

#### THE ADVAITA VEDANTIST DOCTRINE OF ANIRVACANĪYAKHYĀTI

The Advaita Vedantist holds that an illusion is the apprehension (khyāti) of an indefinable (anirvacanīya) object. It is neither real (sat) nor unreal (asat) nor both but indefinable. If it were real, it would not be sublated. If it were unreal, it

<sup>1</sup>tato nirālambanam jalādi-viparyaya-jñānam. PKM., p. 13.

<sup>2</sup>bhīrānti-bhūptā-vasthāyor-aviśeṣa-prasaṅgaśca. na hy-ātra pratibhāsamānārtha-vyatirekeṇā-nyo'sti viśeṣaḥ. pratibhāsamānaśca taj-jñānasyālambanam ityucyate. tannākhyātir eva viparyayaḥ. PKM., p. 13.

would not be sublated. If it were unreal, it would not produce an immediate apprehension. It cannot be both real and unreal, since the two contradictory attributes of reality and unreality cannot exist in the same thing. Hence the Avaitavādin (e.g. Śaṅkara) holds that indefinable silver is produced at the time and place, produces the illusion of silver (e.g., 'this is silver'), and lasts as long as the illusion lasts. Indefinable silver has illusory reality (prātibhāsikasattā) as distinguished from empirical reality (vyāvahārika sattā) of things in the world, and ontological reality (pāramārthika sattā) of Brahman.

Dharmarājādhvarīndra, a follower of Śaṅkara, avers that the causes of indefinable illusory silver are different from those of real silver which has empirical reality. A mode of the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa) or manas in the form of 'this' and 'brightness' arises from the contact of the given substratum with the visual organ vitiated by a certain defect. The consciousness determined by 'this' is reflected in the mental mode. When the mental mode issues out of the visual organ to the given substratum, the consciousness determined by 'this', the consciousness determined by the mental mode, and the consciousness determined by the manas or the consciousness of the knowing self become identical with one another. Then the nescience (avidyā) in the form of a nacre abiding in the object-consciousness (viśaya-caitanya) which has become identical with the consciousness of the knowing self (pramāṭṛ-caitanya) being aided by the subconscious impression of silver, which is revived by the perception of similarity (e.g., brightness, etc.), and by a defect of the visual organ, is modified into illusory silver, on the one hand, and illusory perception of silver, on the other<sup>1</sup>. Illusory silver, which is a modification of nescience, abides in the 'this'-consciousness which is the substratum of the nescience, for, according to the Advaita

<sup>1</sup>tatīka pramāṭṛ-caitanya-bhinnaviśaya-caityā-niṣṭhā śuktitvapra-  
kārikā avidyā cākcikyādisādhya-sandarāna-samudbodhita-rajata-sams-  
kāra-sadhricinā kācādidōṣa-samavahitā rajata-rūpā-rīhā-kāreṇa rajata-  
jñānā-bhāśā-kāreṇa ca pariṇamate. VP., pp. 136-37.

Vedāntist, all effects abide in the nescience, which is their material cause<sup>1</sup>.

The Naiyāyika contends that both illusory silver and empirically real silver existing elsewhere being equally effects of māyā or nescience (avidyā), there is no distinction, according to the Advaitavādin, between illusory silver and real silver. The Advaitavādin rejoins that he admits the distinction between an entity having momentary existence and an entity having durable existence just as the Naiyāyika admits the distinction between such entities. Sound, according to him, which is a quality of ether (ākāśa) has momentary existence whereas its ubiquity, has permanent existence. Both illusory silver and real silver are effects of nescience, but they are of different kinds. Real silver is the effect of nescience alone, but illusory silver is the effect of nescience and a defect of the visual organ. So the former has durable existence whereas the latter has momentary existence<sup>2</sup>.

The Naiyāyika further contends that an illusion is not an apprehension of an indefinable object (e.g., illusory silver) but misperception of an object (e.g., a nacre) as another (e.g., silver), and that the assumption of an indefinable object is gratuitous. The Advaitavādin rejoins that illusion is perceptual error, that perception is produced by the sense-object-intercourse, that a remote piece of silver existing elsewhere cannot have intercourse with a sense-organ, and that therefore it cannot produce illusory perception. The Naiyāyika contends that a remote piece of silver may have extraordinary intercourse through association (jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa) with a sense-organ in the form of an idea and produce illusory perception. The idea of silver revived by the perception of brightness of a nacre may have an extraordinary intercourse (alaukika sannikarṣa) with the visual organ and produce the illusory perception of silver. The Advaitavādin replies that, in that case, an inference becomes unnecessary, because it may

<sup>1</sup>Ibid, p. 141. IPC., P. 284.

<sup>2</sup>yad vā ghaṭā-dyadhyāse avidyaiva doṣatvena heṭuh. sūktirūpy-  
ādhyāse tu kācādayo pi doṣāḥ. VP., p. 137.

be regarded as perception through extraordinary intercourse through association ; that there may be extraordinary perception of 'a fire' following upon the ordinary perception of 'smoke' through the idea of 'a fire' revived by the perception of a common quality. Hence indefinable silver is the object of the illusory perception of silver<sup>1</sup>.

#### THE ADVAITA VEDĀNTIST'S CRITICISM OF ASATKHYĀTI, SATKHYĀTI, ĀTMAKHYĀTI, AND ANYATHĀKHYĀTI

A nonexistent object cannot produce an immediate cognition because it cannot have sensory contact. An illusion is a wrong perception or immediate cognition. So the Mādhvamika doctrine of Asatkhyāti is untenable.

The perception of an existent object cannot be contradicted by a sublating cognition, and, consequently, cannot be illusory. So Rāmānuja's doctrine of Satkhyāti is untenable.

The Yogācāra Vijñānavādin considers the apprehension of an internal or subjective cognition as an external object to be an illusion. He regards an illusion of silver as produced by the subconscious impression of silver among a beginningless series of such impressions (vāsanā). He does not regard an illusion as produced by an external object as he denies the existence of external objects. This account of the doctrine of Ātmakhyāti is given by an Advaitavādin, Vidyāraṇya Mādhavācārya. Vidyāraṇya offers the following criticism of this doctrine. In the illusion of silver the illusory silver is either devoid of origin owing to its extraordinary nature or is produced like a piece of ordinary silver. In the first alternative, it will not be an emergent cognition as it really is. In the second alternative, it is produced either by an external object or by a cognition. It cannot be produced by an external object, since the Yogācāra does not admit the existence of external objects. Nor can it be produced by a cognition. It cannot be produced by a pure cognition, since it is of the nature of emancipation (mokṣa). If it is produced

<sup>1</sup>VP., pp. 132-34. IPC., p. 292.

<sup>2</sup>VPS., p. 34.

by a cognition which is due to a vitiated cause, it is the same originating cognition which apprehends the silver or some other cognition. The first alternative is not possible, because the originating cognition and the originated cognition both are momentary and occur at different moments, and, consequently, the former cannot perceive the latter. Thus the illusory perception of silver becomes impossible. The second alternative also is not possible. If it is another cognition that apprehends the illusory silver, it cannot be a cognition produced by an unvitiated cause, because, in that case, there will be no reason why such a cognition will specially apprehend silver. If, on the other hand, the cognition apprehending the illusory silver is produced by a vitiated cause, then that cause is either silver or not silver. It cannot be silver, because, in that case, silver will have, causal efficiency (*arthakriyā*), and, consequently, real existence, which is not admitted by the *Yogācāra*. If silver is not the cause, then it cannot be manifested in the illusory perception, since a cause of a cognition is admitted to be what imparts its form to the cognition. Thus, in the doctrine of *Ātmakhyāti*, the illusory cognition of silver will never be produced. Hence the doctrine is untenable<sup>1</sup>.

According to the doctrine of *Anyathākhyāti*, an illusion is the perception (*khyāti*) of an object as otherwise (*anyathā*); a piece of silver existing in some other place and time is apprehended as identical with a nacre which has intercourse with the visual organ vitiated by a defect. A nacre is misperceived as silver owing to its similarity with silver. *Vidyāranya* offers the following criticism of this doctrine. He asks to what the otherwiseness (*anyathātva*) belongs. It either belongs to the cognitive act, or to the resulting cognition, or to the object of cognition. The first alternative is impossible. If the act of cognizing a nacre is in the form of silver, then the nacre cannot be called the objective substrate of the illusory cognition of silver, for an object can impart its form to that cognition by which it is apprehended, and, consequently, a

nacre cannot impart its form to a cognition which apprehends silver. The second alternative also is impossible. The otherwiseness cannot belong to the resulting cognition or manifestation (*sphurana*) in consciousness, since the cognition does not essentially differ, whether it is valid or whether it is illusory; or since the cognition does not appear as something different or otherwise. The third alternative also is not possible. Vidyāraṇya asks in what sense the otherwiseness belongs to the object (*e.g.*, a nacre). It means either that the nacre identifies itself with silver or that the nacre is modified into silver. In the first alternative, either there is absolute difference between the nacre and silver or there is difference as well as identify at the same time. The first alternative is untenable, for things which are absolutely different from each other, can never identify themselves with each other. The second alternative also is untenable, for, in that case, the perceptual judgment 'the cow is short-horned' will be illusory. In the second alternative, the nacre is actually modified into silver. Then the cognition of silver is not illusory, since it is the perception of a real modification, and cannot be sublated. If the nacre is said to be modified into silver so long as the illusion lasts, then the silver which is a real modification of the nacre will be perceived also by those whose eyes are not vitiated by any defect. But the illusory silver is not perceived by others so long as the illusion lasts. Hence the doctrine of *Anyathākhyāti* cannot be stated in an intelligible form.<sup>1</sup>

Vidyāraṇya offers the following criticism of the Prābhākara doctrine of *Vivekākhyāti* or *Akhyāti*. What is the non-apprehension (*akhyāti*) of distinction between two cognitions in an illusion? It is either the mere absence of apprehension or the cognition which is the cause of a responsive action to get hold of another object or the cognition of two or more objects which are not distinguished from one another. In the first alternative, there will be an illusion in deep sleep only when there is no apprehension, and not in the waking condition and dream when there is apprehension.

<sup>1</sup>VPS., pp. 33-34, IPC., pp. 293-94.

In the second alternative, there will be no illusion where there is no responsive action owing to indolence or the sudden emergence of a subsuming cognition. In the third alternative, what is the meaning of discrimination which is the opposite of nondiscrimination? It is either apprehension of difference (bhedagraha) or nonapprehension of nondifference (abhedagraha). It is not apprehension of difference, since in the illusion 'this is silver' there is apprehension of difference between the general (sāmānya) and the particular (vīśeṣa), and, therefore, the illusion cannot be nondiscrimination. Nor is it nonapprehension of nondifference, since, difference being apprehended in the manner stated above, there is nonapprehension of nondifference, and since nondiscrimination which is its opposite is not possible in the illusion. Hence both alternatives are not tenable. There can be no nondiscrimination between two objects which are apprehended distinctly. If two unapprehended objects are said to be undiscriminated from each other, then illusion occurs during deep sleep only—which is absurd!

It may be argued that nondiscrimination is nonapprehension of nonrelation. That is possible between 'this' and 'silver' which are cognized. If it be argued that 'this' and 'silver' are unrelated to each other because of the nonperception of their cognitions, then either there is nonapprehension of nonrelation between perception and recollection, or between any two entities, or between two entities devoid of the cognition of relation between them. In the first alternative, 'I am a man' will not be an illusion, inasmuch as both are perceived. The Advaita Vedāntist regards the self as Brahman—one eternal and undifferentiated consciousness—and not as a human body. In the second alternative, 'the short-horned cow' and 'a white cloth' will be an illusion, since there is no cognition of nonrelation between them. In the third alternative also, the same difficulty will arise; the cognition of relation is not possible there, since there is no identity between its objects. The identity between two objects is known by recognition. If the relation between a substance and a quality and the like be said to be the object of the cognition of relation,—and



not their identity, then there is a cognition of relation in the illusion 'this is silver' owing to similarity between them. It may be argued that relation and the cognition of relation are not possible here because of the sublating cognition 'this is not silver',—which is of the nature of the cognition of nonrelation. Then, according to Prabhākara, there is the cognition of nonrelation in the form of the cognition of mutual negation in the cognition of a substance and a quality and the like, since relation between them and the cognition of relation are not possible there, and, therefore, such a cognition will be an illusion. But the cognition of a substance and its quality is not an illusion. Hence nondiscrimination is not nonapprehension of nonrelation<sup>1</sup>.

#### THE CRITICISM OF OF ANIRVACANĪYAKHĀTI

Rāmānuja offers the following criticisms of the Advaita Vedāntist doctrine of Anirvacanīyakhyāti. 1. The assumption of an indefinable object to account for an illusion implies that one thing appears as another, since an indefinable object ( e. g. silver ) appears to consciousness as real. If indefinable silver were apprehended as 'indefinable' at the time of the illusory perception, then the cognition would not be illusory, and, consequently, would not be contradicted by a sublating cognition. Thus the doctrine of Anirvacanīyakhyāti implies the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti. If it be argued that the indefinable object of an illusion does not appear as indefinable so long as the illusion lasts, but that it is subsequently known to be indefinable by philosophical speculation, then also the doctrine of Anirvacanīyakhyāti implies the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti, since an indefinable object appears to consciousness as real. 2. The doctrine of Anyathākhyāti can adequately explain all the facts connected with an illusion—illusory cognition, responsive action consequent upon an illusion, and the subsequent sublating cognition. Hence the assumption of an indefinable object which is absolutely unperceived and unthinkable is

<sup>1</sup>asmāt nārahargāgraho'py-avivakṣaḥ. VPS., p. 29.

unnecessary. 3. Even if we admit that an indefinable object is produced at the time of the corresponding illusion, what is the cause of it? In the illusory perception of silver what is the cause of the indefinable silver which is the object of the illusion? The illusory perception of silver cannot produce the indefinable silver, for there can be no perception of indefinable silver before the production of such silver. The argument that at first a cognition is produced without an object, then this objectless cognition produces the indefinable silver, and makes it an object of apprehension is absurd! 4. A certain defect in the sense-organ (*e. g.*, the eyes) cannot produce the indefinable silver, for a defect in the sense-organ cannot produce an effect in an external object. 5. Nor can the sense-organ, apart from defects, produce the indefinable silver, for sense-organs produce cognitions only, and not the objects of cognitions. 6. Nor can the sense-organ deranged by a certain defect produce the indefinable silver, since it can produce a peculiar modification in the cognition produced by it, but not in the object of that cognition. 7. Nor can beginningless nescience (*avidyā*) produce the indefinable silver, because the doctrine of nescience is unjustifiable. Rāmānuja has brought seven charges against it.<sup>1</sup> 8. All objects, according to Śaṅkara, are unreal appearances, and Brahman alone is real. Then why are different objects designated by different names and why do they produce different cognitions? The indefinable silver is called silver, it may be argued, because it is similar to silver. Then it will produce a cognition 'this is similar to silver' and it will be designated 'an object like silver'. But it produces a cognition 'this is silver' and called 'silver' 9. The indefinable silver is called 'silver' and produces the cognition of 'silver', it may be argued, because 'the genus of silver' abides in it. Is, then, 'the genus of silver' real or unreal? It cannot be real, since it cannot abide in unreal indefinable silver. Nor can it be unreal, since it cannot abide in real silver. Further, it cannot produce a cognition of reality in an unreal object. The

<sup>1</sup>HIP., vol. II, pp. 680—87; RES., I, 1, 1.

conception of an indefinable object is riddled with contradictions. Hence the doctrine of Anirvacanīyakhyaṭi is irrational and unwarranted.

The Mādhva offers the following criticisms of the Advaita Vedāntist's doctrine of Anirvacanīyakhyaṭi. 1. The sublating cognition 'this is not silver' denies the existence of silver in the past, at present, and in the future. So indefinable silver produced at the time of the illusory perception is not its object; it is not produced by nescience (avidyā) and destroyed by the true knowledge of the nacre in which illusory silver is perceived. 2. Nescience abides in the knowing self; indefinable silver is a modification of nescience. So it is a subjective cognition in the empirical self and cannot be perceived as an external object. 3. Even if indefinable silver is produced by nescience and exists outside the percipient self, it should be capable of being perceived by other persons also. But, in fact, it is perceived by that person alone who is a victim of the illusion. 4. How can indefinable silver be perceived? It cannot be perceived through sense-object-intercourse, because it does not exist before peripheral stimulation. It cannot be produced through a subconscious impression (saṁskāra), because the latter is the effect of the previous perception of an object that existed in the past. But indefinable silver had no existence in the past. Nor can the perception of indefinable silver be ascribed to the witness consciousness (sākṣin), like the perception of bliss, because the former is invariably produced by the sense-object-intercourse. If the perception of indefinable silver in a nacre be said to be a misperception of the given datum (e. g., a nacre) due to the visual organ being vitiated by a certain defect, then illusion is nothing but misperception of an object as another (anyathākhyāti). If illusion is ascribed to the witness consciousness, then the witness cannot know the falsity of indefinable silver through the sublating cognition 'this is not silver', because the witness cannot be both the victim of illusion and sublimate it. If the perception of indefinable silver be said to be due to the intercourse of the given datum with

the visual organ and to witness-consciousness of indefinable silver, then the illusion will involve two cognitions—the cognition of the given datum and the cognition of illusory silver, and such a composite cognition will fail to evoke a responsive action. But the illusory perception is experienced to be a single determinate cognition. So the assumption of a dual cognition contradicts the testimony of experience. 5. Is the indefinable silver perceived as existent or as nonexistent? It cannot be perceived as nonexistent, for a nonexistent entity cannot be presented as existent in experience. The Advaitavādin himself holds that if the object of an illusion were nonexistent, it would not be perceived. If the indefinable silver were perceived as indefinable, the perception would not be an illusion. If the indefinable silver were perceived but not “as existent”, it would not be able to evoke a responsive action. An object cannot be perceived without a determination, positive or negative. 6. Is the ‘existence’ of the relation of ‘thisness’ with the nacre real, unreal, or indefinable? It cannot be real, because the illusory silver is indescribable. If it is real, it cannot be indescribable. So the first alternative is false. The second alternative is true. The third alternative leads to infinite regress. If the relation of ‘thisness’ and the nacre and the relation of the reality of the nacre in the indefinable silver that is perceived are both indescribable, then there will be infinite regress. In what sense, are the relations indescribable? They are either empirical (vyāvahārika) or illusory (prātibhāsika). The Advaitavādin does not regard the indefinable silver as empirical or real silver, and, consequently, cannot consider the relations to be empirical. If they are illusory (prātibhāsika), they are perceived as illusory or as empirical (vyāvahārika). If they are perceived as illusory, they cannot produce a responsive action. If they are perceived as empirical, is their empirical nature true or false? Their empirical nature cannot be true, because they are really illusory. Their empirical nature cannot be false, because then what is nonexistent will appear as existent. If their empirical reality be said to be indescribable, the second “anirvacanīya” will, again, involve the difficulties in the first

"anirvacanīya". Hence the doctrine of Anirvacanīyakhyāti is untenable<sup>1</sup>.

Udayana, a Naiyāyika, offers the following criticisms of the doctrine of Anirvacanīyakhyāti. 1. What is the meaning of the indefinable or indescribable object of an illusion (anirvacanīyatva)? Is it the absence of description or the absence of the cause of description? It is not the absence of description, since the illusory object is described as 'this is silver', and since the object of the sublating cognition is described as 'this is not silver'. Nor is it the absence of the cause of description. What is the cause of description? It is either a cognition or an object. There is no absence of cognition, since the Advaita Vedāntist admits the reality of a cognition (khyāti) in an illusion. If the cause of description is an object, is the object nonexistent or existent? If it is nonexistent, then the doctrine of Anirvacanīyakhyāti implies Asatkhyāti. If it is existent, Anirvacanīyakhyāti implies Satkhyāti. 2. Is the existence or nonexistence of the object, which is the cause of description, established by common experience or extraordinary? In the first alternative, both existence and nonexistence can neither be affirmed nor denied. In the second alternative, there is no harm, since even in the absence of extraordinary objects there is neither nonexistence of the object of right cognition nor nonexistence of description. 3. Is an indescribable object essenceless (niḥsvabhāva)? What does essence mean? It is either existence (bhāva) or nonexistence (abhāva). Then, again, the same difficulties arise as are mentioned above. 4. If 'essenceless' means 'unknowable', then the doctrine of Anirvacanīyakhyāti involves self-contradiction, since an indescribable object is unknowable and yet is experienced. 5. If an unknowable object is said to be experienced as knowable, then the doctrine of Anirvacanīyakhyāti involves Anyathākhyāti. 6. If a nonexistent object is said to be experienced, then an empirical object (e. g., a jar) also may be nonexistent and yet experienced so that there is no difference between an empirical object and an

<sup>1</sup>The Philosophy of Śrī Mādhvācārya pp. 127-30.

illusory object. But the Advaita Vedāntist distinguishes between an empirical object of valid knowledge (e. g., a nacre) and an illusory object (e. g., silver). 7. If a nonexistent object is said to be experienced as nonexistent, it cannot produce a responsive action. 8. If a nonexistent object is said to be experienced as existent, it must be so experienced due to similarity between them. But there is no similarity between a nonexistent object and an existent object. 9. If a nonexistent object is said to be experienced as an existent object, though there be no similarity between them, then an existent object also may be experienced as a nonexistent object. Hence the doctrine of Anirvacanīyakhyaṭi is untenable<sup>1</sup>.

#### THE DOCTRINE OF ALAUKIKAKHYĀTI

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa discusses the doctrine of Alaukikakhyāti and attributes it to a certain Mīmāṃsaka<sup>2</sup>. According to him, in the illusion 'this is silver', a nacre is not its object but silver; but this silver is different from ordinary (laukika) silver; it is extraordinary (alaukika) silver; the illusion apprehends extraordinary silver. Ordinary silver serves our practical purpose; it can be turned into ornaments. But extraordinary silver does not serve any practical purpose; it cannot be made into ornaments. In the illusory perception of silver it is 'silver' that is the object of the illusion, since whatever is manifested to consciousness as silver must be regarded as silver; but it is extraordinary silver, because it does not serve any practical purpose.<sup>3</sup>

#### THE CRITICISM OF THE DOCTRINE OF ALAUKIKAKHYĀTI

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa offers the following criticisms of the doctrine of Alaukikakhyāti. 1. The extraordinary silver which is said to be apprehended by the illusion 'this is silver' is not perceived. The sublating cognition 'this is not silver' clearly establishes the nonexistence of silver; it does not establish the extraordinariness of silver which existed at the time of the illusory cognition. Hence there is neither any silver corresponding to

<sup>1</sup>NVTP., I, 1, 2; pp. 414-16.

<sup>2</sup>jāṇaḥ ko'pi mīmāṃsakastvāha. N.M., p. 179.

<sup>3</sup>N.M., p. 187.

the illusory cognition of silver ; nor is it extraordinary. The argument that whatever is manifested to consciousness as silver must be silver is wrong ; silver is manifested to consciousness in the illusory cognition of silver, though really there is no silver at all at that time and in that place. Real silver can be known through the valid cognition of silver, which is not contradicted by a sublating cognition. 2. The distinction between an ordinary object and an extraordinary object either depends upon the distinction of our cognitions or depends upon the fulfilment of our practical purposes. The first alternative is not true, for sometimes we are conscious of the existence of silver, and sometimes of the nonexistence of silver, but we are never conscious of the ordinariness or extraordinariness of silver. The second alternative also is not tenable, for what is the meaning of practical use ? It means either the capacity of being an object of thought and speech or the capacity of producing an effect. It cannot mean the former, since there is no consciousness of ordinariness or extraordinariness of an object. It cannot mean the latter, because, in that case, a woman embraced in a dream will be ordinary, and because a jar, which is destroyed as soon as it is produced, will be extraordinary. 3. If extraordinary silver is apprehended by the illusory cognition of silver, a person, who is the victim of illusion, will not make any effort to pick it up. If it is urged that he perceives extraordinary silver as ordinary silver, then the doctrine of *Alaukikakhyāti* implies *Anyathākhyāti*. 4. A person abstains from making an effort to pick up the illusory object, not because he recognizes the extraordinariness of the existing silver, but because he perceives that there is no silver at all. Hence the doctrine of *Alaukikakhyāti* is untenable<sup>1</sup>. Jayasinha Sūri mentions the doctrine of *Alaukikakhyāti* but does not discuss it. He does not mention the name of its exponent.<sup>2</sup>

#### THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA DOCTRINE OF ANYATHĀKHYĀTI

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that an illusion is the misper-

<sup>1</sup>NM., pp. 187-88.

<sup>2</sup>NTD., p. 67.

ception of one object as a different one. In the illusion of silver in a nacre the perception of brightness of a nacre which is the common quality of silver and a nacre, revives the impression (saṁskāra) of silver perceived in the past ; the intercourse of the nacre with the visual organ tainted by a defect and aided by the revived impression of silver produces the misperception of the nacre as silver. Thus the nacre in intercourse with the tainted visual organ assisted by the revived impression of silver is misapprehended as a piece of silver.<sup>1</sup> Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, a Naiyāyikā, observes that an illusion is a single cognition of the nature of a positive false knowledge. It is the false perception of one thing as a different thing. It is not a composite cognition consisting of a presentation (anubhava) and a representation (smṛti) which are not distinguished from each other. It is not a negation of discrimination between two cognitions. It is a positive misperception. It is a presentative cognition or perception, and not a representative cognition or recollection, the representative character of which has lapsed owing to lapse of memory as Prabhākara holds.<sup>2</sup> It is not the apprehension of a nonexistent entity as the Mādhyaṁika holds. Nor is it the apprehension of an internal or subjective cognition as an external object as the Yogācāra holds. Nor is it the apprehension of an indefinable object as the Advaita Vedānta holds.

Kanāda defines false knowledge (avidyā) as due to the defects of the sense-organs and the defects of impressions<sup>3</sup>. Śaṅkara Miśra explains the aphorism thus : false knowledge or illusion is due to the sense-organs tainted by the bodily humours, and impressions of past experience tainted by the nonperception of the distinctive characters of an object. Candrakānta points out that an illusion due to the defects of the sense-organs apprehends an object as a different object.<sup>4</sup> Thus the Vaiśeṣika also advocates the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti or Viparītakhyāti.

<sup>1</sup>PR., p. 17. NM., p. 182.

<sup>2</sup>tajatan ity-anubhava eva na pramuṣita-smṛtiḥ. NM., p. 182.

<sup>3</sup>indriya-doṣāt saṁskāra-doṣāccā-vidyā, VS., IX, 2, 10.

<sup>4</sup>indriya-doṣād anyathābhūtan anyatho-palabhathe. VSB., ix, 2, 10.



Gaṅgeśa explains how a real object existing elsewhere appears in consciousness in an illusion. The recollection of silver due to the revival of the impression of it, which was perceived in the past, by the perception of the common quality of a nacre and silver, has an extraordinary intercourse with the visual organ and produces the illusory perception of silver in a nacre. Gaṅgeśa calls this extraordinary intercourse intercourse through association (jñānalakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa). This is how an illusion is misperception of an object as a different object. Gaṅgeśa, the founder of the Neo-Naiyāyika school, also advocates the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti. Viśvanātha Pañcānana explains the intercourse through association as the intercourse of an object through the recollection or cognition of it.<sup>1</sup>

#### THE NYĀYA CRITICISM OF PRABHĀKARA'S CRITICISM OF THE DOCTRINE OF ANYATHĀKHYĀTI

Prabhākara contends that the object of the illusion of silver in a nacre is either silver existing in some other time and place or a nacre which conceals its form and assumes the form of silver or a nacre. Further, he contends that the first alternative implies Asatkhyāti or apprehension of a nonexistent object as existent. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that silver is not nonexistent, but that it exists in some other time and place. An absolutely nonexistent thing differs from a thing existing in some other time and place, for the former is never an object of consciousness whereas the latter is. Secondly, Prabhākara contends that the second alternative is unintelligible. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that a nacre is said to conceal its form inasmuch as we do not perceive its peculiar qualities, and that it is said to assume the form of silver inasmuch as we remember the peculiar qualities of silver so that the second alternative is not unintelligible. Thirdly, Prabhākara contends that the third alternative also is unreasonable, for one object can never be apprehended as a different one, and that, if it were so, the proximate piece of land would be the

<sup>1</sup> Jñāna-lakṣaṇaṁ pratyakṣantistū yadvāpāyakaṁ jñānaṁ tasyaiva pratyakṣantī. SM., p. 282. Śā P., i, 63.

object of the illusion of silver. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that a nacre is the *cause* of the illusion of silver, and that it is not the *object* of the illusion. Hence Prabhākara's charges against the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti are groundless<sup>1</sup>.

#### THE YOGA THEORY OF ANYATHĀKHYĀTI

Patañjali defines an illusion as false knowledge, which does not remain uncontradicted<sup>2</sup>. Nescience (avidyā) is a kind of illusion. It is metaphysical error and consists in knowing the noneternal as eternal, the impure as pure, the painful as the pleasant, and the not-self as the self. Vyāsa explains an illusion as a contrary cognition. Vācaspati Miśra also explains it as another cognition opposed to a valid cognition, and not a mere negation of it<sup>3</sup>. Thus Patañjali advocates the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti. Vijñānabhikṣu draws a subtle distinction between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of Anyathākhyāti and the Yoga doctrine of Anyathākhyāti. The Yoga maintains that a form of cognition is wrongly attributed to an external object whereas the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintains that another external object is wrongly attributed to an external object present to a sense-organ. The cognition of silver is wrongly attributed to a nacre which is present to the visual organ in the illusion of silver according to the Yoga<sup>4</sup>. Another external object, e.g., silver existing elsewhere in a jeweller's shop or the like is wrongly attributed to a nacre present to the visual organ according to the Vaiśeṣika<sup>5</sup>. Vijñānabhikṣu observes that the cognition of silver, which is a form of cognition, is actually perceived, and a nacre present to the visual organ is perceived as the substratum of the cognition of silver. Hence it is needless to assume a remote external organ and to attribute it to a nacre.<sup>6</sup> He points out

<sup>1</sup>NM., pp. 194-95; HIP., Vol. I, pp. 478-83; Vol. II, pp. 134-35; IPC., p. 303.

<sup>2</sup>viparyayo mithyājñānam atad-rūpa pratiṣṭham. —ys., i. 8.

<sup>3</sup>ys., ii. 5. vidyā-viparitam jñānāntaram avidyeti. YBh., ii. 5. vidyā-viroddham viparyaya-jñānam avidyā. TV., ii. 5.

<sup>4</sup>bhrama-sthale jñānā-kāryasyaiva viśaye samāropa iti bhāṣaḥ.

<sup>5</sup>vaiśeṣikā-trāyaṁ viśeṣo yad bhāya-rajatāder nāropah kim tvāntara-syaivaeti. YV., i. 8.

<sup>6</sup>jñānākāram anubhava-siddham śuktyādikām haṇnikṛtām vihāpa dūrasaḥ-rajatādi-viśayakatva-kalpanā gauravāt. YV., p. 21.

that the Yoga advocates the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti whereas the Sāṃkhya advocates the doctrine of nondiscrimination (aviveka) inasmuch as it regards metaphysical error as nondiscrimination between the self (puruṣa) and the not-self (prakṛti).<sup>1</sup> But the Sāṃkhya explains perceptual illusion as the apprehension of an existent entity and a nonexistent entity and advocates the doctrine of Sadasatkhyāti. The Yoga regards an illusion as invalid, since it is contradicted by a valid cognition which cognizes an object as it really is. Validity of a cognition consists in its correspondence with its object. Contradictedness is the test of the invalidity of a cogniton.<sup>2</sup>

Patañjali distinguishes an illusion from a vikalpa. He defines a vikalpa as the cognition of an absolutely nonexistent object, which is generated by a word only.<sup>3</sup> The cognition of a sky-flower is a vikalpa, for a sky-flower is an absolutely nonexistent entity. It is generated by the mere word 'sky-flower' corresponding to which there is no external object. A vikalpa is neither a valid cognition nor an illusion. It is not a valid cognition, since there is no external object corresponding to it. Nor is it an illusion, since what is manifested in it is absolutely nonexistent whereas in an illusion one thing is apprehended as another thing which is not absolutely nonexistent. We make use of a vikalpa owing to the power of the cognition of a word only<sup>4</sup>.

#### THE BHĀṬṬA MIMĀṂSAKA DOCTRINE OF ANYATHĀKHYĀTI OR VIPARĪTAKHYĀTI

Pārthasārathi Miśra, a follower of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, explains the nature of illusion in the following manner. The illusion of silver in a nacre is not produced by the intercourse of a nacre with the visual organ. A nacre is perceived as a bright object due to its intercourse with the visual organ,—

'atra ca śāstre' nyathākhyātiḥ siddhānto na tu sāmkyavad aviveka-mātram. YV., i, 8.

\*na kasmāt na pramāṇam? yataḥ pramāṇena bādhyate, bhūtārtha-  
viśayatvāt pramāṇasya. YBh., i, 8.

\*śabda-jñāna-nupātī vastu-śūnyo vikalpaḥ. YS., i, 9.

\*na na pramāṇo-pārohi, na viparyyao-pārohi ca vastuśūnyatve'pi śabda-  
jñāna-nibandhanā vyavahāro dṛiyate. YBh., i, 9

brightness being common to a nacre and a piece of silver ; the peculiar features of a nacre are not perceived owing to the weakness of the visual organ ; then silver is remembered owing to the revival of the subconscious impression of silver ; then the nacre is perceived as silver which is only remembered owing to some defect. Thus an illusion is produced by the intercourse of an object with a sense-organ aided by the recollection of another object to which it is similar<sup>1</sup>. Thus Pārthasārathi Miśra advocates the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti. Śavara asserts that a cognition which is produced by a vitiated instrument is false, and that no other cognition is false. So he regards the misperception of a nacre as silver due to the vitiated sense-object-intercourse as an illusion which is false. He also advocates the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti and not Vivekākhyāti or Akhyāti.

#### THE BHĀṬṬA MIMĀṂSAKA'S CRITICISM OF VIVEKĀKHYĀTI AND OTHER RIVAL DOCTRINES

The Mādhyamika holds that an illusion is the direct apprehension of an attributed nonexistent thing. This view is wrong, because a nonexistent thing cannot be the object of direct apprehension. The Yogācāra holds that a subjective idea of silver is attributed to a nacre, and that an illusion is the projection of a subjective idea outward. This view is wrong for, in that case, the sublating cognition would be in the form 'I am silver'. If 'thisness' is sublated, the illusion will be without any objective substratum. The Advaita Vedāntin holds that an illusion is the attribution of an indefinable (anirvacanīya) object, which is neither real, nor unreal, nor both. This view is wrong, since there is no proof for the existence of such an object. It may be argued that an indefinable entity exists, because a nonexistent thing is not cognized, and because an existent thing is not contradicted. This argument is wrong, inasmuch as silver existing in some other place may be attributed to a nacre present here and

<sup>1</sup>SD., Bombay, 1915, p. 49.

āyasya ca duṣṭaṁ karaṇaṁ yatra ca smithyeti pratyayaḥ sa evā-  
samīchināḥ pratyayo nānyaḥ. Śavara-bhāṣya,

now and produce the perceptual illusion of silver so that the assumption of indefinable silver is unnecessary. It may be argued that indefinable silver must be admitted, because the identity of a nacre with a piece of silver is perceived in the illusion, and that it is not present elsewhere. This argument is wrong, because the identity of 'this' and 'silver' may exist elsewhere also. Hence an illusion is the misperception of a thing existing here for another thing existing elsewhere<sup>1</sup>.

Prabhākara holds that an illusion is the nonapprehension of distinction between a percept and a memory-image due to a defect, that it involves the nonrecognition of the distinctive characters of them, and that it is not misperception of one thing for another. This view is wrong, Pārthasārathi Mīśra argues, because nonapprehension of distinction or nondiscrimination is a negative cognition and because Prabhākara denies the reality of negation (*abhāva*). Nondiscrimination being of the nature of a negation cannot be an error or illusion. It may be argued that recollection that is not recognized as such is nondiscrimination. This argument is wrong, since, in that case, mere recollection would be nondiscrimination. But there is the saying—'one who remembers rightly cannot have invalid knowledge'<sup>2</sup>. Further, there is no rule that a person who remembers silver and is desirous of it should have a responsive action in the presence of a nacre only, and not elsewhere. If a responsive action is said to follow upon the perception of a nacre as silver, then it is true. But that involves the doctrine of *Anyathākhyāti*. If a responsive action were said to follow upon the perception of similarity of a nacre with a piece of silver, then the nacre would be perceived as similar to silver and not as 'this is silver'. In fact, the illusion is in the form 'this is silver', and not in the form 'this is like silver'. No one says, "This is a cow" on knowing a wild cow to be like a cow. If a piece of silver unrelated to a nacre is said to be remembered, then there cannot be a sublatting cognition 'this is not silver' inasmuch as silver unrelated to

<sup>1</sup> 'āto' nyatra ato' nyatra' ropo' nyathākhyāti eveti siddho viparyāsaḥ. YSP., C. S. S., p. 130. Ibid, pp. 136-39.

<sup>2</sup> 'na hi smaran bhāṅgyatityucyate. ŚD., 137.

a nacre is not sublated. It may be argued that nothing is sublated by a sublating cognition but that the distinction between the percept of a nacre and the memory-image of silver, which was not recognized during illusion, is recognized by the sublating cognition. The sublating cognition 'this is not silver' simply distinguishes between the percept of a nacre and the memory-image of silver. This is an unusual explanation of a sublating cognition, which is contradicted by experience. Hence one thing related to another thing is contradicted by a sublating cognition. It may be argued that a distant thing, *e. g.*, silver existing in some other place, cannot generate an illusory perception. This argument is wrong, because a valid perception is produced by an object present here and now in intercourse with a sense-organ, but because an illusory perception may be produced by a remote object existing in some other place. But how can one object in intercourse with a sense-organ produce the cognition of another object? The Bhāṭṭa replies that it can do so owing to some defect, since a defect which vitiates a sense-organ can produce an illusory perception of another distant object. It is found that in dream a thing which is not present here and now is perceived as present owing to a defect of the manas. Hence the intercourse of a sense-organ with an object, the contact of a sense-organ with the manas, and the contact of the manas with the self produce a valid perception in the absence of defects; but they produce the illusory perception of another remote object (*e.g.*, silver) in a present object (*e.g.*, nacre). Thus there is a distinction between a valid perception and an illusory perception according to the Bhāṭṭa doctrine of *Anyathākhyāti* or *Viparītakhyāti*<sup>1</sup>.

Gāgābhaṭṭa, another Bhāṭṭa, contends that Prabhākara's doctrine that an illusion is mere nonapprehension of distinction between the element of perception and the element of recollection, and that it is not misapprehension of one object as another is wrong for the following reasons. First, the assumption of a cognition which apprehends 'silver' but

which does not apprehend the distinction between the perception of 'this' and the recollection of 'silver' violates the parsimony of hypotheses, since it unnecessarily involves a larger number of elements whereas the assumption of the misapprehension of one object as another contains a smaller number of elements. Secondly, nonapprehension of distinction or nondiscrimination cannot evoke a responsive action for the appropriation or avoidance of an illusory object whereas misperception of one object as another can evoke a responsive action, for example, the cognition of silver, which is of the nature of misperception (*anyathākhyāti*) can incite a person to stoop to pick up silver. Thirdly, a sublating cognition is not mere recognition of distinction between the presentative element and the representative element in an illusion, because it takes such a form as 'this is not silver'. It is a definite valid perception which contradicts a previous wrong perception such as 'this is silver'. Thus an illusion is misperception, and a sublating cognition is a correct perception. Both are of the nature of perception. Fourthly, a person ceases to do a responsive action when his illusion is contradicted by a sublating cognition. Fifthly, if nonapprehension of distinction (*asamargāgraha*) were the cause of a responsive action, then a responsive action would occur everywhere. But a certain determinate cognition of a distinct object is the cause of a responsive action which is produced by a valid cognition. The assumption of nonapprehension of distinction between the element of perception and the element of recollection being the cause of a responsive action violates the parsimony of hypotheses. But the *Bhāṭṭa* doctrine of a definite determinate cognition of a thing being the cause of a responsive action due to a valid perception or an illusory perception does not violate the parsimony of hypotheses. Hence the *Prābhākara* doctrine of *Akhyāti* or *Vivekākhyāti* is not tenable<sup>1</sup>.

#### THE MĀDHVA DOCTRINE OF ABHINAVĀNYĀTHĀKHYĀTI

*Madhva* defines an illusion as an apprehension, of a non-

existent thing as an existent object, or of an existent thing as a nonexistent entity. He regards an illusion as the apprehension of one thing as another<sup>1</sup>. In an illusion there is the apprehension of a nonexistent entity or relation as existent in something present to a sense-organ. In the illusion 'this is silver' nonexistent silver is apprehended in a nacre which is present to the visual organ or nonexistent identity of silver with such a nacre is apprehended. Jayatīrtha regards nonexistent silver and nonexistent identity of silver with a nacre both as the object of the illusion.<sup>2</sup>

Madhva agrees with the Mādhyaṃika that an illusion is the apprehension of a nonexistent object, but differs from him in holding that an illusion has an objective substratum (adhiṣṭhāna), and that it is not entirely without a foundation. If there is no objective substratum of an illusion, there can be no sense-object-intercourse without which there can be no perceptual knowledge, valid or invalid. Hence an illusion is the apprehension of a nonexistent entity or relation in a given substratum. The intercourse of the visual organ vitiated by some defects with a nacre produces a false apprehension of it as a piece of silver. Hence the Mādhva doctrine of Anyathākhyāti should not be confused with the Mādhyaṃika doctrine of Asatkhyāti.

Madhva's doctrine is not identical with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of Anyathākhyāti. The Naiyāyika holds that in the illusion 'this is silver' a nacre is misapprehended as silver which exists elsewhere, for instance, in a jeweller's shop. Madhva does not deny that silver existing elsewhere, which was perceived in the past, and which left an impression, is remotely responsible for the illusion. But the present nacre cannot be misperceived as *that* silver. Madhva denies that *the* silver that is perceived in a nacre is existing elsewhere, which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika asserts. The silver that exists elsewhere cannot, in any way, assist the apprehension of it

<sup>1</sup>amāṃśa sattuva-pratītiḥ sato' sattuva-pratītiḥ anyathāpratītiḥ evā bhraṃtiḥ. MBG., II, 26.

<sup>2</sup>ante rajata-tādātmyasyor jñāna-viśeṣaḥ. NS., p. 47.



here. There is no proof for the existence of an object elsewhere that is perceived here. If it does exist elsewhere, how can it be apprehended here?<sup>1</sup> The existence of an object elsewhere is not necessary for sensory contact with it in order to produce the wrong perception of silver. Nor is it necessary for reviving the impression (*samskāra*) of silver. A remote thing cannot come into contact with the visual organ and produce the illusion. The perception of brightness of a nacre can revive the impression of silver, and remote silver need not come over here to revive the impression of it. Madhvā denies that a real object (e.g., silver) existing elsewhere is superimposed upon a present object (e.g., nacre) and apprehended in an illusion. He holds that a *nonexistent* object is apprehended in a *given substratum* in an illusion, or that an existent entity is mis-apprehended as a nonexistent entity. An illusion 'this is silver' is contradicted by the valid cognition 'this is not silver'. This sublating cognition (*bādhakajñāna*) clearly proves that a nonexistent entity (e.g., silver) is apprehended, though wrongly, in an illusion. The illusion is in the form 'this is silver'. The sublating cognition is in the form 'this is *not* silver'. Hence Jayatīrtha designates Madhva's doctrine of illusion Neo-Anyathākhyāti or Abhinavānyathākhyāti and draws a subtle distinction between it and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of Anyathākhyāti.<sup>2</sup>

#### JIVA GOSVĀMI'S DOCTRINE OF ACINTYA BHEDĀBHEDAKHYĀTI

Jīva Gosvāmī, a follower of Caitanya, holds that an illusion apprehends an inconceivable difference and nondifference between a given substratum (e.g., a nacre) and an illusory object (e.g., silver). A nacre is nondifferent from silver because it has brightness in common with silver. It is different from silver because it has some distinctive characters which are not possessed by silver. Thus illusory silver, which

<sup>1</sup>acm prastāsaiva sattu mānābhāvāt, asattu kathaṁ pratiṭiṭi oet? anyatra sattu'pi katham? na hy-anyatra satvam atra upakāri. NS., p. 34.

<sup>2</sup>NS., p. 46. B. N. K. Sarma, "Philosophy of Śrī Madhvācārya", Ch. XXI

is both different and nondifferent from silver in an unthinkable way, is apprehended by the illusory perception 'this is silver'. The nondifference between them is predominantly apprehended by the illusion so long as it lasts. The difference between them is distinctly apprehended by the sublating cognition which contradicts the illusion. The apprehension of nondifference during illusion evokes the responsive action to appropriate the illusory silver. The apprehension of difference by a sublating cognition brings about the cessation of the responsive action. Jīva Gosvāmī tries to reconcile the truths of the different doctrines of illusion. He recognizes the difference between the given substratum (*e. g.*, a nacre) and the illusory object (*e. g.*, silver) that is manifested in consciousness as the doctrine of Asatkhyāti maintains. He also recognizes the nondifference or nondistinction between them during illusion as the Prābhākara maintains.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Kramasandarbhā.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF DREAMS THE EPISTEMIC VALUE OF DREAMS

Dreams are presentative cognitions during sleep, though they have no objective counterparts in reality. They are of the nature of illusions. Some of them are peripherally excited, and others are centrally excited. The former may be called dream-illusions, and the latter, dream-hallucinations after James Sully. But all dreams cannot be explained by peripheral stimulation, due either to the action of extraorganic stimuli, or of intraorganic stimuli, and by central stimulation. There are certain dreams which are prophetic in character, either auspicious or inauspicious. Auspicious dreams betoken good ; inauspicious dreams forebode evil. The former are due to a certain merit (dharma) of the person, and the latter, to a certain demerit (adharma). Some of these prophetic dreams are echoes of our past waking experience while others apprehend entirely novel objects never perceived before. The former are brought about by subconscious impressions of our past experience in co-operation with merit or demerit according as they augur good or evil while the latter, by merit or demerit alone, since there are no subconscious impressions of such absolutely unknown objects. These prophetic dreams due to 'the force of character of clairvoyant dreamers' are valid as they truly forecast some future events. And besides the dream-illusions, dream-hallucinations and prophetic dreams, Ariyavasā-Adichcharāṇi, a Buddhist writer, recognizes another class of dreams which are due to spirit-influence, or due to suggestions from spiritualistic agents which include 'dream-

coincidences'; these may be called telepathic dreams<sup>2</sup>. Of these, the first two kinds of dreams are invalid while the last two kinds are sometimes valid. But ordinarily dreams are to be regarded as invalid<sup>3</sup>.

Udayana distinguishes dream-cognitions from the illusory perceptions of waking life and doubtful and indefinite perceptions. Though dream-cognitions are illusory perceptions because they apprehend objects which are not present at that time and place, and as such resemble the illusory perceptions of waking life, they differ from the latter in that they are produced when the peripheral organs are inoperative while the latter are produced by the peripheral organs. Then again, dream-cognitions are not identical with doubtful and indefinite perceptions. For dream-cognitions are definite and determinate in character in which the mind does not oscillate between alternative possibilities while doubtful and indefinite perceptions are uncertain because in them the mind is not fixed on a definite object but wavers between two objects without any definite decision. But though dreams are thus different from the illusions of our waking life, and doubtful and indefinite perceptions, they also are equally invalid<sup>4</sup>.

Śrīdhara also observes that dream-cognitions are definite and determinate perceptions, as distinguished from indefinite and indeterminate perceptions. And he also shows that dream-cognitions, arising either from the intensity of subconscious impressions, or from intraorganic disorders, or from unseen agencies such as merit and demerit, are purely illusory, for they consist in the false imposition of an external form upon something that is wholly internal, and as such are not

<sup>2</sup> Sri Aurobindo considers some dreams to be "formations of the vital mind, either of the dreamer or of some one else with whom he contacts in sleep of powers or beings of that plane". *Moss Lights on Yoga*, 1952, p. 151. These dreams are without any noetic value.

<sup>3</sup> IPC, Ch. XV.

<sup>4</sup> 'svatārthatve'py-upraate-ndriya-grāma-svabhāve'd viparyayād vyavachchedaḥ nitya-koṭikatvāt saktiāyā-nadhyavasāyābhāvaṃ anubhavanam iti smṛtyah. XV, p. 271.

essentially different from the illusions of our waking life, the only difference between them lying in the fact that the former are illusory perceptions during sleep while the latter are illusory perceptions of waking life. So dream-cognitions are invalid<sup>1</sup>

Besides these dream-cognitions which we do not recognize as dreams during the dream-state, sometimes we have another kind of dream-cognitions which are recognized as dreams. Sometimes in the dream-state we dream that we are dreaming of something. This dream-within-dream, which has a dream for its object, is called by *Prāśastapāda svapnāntika-jñāna*. And *Prāśastapāda* rightly points out that these dreams-within-dreams essentially differ from mere dream-cognitions, since the former are representative in character while the latter are presentative in character; the former are recollections of dream-cognitions while the latter resemble direct sense-perceptions<sup>2</sup>. Though dream-cognitions are invalid, *Udayana* avers, the dreams-within-dreams having dreams for their objects are not invalid. They are valid recollections of dream-experiences, and recollections of real objects are not invalid<sup>3</sup>.

The *Nyāya-Viśeṣika* and the *Advaita Vedānta* recognize the presentative character of dream-cognitions. But, for *Prabhākara*, dream cognitions are really recollections of past waking experience, but they appear to consciousness as direct and immediate perceptions owing to the obscuration of memory (*smṛtipramoṣa*). Thus *Prabhākara* explains both waking illusions and dream-illusions by the same theory of the obscuration of memory<sup>4</sup>.

According to *Prabhākara*, in a dream-cognition what is cognized is an external object perceived elsewhere in the past and remembered during sleep, though it is not recognized as an object of our past experience at that time, but it appears as if it were actually apprehended at that time owing to the

<sup>1</sup>NK., p. 163. <sup>2</sup>Ph., p. 184. <sup>3</sup>KV., p. 275.

<sup>4</sup>*evada svapne'pi vastūni smaryamānāni santyapi anubhūtiśāśa-moṣeṣa bhāṣante gṛhyamāṇavat.* PP., p. 35.

obscuration of memory. The cognition itself is quite valid, so far as the object is concerned since the object was actually perceived in the past. The invalidity of the cognition comes in only when it is regarded as something actually perceived at the time, and not as only remembered and the misapprehension is due to such discrepancies as arise from sleep. Thus the invalidity of a dream-cognition pertains to the accessory conditions which generate the dream-cognition, and not to the cognition *per se*.

According to the Advaita Vedānta, in illusory perceptions we do not perceive an object as another as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds, but we perceive an illusory reality which is produced at that time and place; this reality is illusory and indefinable as distinguished from empirical and ontological reality. Likewise, according to him, dream-cognitions, too, are illusory perceptions, during sleep, of illusory realities produced at that time and place like the illusory perceptions of our waking life, and these illusory realities (e. g., elephants, chariots, etc.) are produced then and there and persist so long as dream-cognitions last<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup>ata eva svapno-palsbdha-rathādinām āgantuka-nidrādi-doṣa-janyatvāt prātibhāsikatvam. VP., p. 159.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF SUPERNORMAL PERCEPTIONS

We have dealt with the psychological nature of the different kinds of supernormal perceptions elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> Here we shall confine our attention to the epistemological value of these different kinds of supernormal perceptions.

#### THE EPISTEMIC VALUE OF PRĀTIBHA-JNĀNA (FLASH OF INTUITION)

Prātibhajñāna is an extrasensory perception or intuition of a future event. Though it generally belongs to sages, Praśastapada says, in rare cases it belongs to ordinary persons also, as when a girl has a flash of intuition that her brother will come tomorrow.<sup>2</sup> Jayanta Bhaṭṭa also avers that though yogins can perceive all objects, past, present and future, ordinary persons are not entirely devoid of the power of perceiving the future. On rare occasions we also have a flash of intuition, for instance, when a girl perceives in her heart of hearts that her brother will come tomorrow.

This flash of intuition must be regarded as valid perception on the following grounds. (i) It is produced by a real object (ii) it is not doubtful; (iii) it is not contradicted; (iv) its causes are not vitiated by any defect.<sup>3</sup>

It may be objected that the cognition is not produced by an object, for the object of the cognition does not exist at that time. This objection would be valid, Jayanta urges, if such a cognition were held to apprehend an object existing at that time. In fact, this intuitive cognition apprehends its object not as existing at that time but as existing in the

<sup>1</sup>IPC, Ch. XVII. <sup>2</sup>Ph., p. 256.

<sup>3</sup>śāntarthe'jñāna na sandigdhe'jñāna na bhāva-vibhakti'ratam. na dṛṣṭa' bhāvanā ceti pramāṇam idam hye'ndam. N.M., p. 108.

future. So it cannot be said that the cognition is not produced by an object. But how can there be a perception of the future? Futurity is nothing but prior nonexistence which will be destroyed; but how can there be a relation between this prior nonexistence and the existent object (e.g., brother)? It is self-contradictory to say that existence is related to nonexistence. Jayanta urges that this objection is not sound. The object of the intuition (e.g. brother) is not nonexistent, but its relation to the place is nonexistent. There is a prior nonexistence not of the object itself, but of its relation to the place. The brother does exist, though not in that place. The girl is reminded of her brother for some reason or other (e.g., anxiety for feeding him etc.), and when the 'brother' flashes in her memory, he is perceived as coming tomorrow. Thus the object of intuitive perception is reproduced owing to a certain cause, and the reproduction of the object is the cause of its presentation to consciousness. The intuition of the object, therefore, is the effect of its reproduction in memory. Thus it is a valid cognition, since it is produced by an object that has a real existence. It is an intuitive perception of a future object brought to consciousness by memory owing to a certain cause.<sup>1</sup>

But it may be urged that sometimes these prophetic intuitions are contradicted by later perceptions. So they cannot be regarded as valid. But when the prophetic intuition of the loving sister is actually verified by the advent of her brother, her intuition cannot be regarded as invalid. It may be urged that it is simply a case of chance coincidence, and, that consequently, the so-called intuition is invalid. There is no evidence to prove that it is a case of chance coincidence. When a clairvoyant intuition of the future is actually verified by a subsequent event, it can never be regarded as invalid.<sup>2</sup>

Śrīdhara avers that this intuitive perception of the future is valid, because it is neither a doubtful cognition nor an

<sup>1</sup>sa śvatanā-gamana-viśiṣṭatvena prātibhāś prātibhārya sa eva janaśa  
manāt anartha-jatvābhāvāt pramāṇaṃ prātibhāṃ NM., p. 107.

<sup>2</sup>NM., p. 106.



illusory cognition. It is not doubtful because there is no oscillation of the mind between two alternatives. It is not illusory because it agrees with the real nature of its object<sup>1</sup>. It is a valid perception. It is not valid inference, comparison, and testimony, Jayanta avers, because it is not generated by a mark of inference, similarity, and a sentence<sup>2</sup>. It may be objected that such an intuition is not perception, since it does not depend upon the internal organ (manas). In the absence of a mark of inference, similarity, sentence and the like a cognition, which is flawless, is mental perception. Hence prātibhajñāna is a valid mental perception<sup>3</sup>.

Vallabhaācārya, a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika syncretist writer, considers prātibhajñāna to be extrasensory valid perception, for it is not produced by the sense-organs. It is not produced by the internal organ, since it does not operate on external objects. It is not inferred from marks of inference such as throbbing of the eyes, etc., because sometimes such signs do not tally with future events. It is not conjecture (ūha) in which one alternative only is cognized owing to the perception of frequently occurring common qualities, because it is a definite cognition such as 'my brother will certainly come tomorrow', like inference. Otherwise, inference also would have to be considered as doubt. It is not illusion because it corresponds with an actual fact. It may be argued that it is a kind of inference because it appears to be perceptual though it is not produced by the sense-organs. This argument is invalid, because it does not depend upon a mark of inference, though it is not produced by the sense-organs. It may be argued that it is inference, though it does not depend upon a mark of inference (līṅga), even as divine knowledge is perception, though it is not produced by the sense-organs. This argument is wrong because prātibhajñāna is immediate

<sup>1</sup>na cedade saṁśayaḥ ubhaya-koṭi-saṁsparśa-bhāvāt na ca viparyayaḥ saṁvādāt ataḥ pramāṇam eva. NK., p. 258.

<sup>2</sup>pramāṇam ca sat pratyakṣam eva na pramāṇāntaram. śabda-līṅga-sādhya-nimitta-napekṣavāt. NM., p. 107.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

knowledge and because immediate knowledge is perception<sup>1</sup>. Vallabhācārya includes prātibhajñāna in āṣajñāna or intuition of sages. He avers that āṣajñāna may occur even in common people.

Veṅkaṭanātha, a follower of Rāmānuja, treats prātibhajñāna as valid knowledge. It immediately knows an external object or event independently of the sense-organs. It is valid because it is found to correspond with an actual fact. It is due to the excellence of the person who has such an intuition of a future event<sup>2</sup>. It is due to his innate clairvoyant character. Such intuition of future events is found in abundance in holy saints<sup>3</sup>. Patañjali includes such intuition in yogic perception and regards it as valid knowledge<sup>4</sup>.

Patañjali takes prātibhajñāna in the sense of intuition, which is the result of the practice of meditation, and which precedes discriminative knowledge of the self as entirely distinct from the mind-body-complex. When this kind of intuition dawns upon a yogin, he has immediate knowledge of all objects<sup>5</sup>. Prātibhajñāna is called redeeming (tāraka) knowledge<sup>6</sup>. Patañjali and Vyāsa ascribe the knowledge of subtle, hidden, distant, past and future objects to a super-normal power of the mind (citta) born of meditation<sup>7</sup>. The supernatural powers of the different sense-organs born of meditation generate the perception of supernatural sounds, touches, visions, tastes and smells even in the extraverted condition of the mind. These powers are impediments to the aspirants after release, who pay no heed to them and focuss their minds on their selves undiverted by them<sup>8</sup>. Patañjali also ascribes the knowledge of subtle, hidden and distant

<sup>1</sup>aparokṣasya pratyakṣatvāt. NL., p. 69.

<sup>2</sup>viśiṣṭa-kāla-puruṣādy-apekṣo-ṭkarṣa-sambhavā. NP., p. 494.

<sup>3</sup>punyaṣu puruṣeṣ-veśā bhūyiṣṭhaṁ satyadarśini. Ibid., p. 494.

<sup>4</sup>tasmāt patañjaliḥ prāha pratibhā ceti tāṁ pramām. Ibid., p. 495.

<sup>5</sup>prātibhāt vā sarvam. YS., iii, 33.

<sup>6</sup>prātibhāṁ nāma tārakaṁ, tadvivēkajasya jñānasya pūrvarūpaṁ, tenaiva sarvam eva jñāti yogi. YBh., iii, 33.

<sup>7</sup>prātibhāt sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṣtātītā-nāgata-jñānam. YBh., iii, 36. YS., iii, 36. \*YS., YBh., iii, 36-37.

objects to the practice of concentration of the luminous sattva of the mind (citta) on them for a long period when it completely conquers grief and other distracting emotions<sup>1</sup>. The sattva of mind becomes luminous and pervasive like ākāśa and calm like the unagitated ocean, when it is focussed on the heart, the seat of mind, for a long period<sup>2</sup>. Vijñāna-bhikṣu explains prātibhajñāna as valid knowledge of subtle objects and the like through the mind (manas) independently of instruction, etc. It is immediate knowledge of supersensible objects not acquired through the sense-organs but through the internal organ<sup>3</sup>.

### THE EPISTEMIC VALUE OF ĀRṢAJÑĀNA (INTUITION OF SAGES)

Kaṇāda considers the intuition of sages (ārṣajñāna) to be valid knowledge due to their special merit<sup>4</sup>. He recognizes two kinds of valid knowledge ; perception and inference. He includes ārṣajñāna in perception. Praśastapāda avers that the sages who are the authors of the scriptures have a valid intuition of all objects—past, present and future—and also of merit (dharma) and other supersensible objects owing to the contact of the internal organ with the self and a peculiar merit born of austerities. Such an intuitive cognition is called ārṣajñāna. This cognition is perceptual in character, since it is not produced by marks of inference and so forth ; but it differs from ordinary perception in that it is not produced by the external sense-organs, but by the internal organ with the help of certain powers acquired by learning, austerities, and meditation. Praśastapāda calls it prātibhajñāna also, since it is a distinct and vivid perception in harmony with the real

<sup>1</sup>YS., iii, 25; i, 36.

<sup>2</sup>hṛdaya-puṇḍarīke dhārayato buddhisattvaṁ hi bhāsvaram ākāśakalpam. YBh., iii, 36.

<sup>3</sup>prātibhā upadeśādi-nairapekṣyeṇa sūkṣmādīnāṁ mānasam yathārthajñānam tat-samarthyam prātibham. YV., iii, 35.

<sup>4</sup>Ārṣam dharmebhyaḥ. VS., ix, 2, 13.

nature of things, not produced by the sense-organs, marks of inference and the like<sup>1</sup>. Śrīdhara also treats it as a valid cognition since it corresponds with the real nature of its object and since it is free from doubt and illusion<sup>2</sup>. Śaṅkara Miśra defines āṛśajñāna as the sages' intuition of the past and the future objects due to their special merit<sup>3</sup>. He regards it either as mental perception or inference from signs (linga) such as throbbing of the eyes, etc.,—the knowledge of invariable concomitance between the *probans* and the *probandum* being dependent on a subconscious impression (saṁskāra) of the experience of previous life. He regards prātibhajñāna as āṛśajñāna occurring in common persons<sup>4</sup>. He admits the validity of āṛśajñāna due to a special merit (dharma) born of austerities. Jaya Nārāyaṇa includes āṛśajñāna in yogic perception and considers it to be valid knowledge because it is due to a special merit alone born of meditation<sup>5</sup>. An illusory perception of a distant object is due to the defect of an object aided by a demerit. But āṛśajñāna is a valid immediate cognition of past, future, and remote objects due to an excellent merit alone born of meditation or austerities<sup>6</sup>. Chandrakānta considers āṛśajñāna as the immediate intuition of past, present, future, and supersensible objects like merit and the like to be valid knowledge due to meditation and trance. He calls āṛśajñāna prātibhajñā<sup>7</sup>. Vallabhācārya, a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinker, treats āṛśajñāna as immediate knowledge but not as sensory perception because it is not produced by the sense-organs in intercourse with their objects<sup>8</sup>. It may be argued that āṛśajñāna is valid perception like divine perception which is valid. Vallabhācārya rejoins that divine knowledge is called valid perception because it is immediate knowledge like

<sup>1</sup>PBh., p. 258. <sup>2</sup>NK., p. 258.

<sup>3</sup>ṛṣiṇām yad aṣṭitā-nāgata-viṣayakam jñānam ted āṛṣam. VSU., ix, 2, 13.

<sup>4</sup>āṛśajñānam vidyaiva sā ca ṛṣiṇām laukikānām ca bhavati. Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>āṛṣam ṛṣiṇām yogaja-dharmena janitam. dharma-mātrā-dhīnam pramā-rūpam eva bhavati. VSV., ix, 2, 13. <sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>VSB., ix, 2, 13.

<sup>8</sup>aparokṣam eva cārśajñānam. na tu pratyakṣam. apindriya-karaṇakatvāt. NL., p. 69.

perception. He does not include āṛṣajñāna in perception or inference but treats it as a distinct kind of valid knowledge. Only valid knowledge of common people is of two kinds : perception and inference. Āṛṣajñāna is an uncommon kind of valid knowledge<sup>1</sup>.

#### THE EPISTEMIC VALUE OF OCCULT PERCEPTION (SIDDHADARŚANA)

Kaṇāda ascribes occult perception to a special merit (dharma) of the occultist. Occult perception is valid immediate knowledge, according to Śaṅkara Miśra, of hidden and remote objects which are present through the sense-organs rendered acute by the application of herbs, unguents, etc., to them, or by uttering incantations (mantra), or by taking a potent medicine, due to a special merit. Occult perception is sensory perception due to the operation of the external sense-organs. Only their power is enhanced by the agencies mentioned above, and yet occult perception is not entirely due to the occult power of medicines, incantations and the like, but also due to a special merit or occult power of the person who has this kind of extraordinary perception. Śaṅkara Miśra includes occult perception in yogic perception, and does not treat it as a distinct kind of valid knowledge<sup>2</sup>. Jaya Nārāyaṇa also observes that occult perception is like the intuition of sages (āṛṣajñāna) and due to a special merit (dharma), and that it is not due to a demerit (adharma) and not illusory<sup>3</sup>. Candrakānta also remarks that occult perception of supersensible objects also is due to a special merit<sup>4</sup>. Only it is not extrasensory perception but sensory perception of supersensible objects through the sense-organs strengthened and purified by unguents and the like. Occult perception is valid because it accords with the real nature of supersensible objects.

<sup>1</sup>Ibid. \*VSU., ix, 2, 13. VS., ix, 2, 13.

<sup>2</sup>VSV., ix, 2, 13. \*VSE., ix, 2, 13.

Prasastapāda does not regard occult perception as a distinct kind of valid knowledge. If occult knowledge cognizes hidden and distant objects, then it is perception. If it cognizes supersensible objects through the medium of the movement of the planets, stars and other heavenly bodies, then it is inference<sup>1</sup>. He admits the validity of occult perception of subtle, remote and hidden objects, which is purely sensuous because it is produced by the external sense-organs refined and strengthened by certain occult medicines<sup>2</sup>.

#### THE EPISTEMIC VALUE OF YOGIC PERCEPTION (YOGIPRATYAKṢA)

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, a Naiyāyika, describes yogic perception as the perception of subtle, hidden, remote, past, and future objects and considers it to be the highest excellence of human perception<sup>3</sup>. The minds of yogis can have the immediate knowledge of all knowable objects due to the repeated practice of meditation. Our minds rendered impure by the taints of love, hatred, etc., cannot attain the highest status of supreme knowledge. But the minds of yogis freed of all veils and impurities and purified and refined can vision all objects. Hence they acquire the power of perceiving all objects with their pure minds free of all taints and rendered one-pointed by constant concentration<sup>4</sup>. It may be contended that the yogis perceive all objects through one cognition or many cognitions, that they cannot perceive mutually contradictory objects through one cognition, that they cannot perceive all objects simultaneously through the atomic manas, and that they cannot exhaustively perceive an infinite number of objects in the universe successively even through unending epochs. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa rejoins that the yogis perceive all objects in all places through a single cognition simultaneously<sup>5</sup>. Mutually contradictory objects

<sup>1</sup>VSU., ix, 2, 13. <sup>2</sup>PBh., p. 238.

<sup>3</sup>darśanasya paro' dīśayaḥ sūksma-vyavahita-viprakṛṣṭa-bhūta-bhaviṣyad-ādi-viśayatvam. NM., p. 103. <sup>4</sup>NM., p. 105.

<sup>5</sup>tyugapad ekaiva buddhyā sarvatra sarvān arthān drakṣyanti yogināḥ. Ibid., p. 107.

(e.g., blue, yellow, etc.) are perceived by a variegated cognition (*citrapratyaya*). It may be contended that if the yogic perception cognizes all past, future and remote objects by a single cognition, then it does not differ from divine perception. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that divine perception is eternal whereas human yogic perception is noneternal and due to the practice of yoga and meditation<sup>1</sup>. It may be contended that there is no scope for meditation in respect of unperceived objects and moral laws (*dharma*) which are ascertained by the study of the Vedas, and that, consequently, yogic perception cannot cognize them. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa rejoins that the yogis first acquire the knowledge of moral laws from the Vedas, meditate on them repeatedly, and then acquire the yogic perception of them without the help of the Vedas, but that God's knowledge of moral laws is natural and not acquired and that He is the creator of the Vedas and the promulgator of moral laws<sup>2</sup>. Yogic perception is valid because it cognizes the real nature of objects.

Praśastapāda, a Vaiśeṣika thinker, divides yogic perception into two kinds: ecstatic (*yukta*) perception and nonecstatic (*viyukta*) perception. He defines ecstatic perception as valid perception of the essential nature of their own selves, other selves, ether (*ākāśa*), space, time, atoms, air, and *manas*, and of the qualities, actions, generalities, particularities, and inherence inhering in them by the yogis in ecstasy through minds aided by merits born of meditation. The yogis perceive these objects through their internal organs (*manas*) strengthened and perfected by merits due to the practice of meditation, whereas we perceive the sensible objects present 'here and now' with our sense-organs. Hence the yogis are distinguished from common people like us<sup>3</sup>. Praśastapāda defines nonecstatic perception as valid perception of subtle, hidden, and remote objects through the fourfold contact of the sense-organs with these objects, contact of the sense-organs with

<sup>1</sup>asti vidya divarasya tathāvidhān nityam eva jñānaṁ yoginān tu yoga-bhāvanā-bhīṣa-prabhavam iti. Ibid, p. 108.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid. <sup>3</sup>PBh. pp. 283-84.

manas, and contact of manas with self, by the yogis, who have fallen out of ecstasy, through the supernatural power born of a special merit due to meditation<sup>1</sup>.

Udayana avers that ecstatic perception (yukta pratyakṣa) is mental perception, that the yogis in a state of trance perceive supersensible objects through the manas aided by a special merit born of meditation, and that they acquire trance or ecstasy by withdrawing the manas from the sense-organs and focussing it on the supersensible objects which are to be intuited. They constantly think of them uninterruptedly for a long time every day and acquire an intuition of them. He also avers that nonecstatic perception (vivyukta pratyakṣa) is sensory perception of subtle, hidden and remote objects through the sense-organs whose powers are enhanced by a special merit born of meditation. A special merit (dharma) is generated by constant practice of concentration of mind and meditation. Different modes of mental concentration produce different kinds of supernatural powers. The sense-organs are rendered more acute and powerful by them and operate on those objects which are not normally within their ken. In nonecstatic perception the impediments to the function of the sense-organs are removed and they are brought under control. The objects are perceived through the sensory contact<sup>2</sup>.

Prāśastapāda regards the indeterminate perception of the bare nature of substances, etc., as the means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa), substances, etc., as objects (prameya), the self as the knower (pramātṛ), and the knowledge of substances, etc., as valid knowledge (pramiti). Udayana describes right determinate cognition of objects as valid knowledge<sup>3</sup>. Or Prāśastapāda regards right, indeterminate, nameless knowledge due to the contact of the sense-organs with the objects, contact of manas with the sense-organs, and contact of manas with

<sup>1</sup>vivyuktānām catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣād yogaja-dharmā-nugraha-sāmarthyāt sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṛṣṭeṣu pratyakṣam utpadyate. Ibid, p. 285.

<sup>2</sup>KRV., pp. 284-85.

<sup>3</sup>pramitiḥ dravyādi-viṣayaṁ jñānam samyak niscayaḥ. Ibid, p. 287.



the self, as the means of valid perception (*pramāṇa*), substances, etc., as objects (*prameya*), self as the knower (*pramātṛ*), and the knowledge of acceptability, avoidability, and neutrality as the result of valid perception (*pramā*)<sup>1</sup>. Udayana attributes the validity of yogic perception to a special merit born of meditation and regards it as the result of perception which is a *pramāṇa* because of its being immediate knowledge<sup>2</sup>. He does not regard it as valid because it is the result of concentration of mind and of the practice of meditation because constant thought of a beloved woman produces the false hallucination of her, and because mere concentration and meditation unaided by merit born of yoga do not produce valid yogic perception<sup>3</sup>.

The Mīmāṃsaka objects that the yogis have no perception of supersensible objects because they are living beings like us, that their cognitions cannot cognize atoms, etc., because their cognitions are like our cognitions, and that their sense-organs cannot operate on supersensible objects, because they are like our sense-organs. Udayana retorts that the Mīmāṃsakas' cognitions also cannot cognize the meanings of the Vedas, because they are like our cognitions, and that their minds (*manas*) cannot operate on the meanings of the Vedas, because they are like our minds. The Mīmāṃsakas deny yogic perception. Udayana asserts emphatically that different methods of yoga practice generate different supernatural powers, and that yogic perception is due to a special merit born of yoga. It is not an unwarranted hypothesis but an actual fact of experience<sup>4</sup>. It cannot be investigated by mere speculation. The Mīmāṃsakas lay stress on the performance of rituals. The Naiyāyika and the Vaiśeṣika accept the efficacy of the practice of yoga too. Jaya Nārāyaṇa also avers

<sup>1</sup>PBh., pp. 288-89. KRV., p. 289.

<sup>2</sup>yoginām anubhavo dharmajatvāt pramā, sāksātkāritvāt pratyakṣa-phalam. NKS., ch. v. p. 147.

<sup>3</sup>dharmā-nanugṛhīta-bhāvanā-mātra-prabhvas tu (anubhavaḥ) na pramā. Ibid., KRV., 284.

<sup>4</sup>yogācca dharmo jāyata ityatra yoga-vidhaya eva pramāṇaṁ teṣāṁ karma-vidhi-tulya-yogaḥśematvāt. KRV., p. 284. NKS., ch. v, p. 147.

that the intuition of yogis is certainly valid knowledge because it is due to a special merit alone<sup>1</sup>. Chandrakānta observes that the practice of yoga removes impurities of the mind, destroys false knowledge (*avidyā*), induces trance, and generates intuition of supersensible objects owing to a special merit produced by it<sup>2</sup>.

Bhāsarvajña, a Naiyāyika, defines yogic perception as the immediate knowledge of objects removed in space, time and nature. He divides it into ecstatic perception and nonecstatic perception. Ecstatic perception, according to him, cognizes all objects due to the contact of self with *manas* aided by a special merit born of yoga. Nonecstatic perception, according to him, is immediate apprehension due to the fourfold contact, or the threefold contact, or the twofold contact, aided by merit born of yoga<sup>3</sup>. Bhāsarvajña borrows the division of yogic perception into ecstatic perception and nonecstatic perception from *Prāśastapāda* and other *Vaiśeṣikas*. The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* syncretist writers, *Viśvanātha* and others, accept this division. *Viśvanātha* observes that ecstatic perception can cognize all supersensible objects (e. g., *ākāśa*, atoms, etc.) always with the aid of merit born of yoga, and that nonecstatic perception can cognize them with an effort of thinking<sup>4</sup>. *Yogaja sannikarṣa* is the extraordinary intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects brought about by yoga. It is not an ordinary intercourse.

*Jayasīmhasūri* observes that common perception is due to proximate space ('here'), present time ('now'), merit or demerit, God, and sometimes light, besides the fourfold contact, and that yogic perception is due to remote space ('there'), remote time (past and future), objects remote in nature (e.g., atoms), and special merit born of yoga. Common

<sup>1</sup>*yoginām jñānaṁ tu dharmamātrā-dhīnam pramārūpam eva bhavati*, VSV., ix, 2, 13.

<sup>2</sup>VSB., ix, 2, 13.

<sup>3</sup>NSar., p. 2.

<sup>4</sup>BhP., i., 66; SM., i, 66.

perception cognizes gross objects whereas yogic perception cognizes subtle objects. Merit is the cause of common perception of desirable objects. Demerit is the cause of common perception of harmful objects. Yogic perception is due to special merit only<sup>1</sup>.

Veṅkaṭanātha, a Viśiṣṭādvāita Vedāntist, defines perception as immediate knowledge and describes immediate knowledge as distinct and vivid manifestation of an object in consciousness. He describes vividness as the power of manifesting an object with its individuality and uniqueness. He divides immediate knowledge into eternal and noneternal. Divine perception is eternal immediate knowledge. Human perception is noneternal immediate knowledge. Human perception is nonyogic perception and yogic perception. Yogic perception is due to excellent merit born of yoga. It is either ecstatic or nonecstatic. Ecstatic perception is produced by the internal organ (manas) only. Nonstatic perception is produced by the external sense-organs also.<sup>2</sup> The special merit is due to the practice of yoga and austerities. The intuition of sages (ārṣajñāna) also due to austerities is generated by excellent merit, and, consequently, included in yogic perception. Śrīnivāsa also includes ārṣajñāna in yogic perception.<sup>3</sup> The author of the "Prajñāparitrāṇa" holds that yogic perception which manifests supersensible objects is independent of physical sense-organs but dependent on spiritual sense-organs. Arjuna could see Kṛṣṇa's cosmic form through the spiritual (divya) eye granted by Kṛṣṇa. Veṅkaṭanātha observes that not only yogic perception but also divine perception and perception

<sup>1</sup>NTD., p. 72-73.

<sup>2</sup>yogipratyakṣaṁ prakṛt-ādṛṣṭa-viśeṣajam tad yuktāvasthāyāṁ manomātra-janyaṁ viyuktā-vasthāyāṁ tu bāhyendriya-janyamapi. NP., p. 72.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid, p. 74-75. NPNS., p. 75.

of the released souls are independent of the physical sense-organs<sup>1</sup>.

It is objected that, though yogic perception may cognize subtle, hidden and remote objects because they exist at the present time and because the sense-organs are strengthened and purified by the practice of yoga, it cannot cognize past objects. Veṅkaṭanātha rejoins that yogic perception can cognize past objects even as recognitive perception cognizes the past condition of a nonexistent object. If a subconscious impression (saṁskāra) be said to relate recognition to the prior condition of an object, then an unseen agency (adṛṣṭa) e.g., a special merit generated by the practice of yoga may be thought to relate yogic perception to a past object as well as a future object. The Navya Nyāya admits an extraordinary yogaja sannikarṣa to account for the yogic perception of past and future objects. A Viśiṣṭādvaitavādin does not believe in such an extraordinary intercourse<sup>2</sup>.

The Sāṁkhya describes yogic perception as a mental and extraordinary perception<sup>3</sup>. It corresponds to ecstatic perception described above. The past is present as merged in the material cause and the future also is present in the material cause in a potential condition. The present is the actual manifest state of a physical entity<sup>4</sup>. Yogic perception cognizes the past and the future objects because they exist in some condition at present and also because of a supernatural power attained by the yogis through the practice of yoga. Their yogic perception cognizes all objects in all times and in all places due to the relation to prakṛti through the manas which acquires excellence due to a special merit born of yoga<sup>5</sup>. The Sāṁkhya explanation is better than the

<sup>1</sup>NP., p 75.

<sup>2</sup>NP., p 655 ; SAS., p. 655.

<sup>3</sup>yogi-pratyakṣaṁ tvabāhyam alaukikaṁca SSV., i, 90.

<sup>4</sup>naṣṭamāpi svakāraṇaṁ līnaṁ bhūtatvenāsti, bhaviṣyadāpi svakāraṇaṁ nāgatatvenāsti. SSV., p. 49.

<sup>5</sup>SSV., i, 91.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika explanation of the yogic perception of the past and the future.

The Yoga also believes that the past and the future are present in a physical substance in some condition, and can, consequently, be cognized by yogic perception. The present alone is real. Temporal order is a construction of the intellect (*buddhinirmāṇa*). There can be no aggregate of moments in reality. Hence the yogis can know the past and the future from the present states of things by concentrating their minds on them and completely withdrawing them from other objects. Further, the Yoga believes that all objects are in the nature of all other objects so that by concentration on any object all other objects are known<sup>1</sup>. Concentration on attributes (*dharma*), characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*), and conditions (*avasthā*) of physical things which are modifications of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* leads to the yogic perception of the past and the present<sup>2</sup>. Concentration of pure *sattva* of mind on subtle, hidden and remote objects generates immediate knowledge of them<sup>3</sup>. Pure *satta* of mind is acquired by the practice of yoga which removes the taints of love, hatred, egoism, nescience, and delusion, and decreases *rajas* and *tamas* to the utmost degree. *Rajas* makes the mind restless. *Tamas* obstructs knowledge and causes ignorance. The yogis can perceive all objects through *prātibhajñāna*<sup>4</sup>. It is not a flash of intuition in common persons as Jayanta Bhaṭṭa holds. It is intuition acquired through the practice of yoga. It is the state prior to discriminating knowledge of the self as distinct from *prakṛti* and mind-body-complex. It is called redeeming (*tāraka*) knowledge because it is the prior state of discriminating knowledge that brings about release<sup>5</sup>. Subtle,

<sup>1</sup>*sarvam sarvātmakam*. YBH., iii, 14.

<sup>2</sup>*pariṇāma-traya-samyamād atitā-nāgata-jñānam*. YS., iii, 16. YBH., iii, 16 ; iv, 12-13.

<sup>3</sup>YS., iii, 25.

<sup>4</sup>*prātibhād vā sarvam*. YS., iii, 33, iii, 43.

<sup>5</sup>*prātibhañ nāma tārakaṁ, tad vivekajasya jñānasya pūrvārūpaṁ, tena vā sarvam eva jñāti*. YBH., iii, 33.

hidden, remote, past and future objects, supernatural sounds, touches, sights, tastes and smells are perceived through *prātibhajñānā*<sup>1</sup>. Such supernormal perceptions are hugged as supernatural powers (*siddhi*) by the extraverted (*vyutthitacitta*) but discarded by the introverted yogis who aspire for liberation alone<sup>2</sup>. Concentration on the present moment and the order of moments generates discriminating knowledge of the self<sup>3</sup>. Furthermore, the Yoga conceives the mind (*citta*) as pervasive (*vibhu*) which perceives all objects when its *rajas* and *tamas* are removed completely and when the sense-organs are completely controlled by the self and cannot restrict its knowledge<sup>4</sup>. The Yoga regards both self and mind (*citta*) as pervasive whereas the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* regards the self as pervasive and mind (*manas*) as atomic. The validity of yogic perception is due to a special merit born of yoga. All orthodox systems of philosophy except the *Mīmāṃsā* believe in the validity of yogic perception.

The Yoga prescribes the methods by which a yogin can perceive his self, his mind (*citta*), and others' minds. *Patañjali* avers that habitual concentration of the mind on the self isolated from experience yields the intuition of the self, experience being for the self and being due to the false identification of the self and the mind which are absolutely different from each other<sup>5</sup>. The self is immutable and conscious. The mind (*buddhi*) is mutable and unconscious. It is made of transparent *sattva* in which the conscious self is reflected. *Vyāsa* avers that the self knows the mental mode in which it is reflected, and that the mental mode does not know the self as its object, since the knower

<sup>1</sup>YS., YBH., iii, 36.

<sup>2</sup>YS., YBH., iii, 37.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid, iii, 52.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid, iv, 17.

<sup>5</sup>*sattva-puruṣayor atyantā-sahkirṇayoh pratyaya-viśeṣo bhogaḥ parār thatvāt svārtha-sādhya-māt puruṣa-jñānam.* YS., iii, 35.

cannot know itself.<sup>1</sup> Patañjali avers that habitual concentration of the mind on the heart-cavity yields the intuition of the pure mind.<sup>2</sup> The heart-cavity is the seat of the mind (*citta*). Patañjali avers that habitual concentration of the mind on any organic expression of another person's mind yields the intuition of it devoid of the knowledge of its object.<sup>3</sup>

The heterodox Buddhist also believes in yogic perception. Dharmakīrti defines yogic perception as the knowledge of a yogin, which is generated by the excellence of meditation on metaphysical truths.<sup>4</sup> Dharmottara explains the definition thus. The four noble truths are : (1) there is suffering ; (2) it has a cause ; (3) it can be stopped ; (4) there is a way to stop suffering<sup>5</sup>. The continued practice of meditation on these truths produces a gradually increasing manifestness of the knowledge of them. When the meditation reaches the highest stage of excellence, it produces the most distinct intuition of them. The object of meditation is most distinctly manifested in consciousness, as if it were a fruit on the palm of one's hand. The yogic perception is the most distinct and indeterminate intuition of an object present 'here and now'. It is devoid of mental constructs (*kalpanā*) or determinations which are capable of being related to words. Until meditation has reached the acme of perfection it yields determinate perception.<sup>6</sup> Yoga is trance (*samādhi*) in which the mind becomes one with its object. A person in trance is a yogin. His intuition of the ontological truths is yogic perception. Because it apprehends its object through valid knowledge, it leads him to a fruitful action. Yogic intuition is valid because it is in

<sup>1</sup>na ca puruṣa-pratyayena buddhi-sattvātmanā puruṣo dr̥ṣyate puruṣa eva, pratyayaṁ svātmāvalambanaṁ paśyati. YBH., iii, 35, HIP., Vol II, pp.44-50, IPC., Vol I, pp. 232-36

<sup>2</sup>hr̥daye citta-saṁvit. YS., iii, 34. YBH. iii, 34.

<sup>3</sup>pratyayasya paracittajñānam. na ca tat sālambanaṁ tasyāviṣayibhūtvāt. YS., iii, 19-20.

<sup>4</sup>bhūtārtha-bhāvanā-prakāṣa-paryanta-jam yogijñānam ceti. NB., i, p. 20.

<sup>5</sup>HIP., Vol. II, p. 281

<sup>6</sup>NET., p. 15

harmony with its object and because it leads to a fruitful action<sup>1</sup>. Thus, though the Buddhist does not believe in God, the permanent self, and the permanent world, he believes in yogic perception and its validity. Though Dharmakīrti is a Vaibhāṣika or a Sautrāntika realist, he treats the object of yogic perception as real. If he is a Yogācāra idealist, he treats it as empirically real. His ontological position is not explained in the "Nyāya-bindu" which is a treatise on Logic.

The Jaina does not believe in God. But he believes in the permanent self and the permanent world. He believes in the possibility of the self's perception independently of the external sense-organs and mind (manas). He recognizes five kinds of knowledge : (1) mati, (2) śruta, (3) avadhi, (4) mañāḥparyaya, and (5) kevala. Mati is knowledge through the external sense-organs and manas. Śruta is testimony as to the reality of an entity due to the destruction or subsidence of karma-particles that veil the self. Avadhi is the immediate knowledge of distant objects due to the same cause. It is clairvoyance, clairauidence, and the like. Mañāḥparyaya is the immediate knowledge of other persons' minds (manas). Kevala is omniscience due to the complete destruction of karma-particles. Pūjyapāda gives this account of the different kinds of knowledge<sup>2</sup>.

Avadhi, mañāḥparyaya and kevala are supernormal perceptions. Avadhi is immediate knowledge of distant objects by the self independently of the external sense-organs and manas. Mañāḥparyaya is immediate knowledge of others' minds (manas) independently of the external sense-organs and manas due to the subsidence of karma-particles and to the purity of the self. Mañāḥparyaya is higher than avadi because it is due to the greater purity of the soul and because it knows a subtle object. Kevala-jñāna is the highest immediate knowledge of all objects due to the destruction of the karma-particles which produce delusion, which obscure knowledge

<sup>1</sup>pramāṇa-suddhārtha-grahitvācca sampādayakam. atah pratyakṣam.

Ibid, p. 15

<sup>2</sup> SS., i, 9.



and perception, and which produce obstacles to knowledge. It is omniscience. It will be discussed in the next section<sup>1</sup>.

The Mīmāṃsaka denies the possibility of yogic intuition. He holds that even if it were possible, it would be illusory. The perception of the yogin is said to be the result of intense meditation; there is a flash of presentative intuition as the result of meditation. This doctrine of intuition is peculiar to the Indian thinkers. But though the cognition produced by constant meditation is manifested as a distinct presentative cognition, does it cognize a thing as apprehended in the past or more than that? If it apprehends exactly the same thing as apprehended in the past, then the cognition produced by intense meditation is nothing but memory which, according to the Mīmāṃsaka, is invalid. And if it apprehends more than what was perceived in the past, then it is illusory since it apprehends something which has no real existence. Hence the Mīmāṃsaka concludes that if yogic intuition is possible at all, it is invalid<sup>2</sup>. The Mīmāṃsaka doctrine is expounded in a treatise on the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika replies that yogic intuition apprehends not only the objects that have already been perceived in the past, but all objects, past, present, and future, subtle and remote, sensible and supersensible, owing to the peculiar merit born of meditation. The yogic intuition is valid because it is in keeping with the real nature of its object—the entire universe. Our want of omniscience is due to the absence of the peculiar merit produced by constant meditation. It is a fact of common experience that though something is unintelligible to us at first, it becomes intelligible when we repeatedly apply intelligence to it. Thus the more we practise meditation upon an object, the greater peculiarity is produced in it at each step of the practice, and when the practice is kept up continuously for a long time, the intellect acquires a fresh force due to the peculiar merit born of meditation and must reach its highest limit of excellence. And there is nothing

<sup>1</sup>SS., i, II, 22-25.

<sup>2</sup>Siddhitrāya, p. 71.

unreasonable in this.<sup>1</sup> But how can the past, distant, and future come into contact with the sense-organs to produce an all-embracing yogic perception? According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the yogic perception is produced by the internal organ into contact with the soul by virtue of certain peculiar powers born of constant meditation.

#### THE EPISTEMIC VALUE OF THE RELEASED SOUL'S PERCEPTION (MUKTAJÑĀNA) : OMNISCIENCE

The Yoga regards the knowledge of the liberated souls as omniscience. Patañjali maintains that trance that continuously showers the intuition of the self as completely isolated from the mind-body-complex is generated by discriminative knowledge of the self.<sup>2</sup> Vyāsa avers that no other cognitions arise after discriminative knowledge of the self owing to the destruction of all potencies of actions and sub-conscious impressions of experiences, and that trance which generates constant intuition of the self arises.<sup>3</sup> This kind of trance eradicates all afflictions (*e.g.*, nescience, etc.) and potencies of actions. All taints which veil the knowledge of the self are destroyed and its knowledge becomes infinite. The self is liberated even in the embodied state and becomes omniscient. The modifications of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* of *prakṛti* cease to affect the released soul.<sup>4</sup> Thus the released soul has immediate knowledge of itself and the universe which does not affect it.

Veṅkaṭanātha, a Viśiṣṭādvaitavādin, observes that the released soul's natural knowledge (*mukta-jñāna*) is immediate intuition of all objects because their sense-organs are not obstructed by nescience (*avidyā*) owing to its total destruction. Their cognitions manifest all objects by their very nature due to the extermination of nescience which obstructs the knowledge of

<sup>1</sup>NK., 198; NTD., p. 82; NM., p. 105.

<sup>2</sup>*prasaṅkhyāne sarvathā vivekakhyāter dharmameghaḥ samādhiḥ*. YS., IV, 29.

<sup>3</sup>YBH., iv, 29.

<sup>4</sup>*kṛtā-karma-nivṛttau jīvanneva vidvān vimukto bhavati*. YBH., iv, 30.

bound souls.<sup>1</sup> As a follower of Rāmānuja, Veṅkaṭanātha holds that the attributive consciousness of a finite self is capable of expansion and contraction, that as nescience (avidyā) which obstructs its knowledge is removed its knowledge expands, that as this adjunct (upādhi) limits its knowledge it contracts, and that it pervades all objects as nescience is completely destroyed.

It is objected that if the knowledge of the released souls cognizes its objects gradually, it can never exhaustively cognize all objects because of the unending nature of the universe, and that it cannot cognize past and future objects because of the absence of sense-object-intercourse. Veṅkaṭanātha rejoins that the omniscience of the released souls is to be accepted on the authority of the Śruti, and that there is no contradiction in their attributive knowledge cognizing all objects simultaneously because of their special power due to the grace of God.<sup>2</sup> He further argues that the knowledge of the released souls simultaneously expands to and cognizes all objects because of the eradication of nescience which no longer obstructs its movement<sup>3</sup>.

Māṇikyanandi, a Jaina, divides knowledge into immediate knowledge or perception and mediate knowledge. Perception is distinct. Distinctness is directness of apprehension of an object with its distinctive features. Perception is empirical (sāmvyavahārika) and transcendental (mukhya). Empirical perception is sensuous or mental. It is nonomniscient due to the veil of karma-particles. Perception of distant objects—clairvoyance, clairaudience, etc. (avadhi), telepathic perception of the mental modes of other persons (manaḥ-

<sup>1</sup>avidyā-hānito mukta-puruṣāṇām hi samvidām. svābhāvika-svarūpeṇa nikhilārthā-vabhāsikā. NP., p. 75.

<sup>2</sup>bhagavataḥ prabhāvā-tīṣayena yugapad eva dharmabūta-jñānasya viśva-viśayatva-prāptau ko virodhaḥ. SAS., p. 654.

<sup>3</sup>sarvair abādhyāṁ gatim anusaratām muktabudher vikāśe yaugapadya-prabhṛtayo yujyante. SAS., p. 655.

paryaya), and omniscience (kevalajñāna) are the three kinds of transcendental perception. The first two are due to the subsidence of karma-particles which encrust the self while omniscience is due to their total destruction and to the absolute purity of the self. The three kinds of transcendental perception are independent of the sense-organs and mind (manas) and dependent on the proximity of the objects to the self. Omniscience is the immediate knowledge of all objects with their distinctive characteristics by the self which is entirely divested of the crust of karma-particles.<sup>1</sup> Karman is infra-atomic matter. Evil thoughts and emotions produce infra-atomic karma-particles which encrust the self which has intrinsic omniscience.

The Jaina does not believe in God but believes in permanent selves and their intrinsic omniscience which is veiled by the crust of karma-particles. Omniscience is due to meditation and absolute purity of the self and complete destruction of karma-particles which encrust it. It is the highest kind of valid knowledge attained by liberated souls, which is determinate knowledge of the universe, which also manifests itself. Knowledge is of the nature of revelation.<sup>2</sup>

Is omniscience made up of a single cognition or many cognitions? Prabhācandra replies that it is a single intuition of the whole world. It does not depend upon the external sense-organs or the internal organ, and, consequently, need not be diversified by many cognitions. Our perception is produced by the external organs or the internal organ; it cannot apprehend past, distant, future and subtle objects. But the perception of the omniscient self is not produced by the external sense-organs or the internal organ; hence it can apprehend all supersensible objects. The pure intuition of the omniscient self is not produced successively; the omniscient self knows all the objects of the universe simultaneously by a single stroke

<sup>1</sup>sāmagrī-viśeṣa-viślesitā-khilāvaraṇam atindriyam aśeṣato mukhyam. PMS., ii, 11.

<sup>2</sup>PMS., i, 1, PMLV., ii, 13; p. 18. TAS., i, 9, 12, 23, 25, 27-29; SS, Ibid. sāktalyenā-varaṇā-pāye evā-tindriyā-śeṣārtha-viśayaṁ viśadam pratyakṣam. PKM.

of intuition, since it transcends the limits of time and space, which are the necessary conditions of all sense-perception, owing to the complete destruction of karma-matter.

The Mīmāṃsaka urges that, if the omniscient self knows all the objects of the world at one moment, then in the next moment it will become unconscious having nothing to know. Prabhācandra replies that the objection would hold good, if both the omniscient cognition and the whole world were destroyed in the next moment, but that both of these are never-ending. The omniscient self knows all the objects of the world by a single unending intuition.

The Mīmāṃsaka urges that if the omniscient self knows the desires and aversions of the non-liberated souls, then it becomes tainted with them which hinder omniscience. Prabhācandra replies that desires and aversions are produced by changes or modifications. But the omniscient self is above all changes and modifications ; so it cannot be tainted by the desires and aversions of others by merely knowing them. Further, they are of sensuous origin ; but the knowledge of the omniscient self is non-sensuous ; hence it cannot be tainted by the imperfections of ordinary persons.

The Mīmāṃsaka urges that the omniscient self cannot perceive the past and the future, since they are nonexistent. And if it knows them as existent, then the knowledge of the omniscient self is invalid. Prabhācandra replies that the past and the future are perceived by the omniscient self not as present but as past and future respectively so that its pure intuition is not invalid.

But how can the past be perceived ? The past is nonexistent. Prabhācandra asks whether past objects are nonexistent in relation to the past time or whether they are nonexistent in relation to the time when they are perceived by the omniscient self. The first alternative is untenable. The past objects are as existent in relation to their own time as the present objects which exist at their own time. The past objects as much exist in the past as the present objects exist at present. The second alternative is true. Prabhācandra admits that the past objects are nonexistent in relation to the present time when

they are perceived by the omniscient self. It knows the past as existing in the past, and knows the future as existing in the future. In other words, it knows the past as produced in the past and knows the future as to be produced in the future. Hence its knowledge is not invalid. But how can the past and the future be perceived by the omniscient self as past and future respectively, though they are not existent at the time of perception? Prabhhācandra gives the following reply. The omniscient self is absolutely free from the bondage of physical existence; its knowledge is not produced by the external sense-organs or by the internal organ; so there is nothing to obstruct its knowledge of the past and the future. It is admitted by all that recognition, which is a kind of perception, can apprehend the past as well as the present, and that a flash of intuition in ordinary life (*prātibha-jñāna*) can apprehend the future as future. Therefore it is not impossible for the omniscient person who is entirely free from the fetters of karma-matter and mundane existence to have a supersensuous vision of the whole world, past, present, and future.<sup>1</sup>

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE VALUE OF DIVINE PERCEPTION

We have discussed the psychological nature of divine perception elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> Here we shall discuss the epistemological value of divine perception with a brief reference to its nature.

Divine knowledge is all-embracing and eternal; it is not diversified by many cognitions; it grasps all the objects of the universe, past, present, and future, subtle and remote by a single allembracing intuition. Divine knowledge is not of the nature of inference, analogy, or verbal cognition. It is perceptual in nature. The divine perception is not produced at all; it is beginningless and endless; it is eternal. The divine perception, therefore, is not of the nature of sensuous perception, but of the nature of creative intuition. God evolves the materials of His consciousness by the divine will, and perceives them all by one all-embracing intuition. Thus the knowledge of God is not determined by its objects; but the objects are determined by it. The divine intuition is above the limitations of time and space. All the divine attributes including divine knowledge are eternal, unlimited, numberless, unconditioned, untainted, unequalled and unexcelled.<sup>2</sup>

Thus divine knowledge may be contrasted with human knowledge. Human knowledge is finite and limited, while divine knowledge is infinite and unlimited. Human knowledge is produced by many causes, while divine knowledge is eternal. Human knowledge is tainted by errors and illusions, while divine knowledge is free from errors and imperfections. Human knowledge is conditioned, while divine knowledge is unconditioned. Human knowledge admits of degrees of excellence, while divine knowledge is unequalled and unexcelled. Human knowledge is derived from perception, inference, analogy and authority, while

<sup>1</sup>IPC, ch, XVIII.

<sup>2</sup>asya jñānaśaktyādi-kalyāṇa-guṇā nityā niḥsimā niḥsaṃkhyā nirupādhikā nirdoṣāḥ samadhika-rahitāś-ca. Tattvatraya, p. 91.

divine knowledge is perceptual in character. Human perception is sensuous in nature, while divine perception is nonsensuous. Human perception is determined by its objects, while divine perception is not determined by its objects, but determines its own objects.<sup>1</sup> Human perception is confined to 'here and now', while divine perception grasps the past, the present, the future, and the remote in an Eternal Now.<sup>2</sup>

With the brief reference to the nature of divine perception let us pass on to the discussion of the value and validity of divine perception. Certain objections have been raised against the validity of divine perception, which have been refuted by Udayana in his "Nyāyakusumāñjali."

First, what is the criterion of the validity of divine knowledge? If novelty of experience is the test of truth, if valid knowledge consists in the cognition of something which has not been cognized before, then divine perception is not valid. God is eternal and omniscient; so He cannot perceive anything new, which He has not already perceived.<sup>3</sup>

Secondly, valid knowledge (pramā) is always the result of an instrument of right cognition (pramāṇa); but divine knowledge is eternal and as such it cannot be the result of an instrument of valid knowledge. Hence divine perception cannot be a valid cognition (pramā). Nor is it an instrument of valid knowledge, for divine perception being inoperative and consequently ineffective cannot serve as a special instrument of valid knowledge. And if divine knowledge is neither a valid cognition nor an instrument of valid cognition, there cannot be a subject of valid knowledge (pramātā) or God, since a knower of valid knowledge is nothing but the constituent cause of valid knowledge.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Cp. Lotze; "For the infinite spirit all these contents, which in our own case, due to stimuli coming from without, would probably be inner productions of his own creative fantasy". *Outlines of a philosophy of Religion*, Calcutta, 1654, p. 70.

<sup>2</sup>Royce, *Conception of God*.

<sup>3</sup>Īśvarajñānam na pramāṇam, tallakṣaṇāyogāt, anadhigatārtha-gantus tathābhāvāt. naca nityasya sarva-viśayasya cānadhigatārthatā. NKS., ch. IV, p. 1.

<sup>4</sup>nirvyāpāratvenā-kāratayā tad-viśeṣa-karṇatvasyā-bhāvāt. NKSP.



All these objections are more apparent than real. First, in divine consciousness there are no distinctions of cognitions. The whole universe is presented to God in one eternal cognition. But though God has only one cognition, it cannot be held that He has already perceived, since He perceives the same object (*e.g.*, the whole world) in the second moment which He has perceived in the first moment; because the divine perception of the second moment does not depend upon that of the first moment, unlike a representative cognition in which the later cognition depends upon the earlier cognition. So divine perception does not consist in the perception of what has already been perceived.<sup>1</sup>

Secondly, valid knowledge is nothing but the cognition of the real nature of its object; the cognizer of valid knowledge is the substratum of valid knowledge, and validity of valid knowledge is nothing but the uncontradicted relation to valid knowledge.<sup>2</sup> A cognition, to be valid, should not necessarily be the result of some other cause. The exact representation of the real nature of the object is the characteristic of all valid knowledge, be it eternal or perishable. This is the only test of the validity of all knowledge, human or divine. There cannot be different criteria for testing the validity of different specimens of knowledge. Human knowledge and divine knowledge do not fall under two different categories. If there is divine knowledge, it must be valid for the same reason as human knowledge is; and human knowledge too must be valid on the same ground as divine knowledge is. The same criterion must apply to all knowledge, human and divine. And that criterion of truth is the exact representation of the real nature of its object. Though divine knowledge is eternal and as such is not the result of any other instrument of valid knowledge, it must be regarded as valid for it truly represents the whole universe which is its object.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Ibid, iv, p. 27.

<sup>2</sup>NKSP, ch. IV.

<sup>3</sup>mitiḥ samyak-paricchittiḥ, tad-vattā ca pramāṭṛtā. taa-ayoga-vyavachchedaḥ prāmāṇyam. NKS., ch. IV, p. 25.

Udayana admits that divine knowledge is not an instrument of valid knowledge because it is not an instrument of its own valid cognition. But it is an instrument of our valid knowledge, since without the operation of divine knowledge we cannot have valid knowledge. The divine knowledge is the ultimate test and supreme norm of the validity of human knowledge. Divine knowledge is the *ratio essendi* of our valid knowledge.<sup>1</sup>

But though in the case of human knowledge by a *pramāṇa* we mean the instrumental cause of valid knowledge and in this sense we cannot regard God as a *pramāṇa* since He is not the instrumental cause of His divine knowledge which is eternal, yet God may be regarded as a *pramāṇa* in another sense. He is eternal and His knowledge is eternal; and there is an eternal and inseparable relation between Him and His knowledge; in this sense God may be regarded as a *pramāṇa*.<sup>2</sup>

Divine knowledge has been established as valid; and this valid knowledge must inhere in a substratum. Thus there must be a substratum of divine knowledge, *viz.* God. A *pramātā* should not necessarily be the agent of valid knowledge, it simply means a substratum or constituent cause of valid knowledge, but not its efficient cause. The idea of agency does not enter into the concept of a *pramātā*; had it been so, our human knowledge would never have been valid, since we have little control over valid knowledge. We have not that freedom of action which brings about our valid knowledge; we cannot validate or invalidate our knowledge by our own free action; even without any effort on our part valid knowledge is produced in our minds. Now, if we can be regarded as knowers, though we cannot bring about our valid knowledge, God also should be regarded as a *pramātā*. As a matter of fact, a *pramātā* is the substratum or inherent cause of valid knowledge. And in this sense God is a *pramātā*, though He does not bring about His valid knowledge<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup>NKS, ch. IV, p. 26-27.

<sup>2</sup>NKS., ch. IV, p. 27.

<sup>3</sup>NKS., ch. IV, p. 25-26.

But another objection has been raised against the validity of divine knowledge. God is omniscient ; there is nothing in the universe which is unknown to Him ; so there is nothing in human experience which escapes divine knowledge. And as there are illusory cognitions in human experience, these too must be the objects of divine knowledge. And if God knows human illusions, He must know also the objects of these illusions, since there cannot be a cognition of another cognition without apprehending the object of that cognition. Just as there cannot be a cognition without apprehending an object so there cannot be a cognition of another cognition without apprehending the object of the latter cognition. So, if human illusions are the objects of divine knowledge, the objects of these illusions too must necessarily be the objects of divine knowledge. Or, God must perceive certain objects as different from what they really are, and thus must be subject to illusions like human beings<sup>1</sup>.

Udayana gives the following reply to the objection. God knows the illusions of human experience, for He is omniscient. But His knowledge of human illusions is not itself illusory. When we perceive silver in a nacre, our perception is illusory ; but when God perceives our illusory perception of silver, He does not perceive silver in a nacre, but He perceives silver as the real object of the cognition of silver, and so His cognition is not illusory. When we perceive that we have a perception of silver, though we do not know that it is illusory, this second perception, *viz.*, the perception of the perception of silver, is not illusory. A cognition of silver in a nacre is illusory ; but when it is appropriated by the self, the cognition of this illusory cognition is not illusory. Likewise, God never perceives silver in a nacre ; He perceives everything as it really is ; but when we perceive silver in a nacre, God perceives that we have an illusory perception of silver in a nacre. Hence God can never be subject to the illusions and imperfections of human experience.

<sup>1</sup> *Īśvara-jñānaṁ na pramā, viparyayatvāt.* NKS. iv, p. 28.

Divine knowledge is absolutely free from limitations and imperfections, illusions and hallucinations. It is the supreme norm and ultimate criterion of the validity of human knowledge.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>NKSP., ch. IV, pp. 28-29 ; IPC. pp. 370-71.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF RECOLLECTION

We have discussed the psychology of recollection elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> Here we shall discuss the epistemology of recollection.

#### The Epistemic Value of Recollection (smṛti) : Its Invalidity

The Mīmāṃsakas, both Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara, and the Advaita Vedāntist, regards recollection as invalid, since, it cognizes an object which was perceived in the past. Pārthasārathi Miśra, a Bhāṭṭa, defines a valid cognition as the cognition of an object which was not cognized in the past, and which is devoid of the cognition of deficiency in its cause, and which is devoid of any sublating cognition<sup>2</sup>. Novelty is a characteristic of valid cognition which must cognize a new object which was not perceived before. Recollection cognizes an object which was perceived in the past. It does not cognize a new object. So it is invalid. Pārthasārathi Miśra also defines a valid cognition as the cognition which cognizes its object as it really is, which was not perceived before<sup>3</sup>. This definition also excludes recollection from valid knowledge. A serial perception (dhārāvāhikā pratyakṣa) is valid because the different momentary perceptions which comprise it apprehend an object related to different moments which were not perceived by the preceding momentary perceptions.<sup>4</sup> Gāgābhaṭṭa, a Bhāṭṭa, defines valid knowledge as apprehension which cognizes an object as it really is. He defines an apprehension as a cognition which is different from recollection. He defines recollection as a cognition which cognizes an object which was cognized by a prior cognition, or a cognition which is produced by a subconscious impression.

<sup>1</sup>IPC., Vol. I, pp. 376-406.

<sup>2</sup>kāraṇadoṣa-bādhaka-jñāna-rahitam agṛhita-grāhi-jñānam pramāṇam. SD., p. 45.

<sup>3</sup>yathārtham agṛhita--grāhi-jñānam pramāṇam. Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

Thus a valid cognition cognizes an object which was not cognized already, and which is not contradicted by a sublating cognition.<sup>1</sup> Thus Gāgābhaṭṭa also excludes recollection from valid knowledge. But he regards serial perception as valid for the reason given by Pārthasārathi Miśra.

Śālikanātha Miśra, a Prābhākara, regards apprehension as valid knowledge. Apprehension is perception which is different from recollection. Recollection is a cognition which is produced by a mere subconscious impression of a previous cognition<sup>2</sup>. Hence Śālikanātha Miśra does not consider recollection to be a valid cognition, since it depends upon a previous cognition<sup>3</sup>. It is not valid since it does not cognize its object independently in that it depends upon a previous cognition. It cognizes its object as 'that'.<sup>4</sup> The lapse of memory (smṛti-pramoṣa) also is invalid, for it depends upon a previous cognition inasmuch as it is due to a mere subconscious impression of the past cognition. But serial or uninterrupted perception (dhārāvāhika buddhi) is valid, because the different momentary perceptions which comprise it are independent of one another<sup>5</sup>.

Dharmarājādharīndra, an Advaita Vedāntist, defines a valid cognition as a cognition, that cognizes an object which was not perceived in the past, and that is not contradicted by a sublating cognition<sup>6</sup>. Recollection is invalid since it cognizes an object which was perceived in the past. Serial perception is not invalid because the different momentary perceptions of the object at different moments do not depend upon the preceding perceptions. This reason for the invalidity of serial perception is given by some. But the Advaita Vedāntist regards serial perception as a single cognition which persists

<sup>1</sup>BC., pp. 10--11.

<sup>2</sup>pramāṇamanubhūtiḥ. sā smṛter anyā. smṛtiḥ pūrva-vijñāna-saṁskāra mātṛajam jñānam. PP., p. 42.

<sup>3</sup>na pramāṇam smṛtiḥ pūrva-pratipatti-vyepkṣaṇāt. Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>smṛtir hi tad-ity-upajāyamānā prācīm pratitīm anurudhyamānā na svātantryeṇā-rtham paricchinattiti na pramāṇam. Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>anyonya-nirapekṣastu dhārāvāhika-buddhayaḥ. Ibid, p. 43.

<sup>6</sup>pramātvam anadhigatā-bādhitā-rtha-viṣaya-jñānatvam. VPR., p. 20.

until it is followed by a different cognition, and considers it to be valid because it cognizes a novel object unperceived in the past and because it is not contradicted by a subsuming cognition<sup>1</sup>.

Aniruddha, a Sāṃkhya thinker, also defines valid knowledge as a cognition which cognizes an object that was not already cognized, and thus excludes recollection from valid knowledge.<sup>2</sup> Patañjali divides mental modes into five kinds, viz., valid knowledge, illusion, imagination, sleep and recollection. He admits three kinds of valid knowledge, viz., perception, inference and testimony.<sup>3</sup> Thus Patañjali also excludes recollection from valid knowledge.

Udayana, a Naiyāyika, defines valid knowledge as apprehension of the real nature of an object, since it does not depend upon any other condition<sup>4</sup>. He rejects the definition of valid knowledge as a cognition that cognizes an object which was not cognized in the past, because an illusion is invalid, though it cognizes an object which was not already cognized, and because serial perception is valid, though it cognizes an object which was cognized in the previous moment. Udayana does not recognize recollection as an independent means of valid knowledge. But Vardhamāna recognizes the validity of recollection if it is a faithful reproduction of the previous original perception, but does not recognize it as an independent *pramāṇa*, like apprehension of the real nature of an object.<sup>5</sup> Udayana gives the following reasons for the invalidity of recollection. Recollection may be said to be valid because its object exists at the time when it is remembered in the same condition as it is remembered. This argument is wrong, since the past condition of an object (*e. g.*, a jar) is cognized by

<sup>1</sup>*dhārāvāhika-buddhi-sthale na jñāna-bhedaḥ, kiṃ tu yāvad ghaṭa-sphuraṇam tāvad ghaṭākārā-ntaḥkaraṇa-vṛttir ekaiva.* Ibid, p. 26.

<sup>2</sup>*anadhigatārtha-gaṇṭṭṛ pramāṇam.* SSV, I, 87.

<sup>3</sup>YS, I, 6-7.

<sup>4</sup>*yathārtho' nūbhavo mānam anapekṣatayeṣyate.* NKS., iv, I.

<sup>5</sup>*smṛter yāthārthyē' pi sva-kāraṇibhūtā-nyūnā-natiriktā-viśayakā-nūbhava-yāthārthyā-peksā, na tvaṇubhavaśye-tyarthaḥ.*

<sup>6</sup>NKSP., ch. IV, p. 2.

recollection, and since its past condition is nonexistent at present. 2. Recollection may be said to be valid like the original apprehension because recollection cognizes the same object as the original apprehension does and because apprehension is regarded as valid by both the disputants. This argument is wrong because the object was cognized by apprehension as present in the past and because recollection does not cognize the object in its prior condition in that it is nonexistent at present<sup>1</sup>. 3. Recollection may be said to be valid because the prior condition existed as present in the past and was cognized by apprehension, and because recollection cognizes the same object even in the absence of its prior condition. This argument is wrong, because, in that case, the perception of black colour in a red-hot jar would be valid. The jar was black in the past, but has become red at present due to heating. So the perception of black colour of the jar at present is invalid, though black colour existed in it in the past. Similarly, recollection of the prior condition of an object at present is invalid, for it does not exist at present. 4. It may be argued that the cognition of the past black colour of a red-hot jar is valid. Udayana replies that it is valid because its past black colour existed in the past, and because the red-hot jar is not cognized as black at present. But Udayana contends that apprehension cognizes 'thisness' which produces a subconscious impression of 'thisness', but that recollection cognizes 'thatness', though it is produced by the subconscious impression of 'thisness'; and that, consequently, recollection is invalid. Recollection cognizes 'thatness' which was not perceived in the past, and so it is invalid. 'Thisness' perceived in the past is cognized as 'thatness' by recollection which cognizes something more than what is warranted by its cause, the subconscious impression of 'thisness'. Hence recollection is invalid<sup>2</sup>. 5. Even if it be granted that recollection which

<sup>1</sup>anubhava-kāle tasyā-rthasya tāvad-avasthyāt smṛti-kāle tvatāvad-āvasthyāt. NVTP., i, 1, 1, p. 162. NNP., p. 162.

<sup>2</sup>na tu smaryamānārthas tadānīm tadavasthaḥ tasmāt smṛtir ayathārthaiva. NVTP., i, 1, 1, pp. 163-65. NNP., p. 163.



faithfully reproduced the original right apprehension is valid, it borrows its validity from the original apprehension. It is not valid in itself independently of the original apprehension. Hence recollection is not an independent *pramāṇa*.<sup>1</sup> Jayanta Bhaṭṭa sets forth the following arguments for the invalidity of recollection. 1. If valid knowledge were a cognition which cognized a novel object which was not apprehended already, then recognition would not be valid. But recognition is admitted by all to be valid knowledge. 2. If recognition is valid, though it cognizes an object which was already apprehended, then recollection also is valid for the same reason. 3. Recollection is invalid, not because it cognizes an object which was already apprehended, but because it is produced by a nonexistent object.<sup>2</sup> The object that is cognized by recollection does not exist at the time. 4. It may be argued that inference of past rainfall is invalid because past rainfall does not exist at the time. This argument is wrong because the mark of inference from which past rainfall is inferred is present. The river full of swift, muddy currents of water is present, from which past rainfall in its catchment area is inferred. So inference is not produced by a nonexistent object. 5. It may be argued that a flash of intuition (*prātibha-jñāna*) is invalid because its object does not exist at the time. A girl has a flash of intuition such as 'my brother will come tomorrow', which proves true. This argument is wrong because her brother exists in a remote place at the time and because his coming tomorrow is cognized by the intuition. Hence this intuition is produced by an object existing at the time. 6. Recollection is invalid because it is not produced by an object existing at the time. It is produced by a subconscious impression, and not by an object that existed in the past and was perceived. An object existing in a remote place in the past does not produce recollection. Hence it is invalid<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup>*anubhavya yathārthatvāt tad-eka-viśayā smṛtir api yatharthe-tyucyate. tasmāt smṛter yāthārthyaṁ yācitaka-maṇḍana-prāyaṁ nājānikam.* NVTP., i. 1, 1; p. 166. NNP., p. 166.

<sup>2</sup>*na smṛter apramāṇatvaṁ gr̥hīta-gr̥hītākṛtam. api tvanartha-janyatvaṁ tad-apramāṇya-kāraṇam.* NM., p. 23.

<sup>3</sup>*deśāntara-sthitārtha-smaraṇe tad-artha-sattvam akāraṇameva.* Ibid, p. 23.

### THE EPISTEMIC VALUE OF RECOLLECTION : ITS VALIDITY

Veñkaṭaṇātha, a follower of Rāmānuja, gives the following arguments for the validity of recollection. 1. He regards recollection as a cognition, which is produced by a mere subconscious impression, and which cognizes 'thatness' or past character of an object. He asks whether recollection is invalid because its object is no longer existent or because it is not of the nature of apprehension (anubhūti) or because of the possibility of its being illusory. He replies that recollection is not invalid for the reasons mentioned above. It will be shown that recollection as such is not invalid. If it were invalid as such, it would be contradicted by a sublating cognition. But sometimes the external object which was perceived in the past and which is remembered at present is found not to be contradicted by a sublating cognition. Such recollection is valid. If recollection were invalid because of its cognizing a nonexistent object, then the inference of a past or a future object also would be invalid. But such inference is valid. So recollection of a past object also is valid. All experience the validity of the recollection of a past object. If recollection were invalid because of its not being of the nature of apprehension (anubhūti), then another object also which is not apprehended would be remembered. Recollection also is self-manifest like apprehension. But it depends upon a subconscious impression directly and upon a past perception indirectly in manifesting a past object. This dependence of recollection upon a subconscious impression (saṃskāra) does not make it invalid. 2. If recollection is said to be invalid, because it cognizes its object depending upon a previous apprehension, then recognition also which is regarded by the opponents as a valid cognition would be invalid for the same reason. 3. If recollection is said to be invalid because of its dependence on another condition, then all cognitions would be invalid because

of their dependence on their own causes<sup>1</sup>. 4. If a cognition were said to be valid because of its being of the nature of mere apprehension (*anubhava*) which is not a reproduction of any other cognition, then determinate perception also, which is considered by the opponent to be a valid cognition, would be invalid inasmuch as it contains recollection of determinations of its object. 5. If recollection is said to be invalid because of its dependence on another condition, the argument is wrong, because recollection is independent in manifesting its object and in producing a responsive action<sup>2</sup>. 6. If recollection were said to be invalid because of its dependence on another cognition like desire in manifesting its object, then recollection would not be a cognition like desire. But a cognition alone, according to the opponent, manifests its object independently. So recollection is of the nature of a cognition. 7. If recollection were said to be invalid because of its dependence on another cognition like a subconscious impression the argument is wrong because an impression (*saṃskāra*) also can independently produce the recollection of an object which was cognized in the past by a cognition which produced the impression. Thus a cognition can cognize its object directly without depending upon any other condition, though it is produced by its cause; and, consequently, recollection being produced by its cause—a subconscious impression—cognizes a past object independently of a previous perception<sup>3</sup>. Perception also manifests its object independently when it is produced by its cause. The ignorant consider recollection and perception to be dependent and independent because of their being produced by the perception of the same object and its absence respectively<sup>4</sup>. 8. Recollection does not depend upon previous perception for the ascertainment of its validity

<sup>1</sup>*paratantratvād aprāmāṇyamiti cenna svahetu-pāraṇtryamātrasya sārvaṭrikatvāt.* NP., p. 483.

<sup>2</sup>*svaviśaya-prakāśa-vyavahārayostu smṛter api svatantratvāt.* Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>*ato hetu-niyata-viśayatvam eva phalitam.* Ibid, p. 484.

<sup>4</sup>*samāna-viśayā-nubhava-janyatva-tadabhāvābhyām smṛty-anubhavayoḥ pāraṇtrya-svātantrya-vyavahāro mandānām.* Ibid, p. 484.

also. Its validity is ascertained by the manifestation of its object and by its not being contradicted by a sublating cognition<sup>1</sup>. It is the special characteristic of recollection that it cognizes an object which was already perceived. 9. If recollection were invalid because of its dependence upon a previous perception, then inference and the like, according to the Prābhākara, would be invalid, serial perception, according to the Naiyāyika, would be invalid, the second yogic perception of an omniscient person, according to the Jaina, would be invalid, and the second noneternal cognition of God, according to some theists, would be invalid. But the Prābhākara regards inference, etc., as valid, the Naiyāyika regards serial perception as valid, the Jaina regards the second yogic perception of an omniscient person as valid, and some theists regard the second noneternal cognition of God as valid, though these cognitions depend upon previous cognitions. If they are valid, though they depend upon previous cognitions, then recollection also is valid, though it depends upon a previous perception. 10. If recollection were invalid because it does not serve any practical purpose, then the perception of grass and the like, which does not serve any practical purpose, would be invalid. Further, recollection is not useless, since the cognition of what has been done and not done depends upon recollection, since poetry is written by poets with the help of memory, since inference and testimony depend upon memory, and since devotion to God also depends upon constant recollection of Him. Hence it is wrong to hold that recollection is invalid because it cognizes an object which was already perceived, and because its object is no longer existent, though it represents its object as it really was. 11. Recollection, which is due to a valid perception, is certainly valid, since it truly represents the real nature of its object<sup>2</sup>. It is wrong to define a valid cognition as a cognition that truly represents the real nature of its object which has not been perceived already. A valid cognition

<sup>1</sup>svaviśayā-prakāśana-bādha-virahādibhiḥ tatsiddheḥ. Ibid, p. 484.

<sup>2</sup>pramāṇahetukā smṛtiḥ pramāṇam evā-visamādāt iti. Ibid, p. 485.

need not be characterized by novelty (anadhigatatva). 12. A determinate cognition which correctly represents the real nature of its object, is valid. Recollection is valid if it correctly represents the real nature of its object which existed in the past. Agreement or correspondence of a cognition with its object is the test of truth<sup>1</sup>. 13. Even the Vaiśeṣikas, who do not regard recollection as a distinct *pramāṇa*, include it in valid knowledge (*vidyā*). So they also admit the validity of recollection. 14. The *Prābhākara* regards all apprehension (*anubhava*) as valid. *Veṅkaṭanātha* contends that all apprehension is not valid, and that illusory perception of a yellow conchshell or the like is invalid. 15. Nor is all recollection invalid, since the correct recollection of a past object is valid. 16. A valid cognition is a determinate cognition which correctly represents the real nature of its object. Its validity is known by itself. It is produced by its causes. It apprehends itself and its validity. Its validity is not ascertained by the knowledge of the proficiency of its cause and of its correspondence with its object<sup>2</sup>. 17. Recollection cannot be said to be invalid because its object does not exist, since the remembered object existed in the past when it was perceived. 18. Recollection is valid because it can produce fruitful action<sup>3</sup>. 19. If recollection were said to be invalid because its object has been destroyed, then inference of the past and the future, testimony, and yogic perception also would be invalid, because their objects are destroyed or nonexistent. But the opponents accept the validity of these cognitions<sup>4</sup>. 20. Recollection is not invalid because it depends upon a previous perception<sup>5</sup>. The opponents also admit that inference is not invalid, because it depends upon a previous perception, that

<sup>1</sup>*yathārtha-niścayo mānaṁ. nātivyāptiḥ smṛtau vyāptiryathārthena hi sā pramā. Ibid. p. 485.*

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid. pp. 486-87.*

<sup>3</sup>*smartavyasyāpi-svakāle sattvād ityarthaḥ arthakriyādi-hetuvācca smṛtir-yathārthā. SAS., p. 577. TMK., 576.*

<sup>4</sup>*SAS., p. 577.*

<sup>5</sup>*yāthārthyaṁ pāratantryān na galati. TMK., p. 577,*

testimony is not invalid, because it depends upon inference, and that recognition is not invalid, because it depends upon a subconscious impression. Hence recollection is valid, though it depends upon a previous perception. Recollection cognizes that object which was perceived by the cognition that is the cause of recollection<sup>1</sup>. It cognizes that particular object which was cognized by a prior perception that is its cause<sup>2</sup>.

Śrinivāsa, a follower of Rāmānuja, defines valid knowledge as a cognition that cognizes an object as it really is, and that produces a fruitful action. He admits the validity of recollection because it correctly remembers an object as it was perceived in the past and because it produces a fruitful action. But he does not consider recollection to be a distinct *pramāṇa*. He includes it in perception because it is produced by the subconscious impression of a prior perception, and because it is a correct reproduction of the previous perception, or because it derives its validity from that of the original perception<sup>3</sup>.

Madhva admits the validity of recollection for the following reasons. 1. He regards correspondence of a cognition with its object-content (*yāthārthya*) as the criterion of its validity, and, consequently, regards recollection as valid, which corresponds with its object-content, though it is a reproduction of the original apprehension<sup>4</sup>. 2. He considers recollection to be mental perception of a past object, which is valid because it correctly represents the nature of its object, and because it cognizes its object as qualified by the past<sup>5</sup>. Recollection is not an exact reproduction of the prior original apprehension, because it cognizes its object as qualified by the *past* whereas it was cognized by

<sup>1</sup>yā smṛtiḥ yena jñānenotpadyate tad-viṣayam eva sā gṛhnāti niyamaḥ. SAS., p. 579.

<sup>2</sup>smṛter anubhūta-vyakti-niyata-viṣayatvam. Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>YMD., p. 4.

<sup>4</sup>prāmāṇyaṁ nānuvādasya smṛter api vihiyate. yāthārthyaṁ eva prāmāṇya-śabdārtho yadvivaṣitaḥ. AV., ii, 1, 18, p. 178.

<sup>5</sup>pratyakṣaṁ mānasain caiva syādatitārtha-gocaram. tadā smṛtipramāṇa-tvam atitātva-viśeṣitam. AV., iii.

the apprehension as present. Apprehension in the form of perception cognizes 'thisness' of its object. But recollection cognizes 'thatness' of its object. Thus it cognizes something more than what was cognized by the prior original apprehension. Hence recollection is valid also because it cognizes an object which was not cognized by the past apprehension. 3. Further, recollection is not contradicted by any sublat-ing cognition, and, consequently, it is valid<sup>1</sup>. 4. Furthermore, recollection which cognizes its object as qualified by the past (tat) is valid, even as recollection which cognizes an object as qualified by the past and the present (tad idam) is considered by all to be valid. There is no rule that a cognition must cognize a present object in order to be valid. Recognition cognizes an object as 'this is that', and is not identical with memory, and yet it is valid. It is valid though it cognizes its object as qualified by the past. Hence recollection also is valid though it cognizes its object as qualified by the past. It is mental perception of a past object as *past*; it directly cognizes it with its past condition<sup>2</sup>. 5. Udayana has argued that the condition in which an object was cognized by the prior originating apprehension is no longer present at the subsequent time of recollection, and that, consequently, recollection is invalid since it does not faithfully reproduce the original apprehension. Jayatīrtha, a follower of Madhva, refutes this objection by pointing out that recollection is valid because it correctly represents its object in that condition in which it was apprehended, and not because that condition exists at present. The condition in which it was apprehended in the past does not exist at present, and yet the recollection of it is valid for the reason stated above. 6. Jayatīrtha further contends that if recollection were invalid because it cognizes an object qualified by the past, then inference and testimony also would be invalid for the same reason. But they are considered by the opponent to be valid, though they

<sup>1</sup>ādhikyam anubhūtat tu yad-atītatvam iṣyate. mānatā ca katham na syāt smṛteḥ bādhaś cā nātra hi. Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

cognize past objects. Similarly, recollection also is valid, though it cognizes a past object<sup>1</sup>. Thus the Mādhva recognizes the validity of recollection, if it correctly represents a past object<sup>2</sup>.

Anantavīrya, a Jaina, proves the validity of recollection on the following grounds. 1. Recollection is said to be invalid because the condition of its object in which it was apprehended in the past does not exist at present. This argument is wrong, because recollection cognizes an object as apprehended in the past, and not because the condition in which its object was apprehended in the past exists at present. 2. If recollection were invalid because the past condition of its object is nonexistent at present, then perception also would be invalid because the present condition of its object is past. The past condition of the object of recollection cannot exist at present by its very nature, even as the present condition of the object of perception cannot exist in the past. Recollection is valid though it cognizes a past object, even as perception is valid though it cognizes a present object<sup>3</sup>. Recollection resembles perception in manifesting or cognizing its own object<sup>4</sup>. So recollection is valid like perception. 3. Inference is recognized as valid. But inference depends upon the recollection of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum. So recollection is valid. If recollection were invalid, then inference also would be invalid. Hence recollection is valid because otherwise inference would be invalid<sup>5</sup>.

The Mādhva regards recollection as mental perception (mānasa pratyakṣa) of a past object. But the Jaina regards recollection as mediate knowledge as distinguished from perception which is immediate knowledge. Vidyānandasvāmī defines recollection as the cognition of an object as *that* or

<sup>1</sup>NS. p. 251.

<sup>2</sup>Philosophy of Sri Madhvācārya, Ch. XVI.

<sup>3</sup>PMSV., p. 14

<sup>4</sup>eva-viśayā-vabhāsanam smaraṇe'py-avīṣṭam. Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>smṛtiḥ prāmāṇam anumāna-prāmāṇyā-nyathā-nupapatteḥ. Ibid.



past, which was apprehended in the past. Recollection is mediate knowledge because it is not characterized by vividness which is a distinctive trait of perception or immediate knowledge<sup>1</sup>. Recollection is valid because it cognizes an object as it was cognized in the past in a particular place by the original apprehension, and because it leads a person to a fruitful action or because it does not lead him to an ineffective or frustrating action<sup>2</sup>. The Jaina proves the validity of recollection by the realistic test of correspondence and the pragmatic test of successful action.

Kaṇāda recognizes perception and inference as distinct means of valid knowledge. He defines valid knowledge (vidyā) as unvitiated knowledge, and invalid knowledge (avidyā) as vitiated knowledge<sup>3</sup>. The Vaiśeṣika admits four kinds of invalid knowledge, viz., doubt, illusion, indefinite cognition (anādhyavasāya) in which both alternatives are unmanifest, and dream. Thus he admits recollection to be valid knowledge by implication, though he does not consider it to be an independent pramāṇa<sup>4</sup>. But Śivāditya defines valid knowledge as apprehension of the real nature of an object, and invalid knowledge as cognition of an object as different from what it really is. He defines apprehension as a cognition which is not recollection<sup>5</sup>. Thus he does not include recollection in valid knowledge.

Vallabhācārya, a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writer (1200 A. D.), accepts the validity of recollection because it is the cause of determinate knowledge of an object<sup>6</sup>. Recollection produces determinate knowledge of a past object. It represents the real nature of its object as apprehended in the past. It cannot be said to be invalid because it depends upon a prior apprehension (anubhava), since any other kind of valid knowledge depends upon its cause for its

<sup>1</sup>Pramāṇaparīkṣā. p. 69.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid, pp. 70.

<sup>3</sup>tat (avidyā) duṣṭam jñānam. aduṣṭam vidyā. VS., ix, 2, 11-12

<sup>4</sup>PBh., B.S.S., pp. 259-60.

<sup>5</sup>tattvā-nubhavaḥ pramā. samṛtīrūpaṁ jñānam anubhavaḥ SP., p., 59.

<sup>6</sup>smṛtir api mānāntaram. arthaniscaya-hetutvat. NL., p. 67.

origination. Recollection is produced by a subconscious impression (saṁskāra) of a previous apprehension, even as inference is produced by the recollection of invariable concomitance of the probans and the probandum. Recollection is valid as inference is valid. Dependence upon a cause cannot make a cognition invalid. If it did, then all cognitions would be invalid<sup>1</sup>. Recollection does not depend upon a prior apprehension to manifest the nature of its object, since recollection cognizes its object as past, and since a prior apprehension manifested its object as present. Recollection may be said to depend upon a prior apprehension as desire depends upon a prior cognition in order to be directed towards its object. Then recollection will cease to be a cognition as desire is not a cognition. If recollection is an exact reproduction of a past apprehension, then it is as valid as the original apprehension. If correspondence of a cognition with an object depends upon the validity of the cognition of its cause, then recollection is valid like inference. The correspondence of inference with its object (e.g. sādhyā or probandum) depends upon the validity of the cognitions of the probans and of the invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum. Similarly, the correspondence of recollection with its past object depends upon the validity of the cognition of its cause (e.g., original apprehension). So recollection is as valid as inference<sup>2</sup>. Recollection is valid, though it depends upon the validity of the prior cognition of its object, even as testimony is valid, though it depends upon the validity of the original perception of the reliable person. If recollection cognizes something more than what was cognized by the past apprehension, then also it is valid if it is in harmony with its object. The original apprehension cognized its object as present (e.g., 'this'). Recollection cognizes the same object as past (e.g., 'that') and yet it is valid because it corresponds with its object. Recollection cognizes an object as qualified by 'thatness' or past condition.

<sup>1</sup>anubhava-pāratantryān-naivam iti cet, na. utpātti-pāratantryasya pramāṇāntara-sāmyāt. Ibid, p. 67.

<sup>2</sup>kāraṇa-jñāna-prāmāṇyāpekṣayā yathārthatvasyā-numiti-sādhārṇyāt. Ibid,

If 'thatness' were cognized by previous apprehension also, then it would cognize its object as past or as characterized by 'thatness', and an object would never be cognized as present or as characterized by 'thisness', and recollection would not depend upon previous apprehension in order to cognize an object qualified by 'thatness', and would, consequently, be valid. 'Thatness' is not cognizedness.<sup>1</sup> If it were so, the statement 'this is cognized' would be identical with the statement 'this is that'. But they are not identical. Nor is 'thatness' being qualified by past apprehension, since past apprehension did not cognize 'thatness'. Nor is 'thatness' being qualified by past time, since a present object also might have existed in the past. It may be argued that recollection cognizes a mere object and that it is said to be characterized by 'thatness' because it is known by inference. This argument contradicts the clear verdict of our experience in such a form as 'I remember that object' so that 'thatness' of its object is not inferred but remembered<sup>2</sup>. The Naiyāyika has argued that recollection cognizes an object qualified by the present time which is past, and that recollection is invalid because the object that existed in the past in that condition does not exist at present. This argument is wrong because recollection cognizes an object qualified by the past condition or 'thatness', and not qualified by the present time that is past, and because the existence of the past condition of its object at the present time is not necessary for the validity of recollection. The presence of an object at the time and its intercourse with a sense-organ are necessary for the validity of perception. But for recollection the presence of its object qualified by 'thatness' or past condition is not necessary. 'Thatness' is either a qualification of the cognition of the past or determination by the past time. Determination by the past time is not cognized by apprehension, but is cognized by recollection which occurs afterwards. But recollection sometimes does not distinctly

<sup>1</sup>Ilrid, p. 68.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid, p. 68.

refer to 'thatness' of its object ; and sometimes it distinctly cognizes the past time which determined the object when it was apprehended ; and sometimes it knows the past time from other sources<sup>1</sup>. Vallabhācārya does not hold, like the Mādhva, that recollection is mental perception of a past object, and that it directly cognizes its object as past<sup>1</sup>.

Mahādevānanda, a follower of Śaṅkara, divides invalid knowledge (apramā) into two kinds : (1) recollection and (2) apprehension. Recollection is produced by a residual impression (saṁskāra) alone. It is of two kinds : true and false. True recollection accords with a real object perceived in the past. False recollection does not accord with a real object perceived in the past<sup>2</sup>. True recollection is of two kinds : (1) recollection of a not-self and (2) recollection of the Self. The recollection of a phenomenal appearance being false, known, insentient, limited, and being inferred to be false is true recollection of a not-self. The recollection of the scriptural text 'That thou art' is true recollection of the Self. False recollection is of two kinds ; (1) recollection of the truth of a phenomenal appearance which is false recollection of a not-self, and (2) recollection of the Self (ātman) in egoism (ahaṁkāra) which is a false phenomenal appearance. Or, recollection of the Self's being a knower, a doer, or an enjoyer is false recollection of the self<sup>3</sup>. Thus Mahādevānanda does not regard recollection as an independent means of valid knowledge, but does not deny its validity when it accords with the reality of its object.

Prabhācandra, a Jaina, puts forward the following arguments for the validity of recollection. Recollection is the knowledge of an object in the form of "that" due to the revival of a residual impression left by a past perception. It is not invalid because it is in harmony with its object. A knowledge which is in harmony with its object is valid, like perception. Recollection is in harmony with its object<sup>4</sup>. So it is valid knowledge.<sup>4</sup> 2. Recollection is not invalid because it

<sup>1</sup>Ibid, p. 68-69.

<sup>2</sup>ACK., p. 258-59.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid, p. 258-65.

<sup>4</sup>PKM, p. 96.

is the knowledge of an object which was perceived already as the Mīmāṃsaka thinks. If it were not valid for this reason, then the perception of a fire which was inferred from a smoke already would not be valid<sup>1</sup>. 3. If recollection is invalid because its object is past and nonexistent at the time, then perception also would be invalid because the very object, which produced perception, does not exist at the moment. If perception is valid because it is produced by a present object, then recollection also is valid because it is produced by a past object. But Prabhācandra denies the production of knowledge by an object. He believes that a veil of infra-atomic particles of karma-matter is removed from the self by a sense-object-intercourse or the like, and knowledge is revealed in the self. 4. Recollection is not invalid because it does not accord with its object. Valid recollection can lead to the attainment of the object through perception and be proved to be in harmony with its object. If recollection fails to produce a successful action in the form of the attainment of its object through perception, it is proved to be in disharmony with its object and consequently invalid<sup>2</sup>. Hence recollection is valid if it is in agreement with its object, and invalid if it is in disagreement with its object.

Vidyānandī, another Jaina, puts forward the following arguments for the validity of recollection. 1. If recollection were invalid because it is the knowledge of an object which was perceived already, then serial perception would be invalid for the same reason. But serial perception is regarded as valid by the Mīmāṃsaka. So recollection also is valid. 2. Recollection of an object produces a successful action or attainment of the object through perception. So it is valid. 3. Recollection is not sublated by a valid knowledge. 4. If recollection is invalid because it depends upon a past perception, then inference also is invalid for the same reason. 5. If inference is valid because it manifests its object in its real nature, then recollection also is valid because it manifests its past object in its real nature. It manifests its object

<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>PKM., p. 69.

correctly, like perception. 6. Desire depends upon the recollection of an object which produced pleasure in the past. Desire for such an object produces an action which leads to the attainment of it. So recollection is valid. 7. Recollection is valid because it destroys error or false attribution, like inference. Its validity is undeniable. 8. Recollection cannot be said to be invalid as a case of inference. It is not an inference because it is not produced by a mark (līṅga) of inference. It is produced in the absence of a probans.<sup>1</sup>

### RECOLLECTION AND SELF

The Advaita Vedānta shows the dependence of recollection on the self (ātman) in the following manner. Recollection presupposes the identity of the self, that perceived an object in the past, that retained its residual impression, that revives the impression, and that remembers it at present. Recollection is produced by a residual impression (saṁskāra) of a past perception. All schools of Indian philosophers are unanimous in this view. The past perception, the residual impression, and the present recollection abide in the same substratum. Then only recollection can be adequately accounted for. The Buddhists regard the self as a series of momentary cognitions, and hold that a cognition perceived an object, that another cognition retained its residual impression, and that another cognition remembers it. Then one person having perceived an object, another person would remember it. The Buddhist Vijñānavādins cannot account for recollection because they regard different momentary cognitions as the substrata of perception, residual impression and recollection. They may argue that the different cognitions forming one series are their substrata and so can account for recollection. This argument is wrong because a series has no reality apart from its members. Even if it were real, the residual impression left by the past perception having been destroyed, there cannot be recollection. If they think the residual impression to be permanent, then they reject their

<sup>1</sup>TSV., i, 15, 17 & 22. Ibid, i, 18-22.

doctrine that all residual impressions are momentary, like all other entities. If a residual impression is momentary, it is destroyed before producing its effect. So recollection is not possible according to the Buddhist Vijñānvādins. Far less is recollection possible according to the Buddhist nihilists (śūnyavādin) or Mādhyamikas, who think all cognitions and external objects to be ontologically nonexistent. Their view leads to the complete stoppage of all worldly transactions. According to the Naiyāyika, although the permanent ubiquitous self is the substratum of the past perception, its residual impression, and its present recollection, the self's cognition cannot be related to the object as shown in a subsequent chapter, and so cannot have recollection in the form of the object as perceived in the past. Without a past perception in the form of a past object, a residual impression in the form of it cannot be produced ; and without a residual impression in the form of a past object there can be no recollection in the form of the past object. According to the Naiyāyika a cognition is absolutely destroyed ; so its residual impression has no distinctive character of the cognition. If it has another distinctive character, then it is not a residual impression of the past cognition. Hence recollection like the past cognition cannot be produced because of the absence of its residual impression. But, according to the Advaita Vedāntin, a mode of the internal organ, on which the conscious self is reflected, is related to an external object, and is modified into its form. The internal organ, on which the conscious self is reflected, retains the residual impression of the cognition of the object in the form of an impression of avidyā ; the impression is revived in the form of the past object in the presence of its exciting causes ; then recollection in the form of the past object is produced in the internal organ. Past perception, its residual impression, and present recollection are modes of the internal organ on which the conscious self is reflected. The self conditioned by the internal organ is the perceiver of the past object, the abode of its residual impression, in a sense, and the recollector. Hence there is the same substratum of past perception, residual

impression, and recollection.<sup>1</sup> The self of the nature of consciousness is the individual witness (sākṣin) which is the perceiver of all entities of the nature of not-self, which are products of the beginningless, indefinable, nescience (avidyā), including the internal organ, and which are superimposed upon it, although it is really devoid of all particular states.<sup>2</sup>

According to the Advaita Vedāntin dreams are due to the revival of the residual impressions of waking perceptions. The internal organ is the substratum of these impressions which are revived during light sleep. Without relation to the internal organ there can be no particular state in the inner individual self (pratyagātman) which is of the nature of self-manifest consciousness. Dreams are the modifications of nescience (ajñāna) manifested by the modes of the internal organ qualified by the residual impressions of waking perceptions, on which the conscious self is reflected. They do not exist outside the modes of the internal organ, and so are said to be mental or subjective. The nescience in the individual self united with an internal organ qualified by the residual impressions of waking perceptions is modified into the forms of dreams. Dreams and recollections both are cognised by the individual witness (jīvasākṣin) <sup>3</sup>.

Utpaladeva (1000 A.D.) a Śaiva monist of the Pratyabhijñā school, holds that recollection depends upon the Lord or Supreme Knower's act of apperception. He is of the nature of consciousness or manifestation (prakāśa) and 'I'-consciousness (vimarśa). He has power of volition, power of knowledge, power of action, power of delight, and power of consciousness. He has power of māyā through which He creates the universe. He limits Himself through His power of māyā and its products, and assumes the state of an individual atomic self, that identifies itself with its gross body, vital forces, or subtle body through nescience. He produces external objects through His volition with His power of māyā. He is the ultimate cause of the past perception of an object, retention

<sup>1</sup>ATP., p. 110.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 117-18.



of its residual trace, and recollection of the past object. A recollection is a determinate cognition which is insentient, and so cannot cognise the object of the past perception. But the conscious Self (*ātman*), Supreme Knower, can manifest or cognize a past object, revive a residual impression of a past perception, and recollect it. He relates the different cognitions to one another, and apprehends their objects. He perceives the object of a past perception because its object is not unmanifest to Him. He can remember the object of a past perception when it is destroyed. A recollection is similar to a past perception. If the former were different from the latter, the remembered object would not be manifested. Hence the past perception and the present recollection have identity in nature, and He is their Knower. An individual atomic self (*jīvātman*) can retain the residual impression of a past perception and recollect the past object as sharing in the nature of the Absolute Knower. Recollection is its own proof since it is self-aware and present ; it proves its validity. Past perception being absent, its self-awareness is absent, and so cannot prove the validity of recollection. Recollection and its validity ultimately depend upon the combining activity of the Supreme Knower who knows plurality and synthesises them into a unity. An individual self, a voluntary self-limitation of the Absolute Knower, sharing in His nature, can relate a past perception, its residual impression, and a present recollection. The causal relation among them also depends upon the Lord's synthetic act of apperception.<sup>1</sup>

Abhinavagupta explains Utpaladeva's view in the following manner. In recollection the object perceived in the past is manifested ; the recollection of the object is not a new manifestation ; it is the manifestation of the past perception ; that perception, being of the nature of a cognition and not being of the nature of an object, cannot be known by another cognition ; but it is self-manifest. If at the time of recollection the past perception is nonexistent, then it cannot be manifested. Or, let it be so ; yet the manifestation of a recollection is the manifestation of the past perception. If they were different

<sup>1</sup>IPK., i, 68 & 87 ; IPKV., i, 5-12, 18, 24-42 & 68.

from each other in their nature, there would be no recollection. It is possible only on the supposition that the self-awareness of a recollection is the self-awareness of the past perception. No other perception, inference or the like different from the self-aware recollection is possible. Hence the one continuous self-awareness enduring from the past perception to the present recollection is the Supreme Knower. No recollection would be possible if one self were the perceiver and if another self were the recollector.<sup>1</sup> So the one Supreme Knower is presupposed by recollection. The Advaita Vedāntists regard the individual witness (jīvasākṣin) as the perceiver, the abode of the impression of the perception, and the recollector. The Śaiva monists regard the Supreme Knower as the perceiver, the abode of the impression of the perception, and the recollector. The different cognitions are apperceived and synthesised into a unity by the one Supreme Knower of the nature of consciousness or manifestation and perfect 'I'-consciousness. An atomic individual self, a limited knower, can recollect a past object because the Supreme Knower acts in him. The Supreme Self manifests all internal cognitions and all external objects and makes a limited knower's perception and recollection of external objects possible. The Supreme Knower's knowledge is unlimited while a limited knower's knowledge is limited because of his identifying his self with his vital forces or subtle body.<sup>2</sup>

Rāmānuja regards the individual self as a knower and of the nature of knowledge. He regards it as of the nature of 'I' both in bondage and in release, in waking state, dream and deep sleep. Veṅkaṭanātha, a follower of Rāmānuja, holds that a residual impression of a past perception abides in the attributive knowledge of the self. The self is unchanging and unmodifiable. But its eternal attributive knowledge is changing and modifiable since it is capable of expansion and contraction under the influence of the self's merits and demerits. Attributive knowledge is the self's eternal

<sup>1</sup>IPV., i, 7, 5.

<sup>2</sup>IPKV., i, 87.

<sup>3</sup>IPK., IPKV., i, 83-85 ; IPV., i, 8, 9-10

distinctive attribute.<sup>1</sup> So all modifications of the attributive knowledge are attributed to the self through knowledge ; and a residual impression produced by a past perception abides in the self's attributive knowledge. The self-object-intercourse is not a condition of recollection. When an external sense-organ has ceased to function, a recollection is produced. So a residual impression of a past perception is its cause. It is revived by similarity, unseen principle (adṛṣṭa) thinking and the like. A past perception cannot be a residual impression since it was destroyed long ago, and cannot produce a future recollection. Without a residual impression produced by a past perception, perception of similarity and the like cannot produce a recollection. A residual impression is a peculiar property (atiśayaviśeṣa) produced by the act of past perception. It is not mere destruction of the past perception. It is the effect of the past perception and the cause of the future recollection. The attributive knowledge of the self moves to an object and cognises it, and leaves an impression in itself, which produces a future recollection.<sup>2</sup> This is the view of the Viśiṣṭādvaitavādin.

<sup>1</sup>SAS., p. 690.

<sup>2</sup>SAS., p. 690.

## CHAPTER X

### SELF, KNOWLEDGE, AND OBJECT THE SĀMĀKHYA-YOGA

According to the Sāmkhya-Yoga the self is conscious by nature while the buddhi, a modification of prakṛti, is unconscious. The self is inactive while the buddhi is active. The self is an experient and a knower while the buddhi is experienced and known. Though the buddhi is composed of sattva, rajas and tamas, like the external objects, yet sattva predominates in it, and so it is transparent. The self is essentially conscious and luminous. When the buddhi is modified into the form of an object, the self is reflected in the mental mode, and intelligises it, and thus knows an object. It cannot directly know an object except through the medium of a mental mode.<sup>1</sup> This is Vācaspati's view. But, according to Vijñānabhikṣu, the self is reflected in the mental mode modified into the form of an object, and the reflection of the self in the mental mode is reflected back in the self. This is how the self knows an object. A mental mode modified into the form of the self cannot apprehend the self because it is unconscious. But it is the self that apprehends the mental mode modified into the form of the self; or the self apprehends the mental mode in which it is reflected, and which is reflected back in itself.<sup>2</sup> The self apprehends an object through the reflection of the mental mode in itself, in which the self is reflected. A cognition is not apprehended by another cognition, since cognitions, as mental modes, are unconscious. Nor is a cognition self-aware for it is an unconscious mental mode. Nor is the self apprehended by a mental mode or cognition. The conscious self apprehends a mental mode or cognition and an object.

<sup>1</sup>YS., ii, 20, TV., ii, 20.

<sup>2</sup>YV., iii, 33, p. 231.

## KUMĀRILA (BHĀṬṬA MIMĀṂSAKA)

Kumārila's view is expounded by his follower, Pārthasarathi Miśra, in the following manner. 1. The act of knowledge has an object, and produces an effect, *viz.*, manifestness in its object, even as the act of cooking produces an effect, *viz.*, cookedness in rice. The act of perception produces perceptibility in its object.<sup>1</sup> The act of inference produces inferability in its object. The objects are divided into two kinds, *viz.*, perceptible and inferable. This division is not possible unless effects are produced in the objects of perception and inference. So effects in these objects must be admitted. The acts of knowledge are inferred from perceptibility and inferability produced by perception and inference in their objects. Hence knowledge is not perceived but interred. 2. Knowledge is inferred from a peculiar property (*atsaya*) produced in its object, which is called manifestness (*prākātya*) or cognisedness (*jñātātā*). Even the Prābhākaras who advocate the doctrine of triple perception must admit that cognisedness is produced by knowledge in its object. Manifestation is common to knowledge, self and an object, but knowledge is not common to them. The knower and the known are not knowledge. Cognisedness exists in the object alone but not in knowledge and its object. Knowerhood exists in the knowing self, but not in knowledge and its object. Cognisedness produced by knowledge in its object is undisputed. Knowledge is inferred from cognisedness.<sup>2</sup> 3. Knowledge is inferred from the relation between the knowing self and the known object, *viz.*, the relation of the pervader and the pervaded, perceived through the *manas*. Without an adventitious cause the relation of the self to the object, *viz.*, the relation of the pervader and the pervaded, is not possible. Knowledge is the adventitious cause of this relation. It is an intervening entity between the self and the object. The act of knowledge is inferred from this relation between the self and the object perceived through the *manas*.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>SD., p. 157.<sup>2</sup>I *bid.*, p. 160.<sup>3</sup>I *bid.*, p. 258.

4. Even the Prābhākaras, who admit that all cognitions are self-manifest, must admit that the relation of the self and the object is perceived through the manas. Otherwise, the experience "the jar is known by me" is not possible, or the relation of the knowing self to the known object cannot be the object of use or speech. What is manifested can be made an object of use. What is not manifested cannot be made an object of use. If mere knowledge is manifested by itself, by what is its relation to the knower manifested? The relation cannot be said to be manifested by the knowledge because it is not produced when the knowledge is produced. The relation of knowledge to its object is nothing but its manifesting the object. When knowledge is produced, and when the object is manifested by it, the relation between them cannot be known by the knowledge. It cannot be argued that the knowledge first manifests an object, and that it then manifests its relation to its object, since the knowledge is momentary. The relation between them cannot be said to be self-manifest for there is no proof for its self-manifestness. All perceive the relation of the knowing self to the known object through the manas. Hence knowledge is inferred from the relation between the self and the object, which is perceived through the manas<sup>1</sup>. 5. Knowledge cannot be said to be perceived on the strength of experience because knowledge is not manifested when its object is manifested, far less its perceptibility.<sup>2</sup> Hence knowledge is not perceptible.

#### PRABHĀKARA (MIMĀMSAKA)

Prabhākara asks whether a *cognition* is uncognised, and replies that it is *cognised* but that it is *cognised*, as a *cognition*, and not as an *object* of cognition.<sup>3</sup> Prabhākara makes a distinction between 'perceptible' (*saṁvedya*) and 'knowable' (*prameya*). He asks whether a cognition is imperceptible, and replies that it is indeed imperceptible, but that it is not unknowable. What is the distinction between 'perceptible'

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 159.

<sup>2</sup>Bṛhāti., p. 64.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 160.

and 'knowable'? That whose nature is ascertained by perception is perceptible. A cognition which ascertains the distinctive nature of an object is called perception. A cognition is not perceptible because it does not ascertain the distinctive nature of its object. But it is not unknowable since its existence is known by inference.<sup>1</sup> Śālikanātha distinctly says: "An object is perceptible, but a cognition is inferable. A cognition is imperceptible for its nature is not ascertained by itself, but it is inferable because its existence is known by inference."<sup>2</sup> Yet Prabhākara does not deny the self-manifestness of a cognition. If a cognition is not manifested, it cannot manifest an object. It manifests or apprehends itself. Only it does not apprehend itself as an object (karma). An object of cognition is called "saṁvedya". A cognition is not apprehended distinctly as an object. Nor is it uncognised for the aforesaid reason.<sup>3</sup> Hence a cognition manifests itself, but not as an object. A self-manifest cognition manifests its substratum or self and its object. It manifests its self as the knower and its object as known. This is called the doctrine of triple perception (tripuṭi-samvid).

Śālikanātha, a follower of Prabhākara, expounds his view thus. Perception is direct knowledge. Apprehension is valid knowledge. Recollection is not valid knowledge because it is not novel knowledge but knowledge of what was already apprehended. Perception is threefold viz., perception with regard to an object, self, and knowledge. The perception of an object is produced by its conjunction with a sense-organ. The self is its inherent cause; it inheres in its substratum—the self. The sense-object-intercourse, etc., are its noninherent cause.<sup>4</sup> The self is directly manifested in all kinds of knowledge and in recollection. If the self is not manifested in them, the objects cannot be manifested by them. All cognitions are produced in the form 'I know'. The self is directly known in all cognitions. But some objects are directly known or perceived while the others are indirectly known, e.g., in inference and recollection.<sup>5</sup> An

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 85.

<sup>2</sup>Bṛhati, p. 64.

<sup>3</sup>RV., p. 65.

<sup>4</sup>PP., p. 51-52.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid, p. 56.

object and the self are manifested by a knowledge distinct from them, which is direct knowledge in regard to itself. But knowledge is known by itself, it is self-manifest. Perception is produced in the form 'I perceive this'. Recollection is produced in the form 'I remember this'. The same perception manifests 'I' and 'this'. The same recollection manifests 'I' and 'this'. There is no other cognition which manifests 'I' and 'this'. But perception manifests itself, and recollection manifests itself. If they are not manifested their objects cannot be manifested. But the self and objects are unmanifest in their nature, and depend upon knowledge to manifest them. But knowledge is of the nature of manifestation, and does not depend upon any other entity to manifest it. The objects and the self are unmanifest since they are not manifested in deep sleep. But they exist at the time, since they are recognised on waking from deep sleep. Hence they must be admitted to be unmanifest in their nature, they are not self-manifest. They depend upon knowledge in order to be manifested, but knowledge is self-manifest. There is no proof for it. Unmanifestness. The existence of an unmanifest cognition is not admitted.<sup>1</sup>

The Bhatta Mimamsaka holds that knowledge is inferred. The Prabhakara urges that knowledge is not inferred from the existence of its object, since there is no invariable concomitance between knowledge and the existence of its object. If knowledge is said to be inferred from the knowledge of its object, that also is not possible because knowledge is not inferred from the knowledge of its object as soon as it is produced. There is no difference between produced knowledge and unproduced knowledge if they are not manifested. Unmanifested knowledge of an object cannot be the probans (linga) from which knowledge can be inferred. Nor is the knowledge of an object manifested by another knowledge, as the Nyāya holds, since another knowledge apprehending it is not known. Hence it must be

<sup>1</sup>Ibid, p. 56-57.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 57.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.



admitted that the knowledge of an object is self-manifest. If self-manifestness of knowledge is admitted, the assumption of another knowledge manifesting it is unreasonable.<sup>1</sup>

### THE JAINA

Prabhācandra holds that a cognition is always known by the self, that it is self-manifest, and that it apprehends its mode, the self, and its object. He also holds that the self is self-manifest. In the cognition "I know the jar by myself" the jar is the object of knowledge, "I" or the self is the knower, "myself" is the instrument, and "know" is the act of knowledge. Whatever is experienced is known as an object of the act of knowledge. Prabhākara who holds that the self cannot be<sup>2</sup> perceived as an object of knowledge is wrong. A cognition and its self are perceived, and are therefore objects of consciousness. It is self-contradictory to hold that the self and its cognition are not *objects* of consciousness, although they are manifested in our perception. The self is manifested both by external perception and by internal perception.<sup>3</sup>

### THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA

The Nyāya holds that perception is produced in the self by the intercourse of an object with a sense-organ, the conjunction of the sense-organ with the manas, and the conjunction of the manas with the self. The sense-object-intercourse is the special cause of perception. It implies the conjunction of the sense-organ with the manas. The conjunction of the manas with the self is the common cause of inference, comparison, and testimony also. Knowledge is produced by an object when it is indirectly connected with the self, and manifests the object. Knowledge is not modified into the form of an object, as the Sāṅkhya and the Advaita Vedānta hold, and yet it apprehends the object. There is a natural relation between a knowledge and an object so that the

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 63.

<sup>2</sup>PKM, p. 31; IPC., Vol. I, pp. 244-45.

former apprehends the latter.<sup>1</sup> Knowledge is an attribute of the self, but not its essence. The self acquires knowledge in conjunction with the sense-organs and the *manas*. It is unconscious in itself, and remains as a ubiquitous entity devoid of its special qualities—knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, and demerit in the state of release. Knowledge and six other special qualities are perceived by the self through the *manas*. There is mental perception of knowledge according to the Nyāya. The Navya Nyāya holds that a cognition is apprehended by a representative cognition (*anuvyavasāya*), which is direct cognition distinguished from recollection. Vardhamāna says: "A determinate cognition does not apprehend itself, but is apprehended by a representative cognition"<sup>2</sup> The self as related to the body, empirical self, is an object of 'I'—consciousness. But the pure self is an object of yogic intuition. Vātsyāyana says: "The self is perceived by a yogin through a special conjunction of the self with the *manas* due to trance as the result of meditation." There is no inconsistency between the two statements as shown above.<sup>4</sup> The Sāṅkhya and the Advaita Vedāntin hold that a mental mode or a cognition is modified into the form of an object. Keśavamīśra refutes this view by observing that all cognitions are indeed formless, and that an object does not produce its form in its cognition. He refutes the view of the Sautrāntika Buddhist who holds that the form of an external object is inferred from the form of a cognition, since the existence of an object is proved by perception. Every cognition is determined by its object, since it is perceived through the *manas* alone when it is related to its object, and since a cognition is known in the form "I have the cognition of a jar", and not merely in the form "I have a cognition."<sup>5</sup>

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka holds that a cognitive act produces a peculiar property, *viz.*, cognisedness (*jñātatā*) in its object,

<sup>1</sup>HNKS., iv, 2-3., NS., NBh. i, 1, 4.

<sup>2</sup>NKSP., iv, 4 ; p. 24.

<sup>3</sup>Tbh., p. 30.

<sup>4</sup>IPC., Vol. I, pp. 224-30 ; NBh., i, 13 & 9.

<sup>5</sup>Tbh., p. 30.

from which it is inferred as its cause. Udayana refutes this doctrine on the following grounds. If there is no natural relation between a cognition and an object, cognisedness is not possible.<sup>1</sup> A cognition apprehends an object because there is a natural relation between them. Because natural relation can adequately account for the apprehension of an object by a cognition, the hypothesis of cognisedness is useless. The Bhāṭṭa argues, that the relation between a particular cognition and a particular object, which makes the former apprehend the latter, is regulated by a principle, and that an attribute produced by a cognition in its object, *viz.*, cognisedness, regulates the relation between them. Vardhamāna urges that natural relation regulates the production of cognisedness also in an object by a cognition.<sup>2</sup> So cognisedness is unnecessary.

2. Cognisedness cannot be produced in past and future objects by a present cognition, and so they cannot be known. But they *are* known by a present cognition. So they are known without cognisedness.<sup>3</sup>

3. A distinctive character of a cognition can apprehend an object; a cognition of a jar can apprehend a jar; a cognition of a cloth can apprehend a cloth. A cognition is an attributive (*viśeṣaṇa*), a jar is a substantive (*viśeṣya*), and a determinate cognition (*viśiṣṭabuddhi*) apprehends the relation between the cognition and the object. The apprehension of the relation between them does not require the additional condition, *viz.*, cognisedness. The cognition "The jar is cognised by me" depends upon the natural relation between the cognition and the jar. The determinateness of the cognition makes it apprehend its object. There is no proof for the existence of cognisedness; it is not perceived. Only an object is perceived, but its cognisedness is not perceived<sup>4</sup>.

4. The Bhāṭṭa may argue that manifestness (*prākāṣya*) or cognisedness (*jñatatā*) is proved by the apprehension "this object is cognised by me." It manifests a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) of its object. Udayana urges that there is no distinctive character or qualification

<sup>1</sup>NKS., iv, 2; p. 10.

<sup>2</sup>NKS., iv, 2.

<sup>3</sup>NKSP., iv, 2. p. 10

<sup>4</sup>NKS., iv. 2: 5 ff.

in an object because cognitions are formless.<sup>1</sup> If a cognition had a form, it could represent the distinctive character, *viz.*, cognisedness in an object. But because it is formless there is no cognisedness in an object. Vardhamāna urges, that the apprehension of the so-called cognisedness apprehends the determinate character of a cognition, and that it does not prove the existence of cognisedness in an object.<sup>2</sup> The so-called cognisedness in an object is nothing but its objectivity. An object is apprehended or manifested by a cognition, but not its so-called manifestness or cognisedness. 5. The Bhāṭṭa may argue, that knowledge being imperceptible is inferred from its effect, *viz.*, cognisedness, and that if knowledge is not known, it cannot give rise to an action. Udayana urges that this argument involves a vicious circle : knowledge is inferred from cognisedness ; cognisedness is inferred from knowledge and an action following from it ; there would be no action consequent on knowledge if cognisedness were not known.<sup>3</sup> Keśavamiśra, a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika syncretist, urges that there is no cognisedness, besides objectivity, of a cognition in an object. There is a natural relation between an apprehending cognition and an apprehended object. There is such a natural relation between them that a cognition apprehends an object and an object is apprehended by a cognition.<sup>4</sup> He further urges that if an object were apprehended through cognisedness, then cognisedness also would be apprehended through another cognisedness, and so on to infinity, and thus the Bhāṭṭa argument would lead to infinite regress. If cognisedness is apprehended without any other cognisedness by nature, then an object also is apprehended by a cognition by nature without cognisedness.<sup>5</sup> A cognition is apprehended by mental perception, but its validity is known by inference.

Prabhākara holds that a self-manifest cognition apprehends and manifests the self, its substratum and its object, which are unmanifest. But, for him, a cognition apprehends itself as a cognition, and not as an object, and it apprehends its self as a

<sup>1</sup>NKS., iv, 4 ; p. 12.

<sup>2</sup>NKSP., iv, 4 ; p. 12.

<sup>3</sup>NKS., iv, p. 14.

<sup>4</sup>TBh., p. 17.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid, IPC., p. 224-30.

knower, and not as an object. The Nyāya refutes Prabhākara's doctrine thus. The cognition "this is a jar" apprehends the jar, but not the self. But the cognition "I know this jar" apprehends the jar and the self. Thus, whenever an object is apprehended by a cognition, the self is not necessarily manifested. Hence the cognition of an object is not necessarily the cognition of the self which is its substratum. Again, an object is apprehended by a cognition, but a cognition is apprehended by mental perception.<sup>1</sup> The self also is apprehended by mental perception. Hence the sense-perception of an object does not apprehend itself and the self. The Nyāya does not admit the self-manifestness of a cognition. The later Nyāya holds that a cognition is apprehended by a representative cognition (*anuvyavasāya*). It is a direct apprehension and not recollection as shown above.<sup>2</sup> In the cognition "I know the jar" there is the apprehension of an object as qualified by a cognition, and the empirical self related to the body is apprehended, but the real self is not apprehended as the knower and the known, since it is self-contradictory. If the self is apprehended, then it must be an object of apprehension. Otherwise, it would not be perceived. If it is argued that the self is not perceived, but that it is directly apprehended, the argument is childish ! It is strange to aver that the self is not perceived, but that it is immediately apprehended.<sup>3</sup>

The Nyāya refutes the Sāṅkhya doctrine thus. According to the Sāṅkhya the self (*puruṣa*) is the experiencer and the *prakṛti* is the experienced. The self experiences a mode of the *buddhi* modified into the form of an object because of its reflection in the mental mode. They seem to acquire the properties of each other owing to close proximity. The self appears to be an active agent, and the *buddhi* appears to be conscious. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa asks the meaning of the Sāṅkhya view that the self perceives an object determined by the *buddhi*. What is its knowerhood (*draṣṭṛtva*)? If it is said

<sup>1</sup>TBh., p. 18.

<sup>2</sup>NK., p. 91 ; IPC., Vol. I, pp. 213-14.

<sup>3</sup>NM., p. 432.

to be due to reflection, is the buddhi reflected in the transparent self, or is the knowing self reflected in the buddhi with a mode? The self of the nature of consciousness is unmodifiable and incapable of movement and so cannot be reflected in the buddhi. If the buddhi moves to the self and is reflected in it, cannot bring about any change in it so that it may become a knower for it is unchangable. If the self is by nature a knower, the reflection of the buddhi in the self is needless. If the self is said to know an object determined by the buddhi, then it was not a knower before it knows the object so determined, for a knower must have an object to be known. Hence the self is a knower by nature. If its knowerhood is said to be natural to it, what it will know and what it will not know cannot be determined. If the buddhi is reflected in the self, they become attached to, and inseparable from, each other, and so it cannot be determined that knowerhood belongs to the self because the buddhi also may be the knower. The theory of reflection cannot definitely determine the self to be the knower. If their functions are undetermined, they cannot be said to be different from each other. If they are said to be different from each other because the self is conscious and an experiencer, and because the buddhi is unconscious and experienced, it is inconceivable how the latter is unconscious even when it is related to knowledge. If the qualities of the buddhi are attributed to the self, and if the qualities of the self are attributed to the buddhi, then it is better to admit that they are not different from each other. If they are assumed to be different, the buddhi becomes conscious when it is related to knowledge, and thus the self and the buddhi become two conscious entities—which is an undesirable contingency. The Sāṃkhya may argue that the buddhi is an organ through which the self perceives an object. It is unnecessary to assume an imperceptible organ—buddhi—for the self's perception of an object abandoning the evident knowerhood and agency of the self. It is better to hold that the self is a knower and an agent.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>NM., p. 491.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticises the Buddhist views as follows. The Buddhist realists hold that external objects and internal cognitions are momentary. The Vaibhāṣika holds that external objects are perceived by cognitions. Jayanta urges that they are not perceived by cognitions invested with their forms, since two forms—the form of an object and the form of a cognition—are not perceived. The admission of two forms would involve infinite regress. The form of an object is not apprehended by a formless cognition. So it is apprehended by a cognition with a form. Since the form of a cognition is apprehended, it is apprehended by another cognition with a form, and that, again, by another, and so to infinity. Hence an object is not perceived by a cognition stamped with its form. The Sautrāntika holds that an object with a form is inferred from a cognition with a form. Jayanta urges that an object cannot be inferred from a cognition, because invariable concomitance between an object and its cognition is never perceived according to the Sautrāntika. He holds that an object is always inferred from a cognition. The Yogācāra Vijñānavādin holds that momentary cognitions alone are real, and that one and the same cognition is the knowing self and the known object. Jayanta urges that it is self-contradictory to hold that the same cognition with a form is both subject and object.<sup>1</sup>

#### THE ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

How does the self perceive an object? There are different views on the subject. According to the Sāṃkhya, when a sense-organ has intercourse with an object, the buddhi issues out of the sense-organ to the object, is modified into its form, and gives its mode to the self, then the self is reflected in the mental mode, is related to the object, and apprehends it. According to the Naiyāyika, when a sense-organ has intercourse with an object, when there is a conjunction of the manas with the sense-organ, and when there is conjunction of the manas with the self, the cognition of the object is produced

<sup>1</sup>NM., p. 16. Indian Realism, pp. 181-205.

in the part of the self—which is limited by the body which ensouls it. He holds that a cognition is manifested by a representative cognition (*anuvyavasāya*). Prabhākara regards a cognition as self-manifest, which manifests the self as its substratum or knower, and which manifests the object as known. Kumārila holds that the self is modified into the cognition of an object when there is sense-manas-self-conjunction. He thinks the self to be a substance of the nature of consciousness and capable of being modified. The Cārvāka regards a sense-organ as a mere site, and holds that a cognition in the form of an object is produced even when it does not come into direct contact with a sense-organ, and that a cognition is a mere modification of a body. According to the Buddhists, a series of ego-cognitions (*ālayavijñāna*) is called the self of the nature of 'I'-cognition (*ahaṃpratyaya*); the immediately preceding cognition (*samanantara-pratyaya*) is called the manas. The dominant cognition (*adbipatipratyaya*) is called a sense-organ. The cognition of the given datum (*ālambana-pratyaya*) is called an object. Light or the like is called the auxiliary condition (*sahakāri-pratyaya*). A cognition produced by these four kinds of causes is called an object-cognition (*pravṛttivijñāna*) or cognition tainted with an object. This is the view of the Yogācāra Vijñānavādin. All these views are inconsistent with one another, and cannot all be true.

The Advaita Vedāntin refutes the Sāṃkhya view thus. The Sāṃkhya regards the self as unmodifiable, and yet holds that the self is reflected in the buddhi and intelligises it, or that the buddhi intelligised by the self is reflected back in it. In both cases, the self becomes modifiable. Thus the Sāṃkhya contradicts his own view that the self is immutable. He may argue that the self merely "sees" or knows the buddhi modified into the form of an object, that "seeing" or knowing is its essence, and that it does not come over to the buddhi. This defence is useless because all the alternatives involved in it are untenable. The cognition which constitutes the essence of the self manifests the buddhi modified into the form of its object as related to the self, or it manifests the mode of the buddhi



as unrelated to the self. The first alternative is untenable, since the self is partless and cannot come into contact with a mental mode. Further, the self is neutral and cannot relate itself to a mental mode, since, in that case, it would contradict its nature. Nor can a cognition apprehend an object unrelated to the self, since then it would be able to apprehend any object unrelated to it. If proximity be said to relate an object to the self, what does proximity mean? It is either existence in the same substratum or mutual confrontation or interpenetration. The first alternative is not tenable. The self and the buddhi cannot exist in the same substratum, like a colour and a taste. Nor is the second alternative tenable. The self is all-pervasive and cannot confront the buddhi modified into the form of an object. Nor is the third alternative possible. If the self and the buddhi interpenetrate each other, like heat and iron, the self will become modifiable. Nor can there be proximity of the self to the buddhi as between a substratum and its content, like the relation of a vessel to a plum, since the self is detached or unrelated. Further, there is no means of valid knowledge to prove it. The self's apprehension of an object through its reflection in the buddhi or the intelligised buddhi's reflection in the self is not perceived. Nor is it inferred, since the invariable concomitance between a probans and a probandum is not known in any instance. It cannot be said to be inferred from the invariable concomitance between light and object, since both are composed of parts and capable of motion and can therefore be proximate to each other, but the self is partless, immovable, and so cannot be proximate to the buddhi. Hence there is no proof for the self and the buddhi moving to each other. The movement of the self, which is detached, perfect, and partless, to the buddhi is neither perceived nor inferred. Hence the self cannot apprehend an object through a mental mode in which the self is reflected or which is reflected back in the self. So the Sāṃkhya view is irrational.

The Advaita Vedāntin refutes the Nyāya view thus. A cognition cannot apprehend an object without a relation between them. According to the Naiyāyika there is no direct relation between them. There can be neither conjunction nor

any other relation between them. There being no such relation nor any original relation, there can be no other relation depending upon them. Hence there is no direct relation between a cognition and an object. The Naiyāyika may argue that conjunction between an object and a sense-organ, conjunction between a sense-organ and the manas, and conjunction between the manas and the self, bring about an indirect relation between a cognition produced by them and the object. This argument is wrong, since, in that case, all objects would be indirectly related to the cognition, because they are indirectly related to the object which is said to be indirectly related to a cognition, and thus all objects would be apprehended by the cognition. All objects are indirectly related to an object. The object is related to a sense-organ. The sense-organ is related to the atomic manas. The manas is related to the self limited by its body. Thus all objects would be directly related to the cognition produced by the aforesaid relations in the self limited by its body, and be apprehended by it. The Naiyāyika may argue that an effect of an action is produced in an object related to an instrument as an object is cut to pieces when it is struck by an axe. In that case, cognition would be produced in an object by a sense-organ, and not in the self. But we have such an experience as 'the cognition of a jar is produced in me'. So the argument is wrong, because it contradicts our experience. The Naiyāyika may argue that an object in conjunction with a sense-organ produces a cognition in the self, and that any other object cannot do so. In that case, ubiquitous ether being in conjunction with all selves, cognition of ether would be produced in them all. The Naiyāyika may argue that conjunction of a sense-organ with an intended object produces a cognition in the self. This argument is wrong, because an unintended bad odour in conjunction with the olfactory organ produces a cognition in the self. A cognition is not related to an object through a series of conjunctions because the cognition produced by them inheres in the self, and because it is not related to a sense-organ. Further, there is no proof for the continuance of a series of conjunctions till the produced

cognition produces a peculiarity (*atiśaya*) in an object. The peculiarity in an object can be produced by a cognition or mental mode going out to the object, and the cognition can manifest it. So a cognition cannot be related to an object through a sense-organ. Nor can a cognition be related to an object through its substratum. If it could be so related, a cognition abiding in the ubiquitous self would manifest all objects. If a cognition abided in the self limited by its body, it would not be related to an object outside the body, and could not manifest it. So a cognition is not related to an object through its substratum. If it be argued that a cognition may cognise an object without being related to it, then a cognition will manifest all objects without being related to them, and there will be no relation between a knowing self, knowledge, and a known object. But we have such an experience as "this is known by me". Hence the Naiyāyika cannot account for the apprehension of an object by a cognition.

The Advaita Vedāntin refutes Prabhākara's view thus. Although a cognition is self-manifest, according to him, yet there is no relation between a cognition in a self limited by its body and an external object; and therefore a cognition cannot manifest an object. A self-manifest cognition can manifest itself only, and can manifest neither a self, its substratum, nor its object. According to Prabhākara a cognition cannot pervade an object, since he admits it to inhere in a self limited by its body only, and since he admits it to be a quality of a self. A cognition, a quality of a self, cannot produce a peculiarity (*atiśaya*) in anything except its substratum, a self. Neither a quality nor an action is perceived to produce a peculiarity in anything except its substratum. So a cognition cannot manifest an external object. Nor can a self, a substratum of a cognition, manifest an external object, since it does not pervade an object, although it is a substratum of the cognition, because it is limited by a body. Nor can a cognition abiding in a self, which is said to apprehend an object, apprehend the self, because there is no proof of its pervading both. A self-manifest

cognition cannot manifest a self, its substratum, and an object, even as light manifests a lamp, its substratum, and external objects. Light has rays which can spread and manifest both a lamp and external objects. But a cognition is partless and devoid of rays, and so cannot spread to a self and an external object. Hence the example cited is not appropriate. Further, if a cognition, which inheres in a self, manifests the self, as a knower, then the self becomes both a knower and a known object—which is self-contradictory. The same self cannot be both a subject and an object of a cognition. Further, a cognition is produced in the entire self or in a particular region of the self. In the first alternative, a cognition manifests only the phenomenal self, for the real self has no particular region without a limiting condition (e. g., a body). The real self is partless. When it is limited by a body, it ceases to be an ontological reality. So the experience “I am” would be illusory since the word “I” means the embodied self. In the second alternative, there would be no self as an object of “I”-consciousness. Hence there can be no relation between a cognition and an object, and so a cognition cannot apprehend an object according to Prabhākara.

The Advaita Vedāntin refutes Kumārila's view thus. Kumārila holds that a self is modified into a cognition which manifests an object due to the conjunction of the object with a sense-organ. Is the self limited by its body modified? Or, is the ubiquitous self modified? In the first alternative, if the modification of the self exists within a body, it cannot spread to an external object, and so cannot manifest it. In the second alternative, if the entire self spreads to an external object and is modified into its cognition, then there will be no mental perception of the cognition as Kumārila holds. If the self spreads partly to an object and is partly modified into its cognition, then it will be composed of parts and cease to be ubiquitous. A partless ubiquitous substance is never found to have the property of being composed of parts. Hence the self limited by a body or the ubiquitous self cannot be modified into the cognition of an object. If it could, it would be modified into the cognitions of all objects and manifest them,

since it is ubiquitous. In fact, the self cannot be modified, for a modifiable self would be noneternal. Further, Kumārila holds that the self is a conscious substance, and that as a substance it is of the nature of insentience and as conscious it is of the nature of knowledge. But the self being partly insentient and partly conscious would be composed of parts. But the self is partless and devoid of the distinction of whole and parts. Hence Kumārila's view of the self as a substance which is partly insentient and partly conscious and modifiable into the cognition of an object is unreasonable.

The Advaita Vedāntin refutes the Cārvāka view that a cognition assumes the form of an object which is not directly related to a sense-organ, a mere site, and that a cognition is a mere modification of the body. If the sense-organs were mere sites, there would be no blind and deaf persons, and there would be no visual perception of distant stars because they are not related to the sites of the eyes. If object were apprehended by the sense-organs without being related to them, then all objects would be perceived. Further, a produced cognition is not a modification of the body since consciousness is not a modification of matter. If consciousness were a property of the body, it could not manifest an object. Hence the Cārvāka view is wrong.

The Advaita Vedāntin refutes the Buddhist view thus. The Buddhist distinction of ālayavijñāna, pravṛttivijñāna, samanantarapratyaya and adhipatipratyaya is not consistent with his own view. Is a single "I"-cognition ālayavijñāna? Or, is a series of "I"-cognitions ālayavijñāna? In the first alternative, there would be no such cognition as "I know this", since "I"-cognition is momentary, since there is no apprehension of the knower, the knowledge, and the known object, and since "I"-cognition and object-cognition are incapable of communicating with each other. It may be argued that "I"-cognition, "this"-cognition, and "knowledge"-cognition—these three cognitions together know "I know this." This argument is wrong, for, in that case, the self would not apprehend an object and bring about the end of all practical life, since these cognitions are ignorant of one another. It may be argued

that the three aforesaid cognitions are produced in succession and that then a fourth cognition, which is of the nature of the three cognitions, is produced. This argument is wrong, because this cognition also would not know the relation among the three cognitions, and therefore would not apprehend the object. Otherwise, if the fourth cognition were simultaneous with the preceding three cognitions, it would contradict the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness. If they were not synchronous but successive, then there would be no relation of subject and object between any two of them, and therefore the "I"-cognition (*ālayavijñāna*) would not apprehend an object-cognition (*pravṛtinvijñāna*). The second alternative also is not tenable. There is no series of cognitions distinct from its members or momentary cognitions. If a single "I"-cognition cannot apprehend an object-cognition, a series of "I"-cognitions also cannot do so. If the series be regarded as stable, it contradicts the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness. Whatever be the nature of the series of "I"-cognitions within a body, it cannot be related to an external object, and apprehend it. A single "I"-cognition or a series of "I"-cognitions is not the self. Further, the series of "I"-cognitions is either self-manifest or manifested by another cognition. The first alternative is not tenable. If the series be different from its members, it would be known by them. But the Buddhist does not admit it. If the series be identical with its members, it is momentary and ceases to be a series. The second alternative also is untenable. If the series be manifested by another cognition, the latter, being momentary, will not apprehend the members of the series as belonging to a series, and will not manifest it as a series. A series will not be manifested at a single moment. If a permanent cognition be admitted to manifest or apprehend a series, it will be the self. If the permanent cognition be apprehended by another cognition, there will be infinite regress. If it be self-manifest, the Buddhist abandons his view and adopts the view of the Advaita Vedāntin, who regards the self as one, eternal, immutable, consciousness, which is the witness (*sākṣin*) of the production and destruction of many successive

cognitions. Further, the object-cognition said to be produced by a sense-organ and the like is a manifestation of the "I"-cognition, or another cognition produced by it. The first alternative is not possible since the "I"-cognition, being unrelated to an object, cannot be manifested as an object-cognition. Nor is the second alternative possible since if the object-cognition be produced within the "I"-cognition, it cannot be related to an external object and produce an object-cognition. If the "I"-cognition produce an object-cognition outside the body, it being unrelated to the object-cognition, it cannot react upon an external-object through the object-cognition. Moreover, the four causes of an object-cognition, the manas, the sense-organ, the datum, and the auxiliary condition are produced either simultaneously or successively. The first alternative is not tenable, since there is no proof for their being produced simultaneously. The cognitions of different kinds cannot be related to each other as causes and effects. The cognitions of the manas, the sense-organ, the datum, and the auxiliary condition are produced by different causal conditions and therefore cannot be produced simultaneously. Nor is the second alternative possible, since if the four kinds of causes are successive, they cannot produce the object-cognition by their conjoint action. Hence the Buddhist doctrine is wrong.

The Advaita Vedāntin refutes the Jaina view. According to the Jaina the self is coextensive with the body it occupies. So it cannot be related to an external object and apprehend it. Besides, the self being of intermediate magnitude becomes noneternal.

The Advaita Vedāntin refutes the Vaiṣṇavas' view that the self is of atomic magnitude (*aṇu*). If the self is atomic, it cannot pervade its body, and, consequently, cannot feel sensations in all parts of its body. It may be argued that knowledge of the atomic self pervades the body. Then knowledge is either the essence, or an attribute, or a ray of the self, like a ray of light. If knowledge be the essence of the self, it cannot pervade the body, like the self. Nor can knowledge be its attribute, since an attribute cannot exist apart from its substance. Nor can knowledge be a ray of the self, since the

self is partless, and since a ray of light is a small particle of it. Hence the view of Rāmānuja and others is wrong.<sup>1</sup>

The Advaita Vedāntin explains the relation of the self, knowledge, and object in the following manner. Knowledge is the essence of the self. It is self-manifest. Hence the self also is self-manifest. Knowledge is unmodificable. So the self also is unmodifiable. It is of the nature of knowledge, consciousness, or awareness. It is eternal, nondual and undifferentiated. It is not in itself a knower, a doer, and an enjoyer or a sufferer. Its being a knower, being a doer, and being an enjoyer or a sufferer are due to the superimposition of egoism (ahaṁkāra)—a limiting adjunct (upādhi)—on it. The internal organ (antaḥkāraṇa) issues out through a sense-organ to an object and is modified into its form. The self of the nature of consciousness is reflected in the mental mode and erroneously identifies itself with the mode due to superimposition and apprehends an external object. The self of the nature of consciousness being manifested in the internal organ within the body and being limited by and identified with a particular mode of the internal organ is called the knower (pramāṭṛ). The self limited by a particular mode of the internal organ modified into the form of an object is called the means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). The self limited by an external object pervaded by a mode of the internal organ and identified with the object is called the object of knowledge (prameya). The self limited by and identified with the manifestation of an object is called the result of the means of valid knowledge (pramiti). These differences are phenomenal and due to the limiting adjuncts (upādhi). But the self in its real nature is unmodifiable, undifferentiated, changeless, of the nature of consciousness, and the witness (sākṣin) that manifests all. Because the knower, the means of knowledge, and the known object are manifested as states of the internal organ directly by the self or witness and related to one another by it, we have the experience "I know this" or "this is known by

<sup>1</sup>ATP., pp. 89-100.



me." These factors, being limited, unrelated to, and ignorant of, one another, cannot produce such an experience<sup>1</sup>.

Vidyāraṇya (1400 A. D.) describes the distinction of the knower, the knowledge, and the known object in the following manner. Positive nescience (*avidyā*) veiling the one eternal consciousness or Self appears to be the world-appearance. The internal organ is a product of nescience. The internal organ within a body urged by merits and demerits of an individual self issues through a sense-organ to an external object, and is modified into its form. The part of the internal organ limited by a body called egoism (*ahaṁkāra*) is the doer. The mode or function of the internal organ between the body and the object called mental mode or knowledge is action. An external object pervaded by a mental mode making it capable of being manifested is the object of action. The internal organ is very translucent; so the eternal consciousness (*caitanya*) is manifested in it. Although the manifesting consciousness is one, it becomes threefold according as the parts of the internal organ differ in which it is manifested. The part of the universal consciousness which is limited by the part of the internal organ called the doer is the knower (*pramātr*). The part of the universal consciousness which is limited by the part of the internal organ called action is the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The part of the universal consciousness limited by an external object which is pervaded by a mode of the internal organ and made capable of being manifested by it is the object of knowledge. Hence there is no intermixture of the knower, the knowledge, and the known object. All the three parts are connected with the internal organ in which the universal consciousness or *Ātman* is manifested. The part of the universal consciousness limited by the manifestation of the object pervaded by a mode of the internal organ is the result of the means of valid knowledge (*pramiti*)<sup>2</sup>. The internal organ is manifested and the *Ātman* manifests it. They are related to each other as manifested and manifesters. They are superimposed on each other and erroneously

<sup>1</sup>ATP., pp.,101-06

<sup>2</sup>VPS., pp. 71-72

identified with each other. So the *Ātman* thinks itself to be the knower, and the internal organ appears to be conscious.

Dharmarājādharīndra (1600 A.D.) admits three kinds of consciousness, *viz.*, object-consciousness, knowledge-consciousness, and knower-consciousness. The consciousness limited by a jar and the like is the object-consciousness. The consciousness limited by a mode of the internal organ is the knowledge-consciousness. The consciousness limited by an internal-organ is the knower-consciousness. An individual self (*jīva*) is the consciousness limited by an internal organ. The witness of an individual self (*jīvasākṣin*) is the consciousness conditioned by an internal organ. The former is qualified by an internal organ while the latter is not qualified by it.<sup>1</sup> A qualification is connected with an effect, but a condition is not connected with it, but is present in it, and differentiates it from other entities. "A noneternal jar is qualified by a colour." Here colour is a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) of a jar. "The ear is ether conditioned by the ear-cavity." Here the ear-cavity is a condition (*upādhi*). The eternal consciousness qualified by an internal organ is called an individual self (*jīva*). The eternal consciousness conditioned by an internal organ is called the witness of an individual self (*jīvasākṣin*). The eternal consciousness (*caitanya*) is the *Ātman* or Brahman. It is not mental consciousness but supramental, transcendental, pure, universal, undifferentiated, consciousness unconditioned and unqualified by an internal organ, a modification of positive nescience (*avidyā*).

Mahādevānanda gives the following description of the knower, the knowledge, and the known object. The universal consciousness qualified by an internal organ is the knower-consciousness. The universal consciousness limited by a mode of the internal organ is the knowledge-consciousness. The universal consciousness limited by a jar and the like is the object-consciousness. The consciousness manifested by the mode of the internal organ is the result-consciousness.<sup>2</sup> As the

<sup>1</sup>VP., pp. 55-56, 102-03

<sup>2</sup>ACK., p. 133.

mental mode and the object coexist in the same locus, the consciousnesses conditioned by them become identical. The internal organ issues through a sense-organ to an object, is united with it, and modified into its form. This modification of the internal organ is called a mental mode (*vr̥tti*). The object-consciousness is reflected in this mental mode. Then the consciousnesses conditioned by the mental mode and the object become identical, since they coexist in the same locus ; or, the knowledge-consciousness and the object-consciousness become identical. The mental mode or knowledge removes the veil of nescience (*avidyā*). Then the object is manifested by the witness (*sākṣin*). The universal consciousness conditioned by the internal organ is the witness. Evidently it is the individual witness (*jīvasākṣin*)<sup>1</sup>

The Śaiva monist holds that the Lord, the Absolute, or universal consciousness, is the Supreme Knower (*parapramāṭṛ*). He assumes the empirical states of the limited knower (*jñāṭṛ*) and the known object (*jñeya*) under different conditions. The knower can know the known object because of their ontological identity as the Supreme Knower.<sup>2</sup>

BHĀSKARA (900 A. D.)

Some Mīmāṃsakas hold that the act of knowledge is always inferred from the experience of objects produced by it.<sup>3</sup> The act of knowledge produces the experience or consciousness of an object as a result, as the act of cooking produces cookedness in rice. Bhāskara offers the following criticisms of it. 1. There is no proof for the existence of the act of knowledge. It is said to be produced by the sense-organs (eg., the eyes). They produce valid knowledge, experience, apprehension. Experience is produced when there is an intercourse of an object with a sense-organ directed by the *manas* in the presence of light. Experience is not produced in the absence of the intercourse.

<sup>1</sup>ACK., p. 135. Ibid, pp. 133-34.

<sup>2</sup>Spandakārikā, 18.

<sup>3</sup>BBS., I, 1, 1.

Another intermediate act of knowledge is needless to produce experience. If it is assumed, it will lead to infinite regress.

2. There is no reason (*hetu*) for inferring the act of knowledge. Experience is not the reason because the invariable concomitance between experience and the act of knowledge has not been known. If the probandum (e. g., fire) is perceptible, its invariable concomitance with the probans (e. g., smoke) can be perceived. But the act of knowledge is not perceptible according to Kumārila. So its invariable concomitance with experience or consciousness of an object cannot be perceived. If the act of knowledge is perceived, it is proved by perception, and there is no need for inference. 3. Inference is the knowledge of one object from the knowledge of another between which invariable concomitance has been known. The powers of the sense-organs are known by presumption (*arthāpatti*). There is no scope for presumption here, since experience is produced just after the sense-object-intercourse. Experience or apprehension itself is knowledge. It is not different from knowledge. Acceptance or rejection of the object is the result of knowledge. The knowing self, knowledge, and acceptance or rejection are perceived as a cook, cooking, and cookedness are perceived. There is no inferable act of knowledge.

Some hold that the self's ray of knowledge issues out of the orifice of a sense-organ and reaches an object, like a ray of light of a lamp within a jar issuing out of its many holes, and that the self's consciousness becomes identical with the object-consciousness. Bhāskara criticises this view. The knowledge of colour and the like is momentary, and the consciousness of the self is eternal. There cannot be identity of the eternal consciousness of the self with the noneternal knowledge. If the knowledge of an object be said to be the consciousness of the self, then the cognitions of the objects will simultaneously exist in it, and there will be no forgetfulness of them. So it is reasonable to hold that the knowledge of an object produced by a sense-organ, which is then destroyed, is different from the self's eternal consciousness.

## THE VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA VEDĀNTA

Rāmānuja (1200 A. D.) considers the individual self to be a knower and yet of the nature of knowledge. It is of the nature of a knower, and not mere knowledge, nor is it insentient.<sup>1</sup> The Śruti says "This self is the seer, hearer, doer, and of the nature of knowledge"; "Who can know the knower?" "This self is full of knowledge and an internal light in the heart"; "He who knows this is the self".<sup>2</sup> The self is a knower, a doer, and an enjoyer or a sufferer. It is atomic, and resides in the heart. It pervades the body with its attribute of knowledge, and feels sensations in all its parts. Its knowledge, like a ray of a gem, can move out of its abode, the self, to an external object and manifest it. The self is said to be of the nature of knowledge for knowledge is its essential attribute. It is of the nature of consciousness, and yet endowed with the attribute of consciousness. It is a self-manifest knower, and not mere manifestation.<sup>3</sup>

The Sāṃkhya wrongly holds that prakṛti is an active agent, and that the self (puruṣa) is a knower alone, and not an active agent. The scriptures enjoin right actions and prohibit wrong actions. They cannot enlighten unconscious prakṛti, or its evolute, buddhi, and urge it to do right actions and abstain from wrong actions. The "Bhagavad Gītā" regards the self as the doer of an action, and considers it, a motor sense-organ, the body, various bodily efforts, and merits and demerits or the the Divine Will to be the causes of an action. The self's actions are controlled by God, the Inner Controller (antar्याmin), but not completely determined by His will.<sup>4</sup> God regulates an individual self's actions according to its merits and demerits. It is a doer, and therefore an experiencer of the fruits of its actions—joys and miseries. It is an enjoyer and a sufferer. It is also a knower (jñātr). The Śruti says, "There is no destruction of the knowledge of a knower."

<sup>1</sup>RBS., ii, 3, 19

<sup>2</sup>Praś. Up., iv, 9 ; Bṛ. Up., vi, 5, 15 ; vi, 3, 7 ; Chānd. Up., viii, 12, 4 ; RBS., ii, 3, 19.

<sup>3</sup>RBS., ii, 3, 20, 26 & 28 ; i, 1, 1.

<sup>4</sup>RBS., ii, 3, 33 & 40 ; BG., xviii, 14 ; Bṛ. Up., V, 7, 22.

Knowledge is the manifestation of an object. The inner self is of the nature of "I", a knower, and known by "I"-consciousness. We have such experience as "I know this". It is undeniable. One who denies this fact of experience is an object of ridicule like a person who says "My mother is a barren woman." Hence the self is a real knower and of the nature of "I". It is self-manifest, and not manifested by any other entity. Its being of the nature of knowledge or consciousness is its self-manifestness. What is self-manifest, or of the nature of manifestation, is not manifested by any other entity, like a lighted lamp.<sup>1</sup> The self cannot be mere knowledge. Knowledge implies a knower and a known object. The self is a knower that is certainly self-manifest, and not mere manifestation. So mere knowledge cannot be the self. Knowledge is manifestation. Manifestation is manifestation of some entity. Knowledge is not insentient because it manifests itself to itself. Knowledge is manifested to its self in which it abides as an attribute, like pleasure. It is not manifested to any other self. Mere knowledge is not the self. But the knower of the nature of "I" is the self. The self is conscious, and manifests itself to itself through its being. It not only manifests itself, but also its knowledge. The manifestation of knowledge depends upon it. Knowledge depends upon it as its attribute, and its manifestation depends upon it. The self is by its nature a knower ; it is of the nature of "I" or conscious knower, and not mere knowledge. It is "I" in waking state, dream, and deep sleep, in bondage and release. If it is divested of its nature of "I", it ceases to be the inner self ; it is essentially a knower of the nature of "I". Rāmānuja denies the existence of knowledge without a self and an object. Knowledge is an attribute of the self, and cannot exist apart from it. It is the manifestation of an object. It manifests itself when it manifests its object. If it does not manifest its object by its nature, it cannot manifest itself. If knowledge were cognised by another knowledge, as the Nyāya holds, it would cease to be knowledge. Even in deep sleep, swoon, intoxication, etc., there is no consciousness devoid of self and

<sup>1</sup>RBS., I. 1, 1.

object. There is determinate apprehension of self and object even in these states. Knowledge is never indeterminate, selfless and objectless. Knowledge is the manifestation of an object by its being to its abode—the self. Its self-manifestation is manifestation of itself to its substratum—self through its existence. Manifestation is common to unconscious and conscious entities, which makes them objects of action. Insentient objects and a conscious self both are manifested by knowledge. Knowledge manifests its object to its self for its action upon the object. It serves the purpose of the self's action. We have such an experience "I know a jar". It testifies to the fact that knowledge has always a knowing self and a known object. There is no knowledge without a self, its substratum, and an object, since it is never perceived. It must have a knower (*kartṛ*) and an object to be known (*karma*).

Śaṅkara argues that apprehension or knowledge is the ontological reality, since it is common to the knowledge of the self and the knowledge of an object. Rāmānuja refutes this argument by pointing out that apprehension is always apprehension of an object by a self. The difference between apprehension and its object is perceived, and the perception is not contradicted. So knowledge or apprehension cannot be the only ontological reality. Śaṅkara argues that apprehension is self-manifest. Rāmānuja refutes it by pointing out that apprehension manifests an object to its self in which it subsists, but not to any other self. One self's apprehension is inferred by another self. One's own past apprehension is inferred from one's present recollection. So all apprehension is not self-manifest. An apprehension does not cease to be an apprehension when it is known by another cognition. One's own past apprehension is known by recollection. Another's apprehension is known by inference. But these do not cease to be apprehension. When an apprehension is known by another cognition, it does not lose its nature as apprehension. So all apprehension is not self-manifest or self-aware. An apprehension is manifested in its present state to its substratum—the self—through its being. Or, it manifests the existence of its object through its being. Such apprehension

manifests itself ; and even if it is known by another cognition, it does not cease to be an apprehension. A jar and other objects are not apprehensions because they are unmanifest and unconscious, and not because they are objects of apprehension. Śaṅkara regards the self as mere knowledge. An insentient object is manifested by an apprehension. But an apprehension is self-manifest, and does not require another apprehension to manifest it. But what is manifested by an apprehension is different from it ; a jar and other insentient objects are different from apprehension which manifests them. Rāmānuja denies that whatever is known by apprehension ceases to be apprehension, and that whatever is not apprehended by an apprehension is of the nature of apprehension. For a sky-flower is absolutely nonexistent, and so cannot be an object of apprehension. But for this reason it is not apprehension. Hence whatever is an object of apprehension cannot be nonapprehension. There is no rule that apprehension manifests a present object, for in that case past and future objects would not be cognised. Perception, inference, testimony, etc., are called apprehension. Inference and testimony cognize past and future objects also. Śaṅkara argues that the unchanging and immutable self cannot be the knower or the agent of the act of knowledge, and that therefore egoism (ahaṁkāra) which is insentient, modifiable, a mode of prakṛti, and a form of the internal organ, is a knower. If the self be admitted to be a knower, and an object of "I"-consciousness (ahaṁpratyaya), it becomes not-self, objective, and insentient. Rāmānuja retutes this argument by observing that egoism (ahaṁkāra), a form of the internal organ, is insentient, known, objective, a modification of prakṛti, and a means to the self's end, but that knowerhood is an uncommon attribute of conscious entities. Knowledge is not a quality of egoism because it is an object of knowledge. Further, being a knower is not a modification, but abides in the self of which knowledge is a quality ; knowledge is its essential and permanent quality. The self is the substratum of knowledge, which is capable of expansion and contraction, although it is unlimited in itself. The self which is of the nature of



knowledge is a knower; insentient egoism can never be a knower. Śaṅkara argues that egoism can be a knower because of the reflection of the conscious self in it. Rāmānuja asks the meaning of reflection of self or universal consciousness in egoism. It is either reflection of egoism in universal consciousness (cit), or reflection of universal consciousness (cit) in egoism. The first alternative is not tenable, since Śaṅkara does not admit that universal consciousness or self is a knower. Nor is the second alternative tenable, since insentient egoism can never be a knower. Śaṅkara holds that the self exists as the witness (sākṣin) of nescience (ajñāna) in deep sleep. Rāmānuja urges that a witness is a direct knower, that an unknowing self is not a witness, and that a knower alone is said to be a witness in the Vedas and by common people. Hence the self is a knower, and not mere knowledge.<sup>1</sup>

Veṅkaṭanātha (1300AD.), a follower of Rāmānuja, argues that knowledge is self-proved, independent of any other knowledge which may apprehend it, and favourable to the self's effective action upon it. We have such experience as "I know this." The act of knowing is manifested with the knowing self and the known object.<sup>2</sup> Kumārila holds that the act of knowledge is inferred from manifestness (prākāṭya) or cognisedness (jñātātā) produced by it in its object. Veṅkaṭanātha rejects manifestness in an object, because it is not perceived by any body apart from the object, and because the assumption of it violates the parsimony of hypotheses. If knowledge is said to be manifested as an attribute of the self, then knowledge is not inferred from manifestness of its object. Knowledge is self-manifest, and when it manifests itself, it manifests its self also of which it is an attribute, and its object known by it.<sup>3</sup> The Navya Nyāya holds that knowledge is manifested by a "representative knowledge" (anuvyavasāya). Veṅkaṭanātha rejects "representative knowledge" or knowledge which manifests

<sup>1</sup>Ibid. TMK., SAS., pp. 163-67.

<sup>2</sup>SAS., p. 389.

<sup>3</sup>SAS., p. 389-90.

or apprehends another knowledge, because knowledge does not depend upon any other knowledge to manifest it. It is self-manifest. The Nyāya believes in omniscient God. He knows all entities including His knowledge. His knowledge is self-manifest. If he did not know His knowledge, His knowledge would not know all. Some hold that God's cognitions know themselves, but that they are not self-manifest.<sup>1</sup> Let them draw such a meaningless distinction. But no distinction should be made between the knower (kartṛ) and the known (karma) within God's knowledge. It cannot be denied that His knowledge is independent of any other knowledge apprehending it, and that it is favourable to His action. Some hold that God has two cognitions— cognition apprehending all entities and a cognition apprehending this cognition, and that He is omniscient for this reason.<sup>2</sup> Veṅkaṭanātha urges that there is no proof for God's having two cognitions, and that His omniscience can be shown otherwise. So the hypothesis of God's two aforesaid cognitions is unwarranted. His omniscience is possible on the hypothesis that His knowledge apprehends itself and all other entities. Some who do not admit self-manifestness of knowledge hold that God's knowledge knows all other entities, but not itself. Vñkaṭanātha urges that it is absurd to hold that God is omniscient, and that yet He does not know His knowledge. If His knowledge did not know itself, He would not know Himself to be the subject of His knowledge, He would not know others not to be the abodes of His knowledge, He would not know what are the objects of His knowledge and what are not the objects of His knowledge; in fact, He would not know the distinctive characters of His knowledge, and thus He would have both infinite knowledge and infinite ignorance, and would be almost like individual souls.<sup>2</sup> Then it would be much better to explain the universe by an unseen principle (adr̥ṣṭa) which would not violate the law of parsimony. Thus the nonadmission of God's omniscience would lead to many undesirable contingencies.

<sup>1</sup>Ibid, p. 390.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid, p. 391.

Further, a serial cognition (dhārāvāhika-buddhi) of an object is admitted by all. It apprehends an object for a certain duration, and knows that it continues to do so for some length of time. It is not apprehended by some other cognition. If it were apprehended by some other cognition, its continuity would be broken. Hence a serial cognition apprehends or manifests itself. There is no proof for its being not known. It may be argued that knowledge does not know itself because it cannot be the knower and the known at the same time, even as a finger cannot touch itself, or as an axe cannot cut itself, or as fire cannot burn itself. This argument is wrong, since as the self is both knower and known, as it is perceived by itself, so it is the cause of the knowledge which apprehends itself. Hence knowledge is self-manifest or self-aware.

Some deny the knowability of the knowledge in order to save its self-manifestness. Prabhākara holds that knowledge is self-manifest and that it does not apprehend itself as an object of knowledge (vedya) but as knowledge (vedana). Some Advaita Vedāntists hold that knowledge is self-manifest, but that it does not apprehend itself as an object of knowledge for what is known (vedya) is insentient. Veṅkaṭanātha asks whether insentience is mere knowability, or whether insentience is proved by the knowledge that apprehends the knowledge, or whether insentience is the absence of self-manifestness, or whether insentience is the state of not being known, or whether insentience is something else. Veṅkaṭanātha urges that none of these alternatives are possible according to the opponents. The first alternative that insentience is knowability is the opponent's view which he has not proved ; his reason is not different from his conclusion. The second alternative is not possible, because knowability has to be proved by an inference independent of the knowledge that apprehends the knowledge, and because invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between knowability and being proved by the knowledge that apprehends the knowledge is absent in this case of inference. Nor is the third alternative possible for there is a difference in names alone between knowability and the absence of self-

manifestness. Nor is the fourth alternative possible because it is a desired contingency, and because knowledge while existing is not apprehended by any other knowledge.<sup>1</sup> Nor is the fifth alternative possible, because an object apprehended by a knowledge cannot have a contrary property, and because there is no invariable concomitance between knowability and having a contrary property. If knowability is not something else, it is knowable—which is a desired contingency. If a disciple and a teacher do not know the cognitions of each other, they cannot have any discussion. Similarly, two disputants cannot carry on a dispute without knowing the cognitions of each other. Even common people cannot converse with one another without knowing the cognitions of one another. The opponents may argue that the modes of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) may know each other, and lead to practical actions. Veṅkaṭanātha contends that the functions of the internal organ cannot be called cognitions, like those of the external sense-organs, because they are insentient. If they are cognitions, there is no use of admitting the conscious self besides them, the consciousness determined by the mental mode (*vr̥tṭyavacchinna-caitanya*) and the mental mode will know each other, and the former will cease to be pure consciousness because it is known by the mental mode. Hence knowledge cannot be unknowable ; knowledge is self-manifest and apprehends itself.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Ibid, p. 393.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid, p. 391-93.

## CHAPTER XI

### GENERAL PROBLEMS OF INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY TESTS OF TRUTH

#### CORRESPONDENCE (YĀTHĀRTHYA)

The Nyāya defines valid knowledge as apprehension of an object as it really is. When a jar is apprehended as a jar in which the genus 'jarness' subsists, the apprehension is valid knowledge. Valid knowledge is apprehension of an object as endued with qualities which really exist in it. The apprehension of an object in its real nature is valid knowledge. Invalid knowledge is the apprehension of an object as it is not in its real nature. It is the apprehension of an object as endued with qualities which do not really exist in it. When a white conch-shell is apprehended as yellow by jaundiced eyes, the knowledge is invalid. Thus correspondence is the test of truth. Correspondence is agreement or harmony of ideas or judgments with facts. When a shell is apprehended as a shell, the knowledge is true or valid. When it is apprehended as silver, the apprehension "this is silver" is false or invalid. Thus factual consistency or correspondence is the test of truth. The Naiyāyika is a realist. Like the Western realist, he regards correspondence as the test of truth<sup>1</sup>.

#### WORKABILITY (PRAVṚTTISĀMARTHYA)

The Nyāya regards workability or practical utility also as a test of truth. The knowledge "this is water" is valid, if it leads to fruitful activity, if it prompts activity which quenches thirst. A judgment is true, if it has capacity for prompting fruitful activity. If it does not prompt fruitful activity, it is invalid. The judgement "this is silver" is invalid, if it cannot lead to fruitful activity. A shell mistaken for silver cannot come to practical use. It cannot be made into an ornament.

<sup>1</sup>TS., SM., 134-35, p. 126-27.

Thus practical inutility is a test of falsity. The Nyāya recognises the realistic test of factual consistency or correspondence and the pragmatist test of practical efficiency as the criteria of truth. The Nyāya advocates realistic pragmatism. Workability is a test of truth. But it does not constitute truth. Truth is correspondence of ideas with facts. It is conformity with reality. A judgment is true, if it conforms to facts. But its truth or correspondence with facts is known by its practical utility.

#### COHERENCE OR NON-CONTRADICTION (ABĀDHITATVA)

The Advaita Vedāntist regards logical consistency of a judgment with other judgments known to be true as the test of truth. Uncontradictedness or coherence is the test of truth. When a judgment is contradicted by other judgments, it is false. When it is not contradicted by other judgments, it is true. Non-contradiction, coherence, ideal consistency, or harmony of judgments is the test of truth. The Vedāntist agrees with the Western Idealists or Absolutists, like Bradley and Bosarquet, in regarding coherence as the test of truth.

The "Vedāntaparibhāsa" gives three tests of truth, viz, (1) novelty (2) non-contradiction, and (3) practical utility or efficiency. Valid knowledge is characterized by novelty. It must apprehend something new, which was not known before. Recollection is memory of an object, which was perceived before. It does not add to our knowledge. It is simply reproduction of previous perception. So it should not be regarded as strictly valid knowledge. Valid knowledge acquaints us with something new. Novelty is a characteristic of truth. It implies factual consistency or agreement with given facts, which have empirical reality. The Advaita Vedānta recognizes the empirical reality of the world, but not its ontological reality. The empirical knowledge of plurality is contradicted by the intuition of Identity of the Absolute. The tests of truth given above apply to facts of empirical knowledge.

#### SOURCES OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

The Cārvāka regards perception alone as the means of valid knowledge. The Bauddha regards perception and

inference as the means of valid knowledge. The Sāṅkhya and the Yoga regard perception, inference, and testimony as the means of valid knowledge. The Mīmāṃsaka (Kumārila) and the Advaita Vedānta regard perception, inference, comparison, testimony, presumption, and non-apprehension as the means of valid knowledge. Prabhākara, the founder of a school of Mīmāṃsā, rejects non-apprehension as a distinct source of valid knowledge.

#### PERCEPTION

The Nyāya defines perception as knowledge produced by the intercourse of a sense-organ with an object, which cannot be defined by a name, which does not contradict the real nature of its object, and which is of the nature of determinate knowledge. Perception is knowledge produced by the sense-object-intercourse. Valid perception does not contradict the real character of its object as it really exists. If it does not conform to its object, it is illusory. There are two kinds of perception, indeterminate and determinate. Indeterminate perception is nameless. It is perception of an object devoid of its name. Determinate perception is definite knowledge of an object with its name.

The later Naiyāyika defines perception as immediate knowledge or knowledge which is not produced through the medium of some other knowledge. Inference is mediate knowledge. It is produced through the medium of some other knowledge. Knowledge of the middle term produces inference. But perception is not mediate knowledge. It is directly produced by the intercourse of a sense-organ with an object. This definition includes divine perception and yogic perception, which are not produced by the sense-object-intercourse.

Indeterminate perception is perception of an object as something. It is immediate apprehension. It is knowledge of acquaintance. It is perception of an object as not endowed with qualities, actions, generality, and other features. Indeterminate perception is free from recollection. It is devoid of assimilation and discrimination. Perception of a pen as something, not as a pen like other pens, and different from pencils, books, inkpots

and the like is indeterminate. But when an object is perceived as belonging to a particular class or genus, endued with certain qualities, and bearing a particular name, the perception is determinate. When an object is perceived as a pen like other pens, unlike books, pencils, inkpots and the like, the perception is determinate. Indeterminate perception is presentative knowledge. Determinate perception is presentative-representative knowledge. Indeterminate perception does not involve knowledge of relations, assimilation, and discrimination. Determinate perception involves knowledge of relations, assimilation, and discrimination. Indeterminate perception is free from memory. Determinate perception contains memory. It is perception mixed with memory.

#### INFERENCE

Inference is knowledge (māna) after (anu) knowledge. It is knowledge derived through the medium of some other knowledge. Inference is knowledge of a probandum in something, derived from the knowledge of the probans which is known to be invariably accompanied by the probandum. Inference is based upon the knowledge of invariable concomitance of the middle term with the major term. Smoke, the middle term, is known to be invariably accompanied by a fire. Wherever there is smoke, there is a fire. This is called vyāpti. It is pervasion of the middle term by the major term. I perceive smoke in a hill, but I do not perceive a fire in it. Then I remember the vyāpti that wherever there is smoke, there is a fire. Then I infer the existence of a fire in the hill from the smoke perceived. The inference or syllogism consists of the following five propositions :—

- (1) The hill is fiery (thesis) ;
- (2) Because the hill is smoky (reason) ;
- (3) Whatever is smoky, is fiery, for example, a kitchen (example) ;
- (4) The hill is smoky (application) ;
- (5) Therefore, the hill is fiery (conclusion).

A syllogism consists of five propositions : (1) thesis ; (2) reason ; (3) example ; (4) application ; and (5) conclusion.



The thesis states the proposition to be proved. The reason states the reason or the middle term for proving the existence of the major term. The example states the general rule of invariable concomitance of the middle term with the major term, illustrated by an example. The mention of the example shows that the universal major premise is an induction derived from generalization from particular instances observed. The universal major premise is applied to a particular instance, and a new conclusion is reached. The Nyāya syllogism is inductive-deductive. It is material-formal. It does not give only formal truth. It gives also material truth.

The Greek syllogism propounded by Aristotle consists of three propositions, the major premise, the minor premise, and the conclusion. The third, fourth, and fifth propositions of the Nyāya syllogism correspond to the major premise, the minor premise, and the conclusion of the Aristotelian syllogism. Or, the first, second, and third propositions of the Nyāya syllogism correspond to the conclusion, the minor premise, and the major premise of the Aristotelian syllogism. The Nyāya universal major premise is illustrated by an example, while the universal major premise of the Aristotelian syllogism is not illustrated by an example. The Nyāya syllogism is inductive-deductive, while the Aristotelian syllogism is purely deductive.

There are three kinds of inference. *Pūrvavat* inference is inference of an effect from a cause. Future rainfall is inferred from the rise of clouds. *Śeṣavat* inference is inference of a cause from an effect. Previous rainfall is inferred from the flood in the river and swiftness of the current. *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference is inference of an unperceived event from a perceived event, which are uniformly co-existent. The motion of the sun is inferred from its different positions in the sky in different parts of the day. Or it is inference by elimination. The existence of the substance, self, is inferred from cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition. They do not exist in earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, and *manas*. Therefore they must exist in the self. The ancient Nyāya recognizes these three kinds of inference.

The modern Nyāya recognizes three kinds of inference : *Kevalānvayi*, *Kevalavyatireki*, and *Anvayavyatireki*. Where-

ever there is smoke, there is a fire, for example, in a kitchen. Wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke, for example, in a lake. There is smoke in the hill. Therefore there is a fire in the hill. This is Anvavyatireki inference. It is based on agreement in presence and agreement in absence. Whatever is knowable is nameable, for example, a cloth. The jar is knowable. Therefore the jar is nameable. This is Kevalānvayi inference. It is based upon agreement in presence only. A negative instance is not available here. Earth differs from the other substances because it has smell. What does not differ from the other substances, has no smell, for example, water. This is not like that. So it is not water. Here what has smell is different from the other substances. There is no positive instance of this. Earth is the only subject of inference. This is Kevalavyatireki inference<sup>1</sup>.

#### COMPARISON (UPAMĀNA)

The Nyāya holds that comparison is the knowledge of an unknown object from its similarity with a known object. For example, the knowledge 'the wild cow is like a cow' is comparison. The wild cow is the object denoted by the name 'wild cow.' Comparison is the knowledge of the relation of a name and an object named<sup>2</sup>. Knowledge of similarity is the instrument of the knowledge by comparison. A person hears from a forester that 'a wild cow' is like a cow, goes to a forest, remembers the statement of the forester, and perceives an animal similar to a cow. Then he knows that the unfamiliar animal is a wild cow<sup>3</sup>. Here comparison is knowledge of similarity with a cow existing in a wild cow. Comparison, according to the Nyāya, is knowledge of similarity with a remembered object existing in an unfamiliar perceived object.

But the Mīmāṃsā holds that comparison is knowledge of similarity of a perceived unfamiliar object with an object perceived in the past and remembered now existing in the

<sup>1</sup>TS., p. 44

<sup>2</sup>NBp., h. i, 1, 6, TS., p. 49.

<sup>3</sup>TS., p. 49-50.

familiar object. The knowledge that 'the cow is similar to the wild cow' perceived in the past in a town is comparison. Thus the Nyāya view of comparison is different from the Mīmāṃsā view.<sup>1</sup>

### TESTIMONY (ŚABDA)

Testimony is knowledge derived from authority. It is the authoritative statement of a reliable person equipped with direct knowledge of the real character of an object.<sup>2</sup> Testimony is of two kinds : (1) testimony that conveys knowledge of sensible objects. (2) testimony that conveys knowledge of supersensible objects.<sup>3</sup> An authoritative statement is a sentence. A sentence consists of words. The words must have expectancy, fitness, proximity, and intention. 'Bring a cow.' In this sentence the words have expectancy, fitness, proximity, and intention. If the words are uttered at an interval of a day, they do not convey any meaning. They must be uttered in quick succession to convey sense. Proximity of the words to one another is a condition of the intelligibility of a sentence. 'Quench thirst with fire.' In this sentence there is no fitness or compatibility of the words with one another. Fitness, or mutual compatibility of words with one another is another condition of the intelligibility of a sentence. The word 'bring' does not make a sentence. It has expectancy for other words. The words 'bring a' also do not make a sentence. They have expectancy for another word. But the words 'bring a cow' make a complete sentence. So expectancy is another condition of intelligibility of a sentence. 'Bring saindhava.' If this sentence is uttered by a person at the time of eating, it means 'bring salt.' But if it is uttered by him ready to go to a distant place, it means 'bring a horse.' Thus a sentence must convey an intention of the speaker. Expectancy, fitness or compatibility, proximity, and intention are the four conditions of intelligibility of a sentence.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>SD., p. 208-09.

<sup>2</sup>NS., i. l. 7.

<sup>3</sup>NBh., i. l. 7-8.

<sup>4</sup>SM., p. 384.

## PRESUMPTION ( ARTHĀPATTI )

Kumārila, the founder of a school of Mīmāṃsā, recognizes two other sources of valid knowledge, viz., presumption and non-apprehension. He admits perception, inference, comparison, testimony, presumption, and non-apprehension as the six means of valid knowledge. The Advaita Vedānta also recognizes these six pramāṇas. Prabhākara, the founder of a different school of Mīmāṃsā, rejects non-apprehension as an independent means of valid knowledge.

Presumption consists in making an assumption or hypothesis to reconcile inconsistent facts. Two inconsistent facts are made consistent by a hypothesis or assumption. Devadatta is known to be alive. He is found to be absent from his house. These two facts are inconsistent with each other. They can be made consistent with each other by the assumption of an unperceived fact that 'Devadatta is outside his house.' Without this hypothesis the two inconsistent facts cannot be made consistent with each other.<sup>1</sup> Devadatta does not eat any food in the day. Yet he is fat. These two facts are inconsistent with each other. They can be made consistent with each other by the assumption that 'Devadatta eats food at night.' Thus presumption or implication is an independent source of valid knowledge.

## NON-APPREHENSION ( ANUPALABDHI )

Kumārila and the Advaita Vedānta recognize non-apprehension as a distinct source of valid knowledge. Non-apprehension apprehends non-existence of an object, which is not present. Non-existence of a jar on the ground is known by non-apprehension. Only non-existence of an object capable of being perceived can be known by non-apprehension. A jar is capable of being perceived. Therefore non-existence of a jar can be known by non-apprehension. Merit (adṛṣṭa) is imperceptible. So non-existence of merit cannot be apprehended by non-apprehension.

Non-existence is real and objective. It is not merely ideal and subjective. It is not a logical category. It is an ontological category. It can be known by non-apprehension, which is a distinct source of valid knowledge.

Non-existence is not identical with mere locus. Non-existence of a jar on the ground is not identical with bare ground as Prabhākara wrongly supposes. If non-existence of a jar were identical with its locus—the bare ground, non-existence of a cloth also would be apprehended on the ground. But it is not apprehended there. So non-existence of a jar on the ground is apprehended by non-apprehension. It is also called non-perception or non-cognition. Kumārila and the Advaita Vadānta recognize it as a distinct source of valid knowledge.

#### VAIBHĀṢIKA DIRECT REALISM

The Vaibhāṣikas, a school of Bauddha realists, maintain that there are external objects, and that they are perceived directly. External objects are impermanent; they are not durable. The mind knows them directly. It does not know them indirectly through the medium of ideas, which are said to be their copies. The Vaibhāṣikas are advocates of direct realism. They reject representationism. They advocate presentative realism.

The Vaibhāṣikas refute the Sautrāntika doctrine of representative realism. The Sautrāntika maintains that external objects are inferred from their cognitions or ideas. There is no knowledge of invariable concomitance of ideas with external objects, and external objects cannot, therefore, be inferred from their ideas.<sup>1</sup>

#### SAUTRĀNTIKA INDIRECT REALISM

The Sautrāntikas, another school of Bauddha realists, maintain that external objects are inferred from their ideas, which are their copies, images, or representations. They are advocates of indirect realism or representative realism, or

<sup>1</sup>SDS., ch. II

representationism. They, like Descartes and Locke, believe in representative theory of perception. Perception is mediate knowledge. External objects are known through the medium of their ideas. They can never be perceived directly and immediately. Thus the Sautrāntikas are advocates of representative realism. External objects are impermanent. They produce their ideas in the mind, and imprint their forms on the ideas. Thus the forms of ideas are copies of the forms of external objects. There is similarity between them. Therefore, the forms of external objects are inferred from the forms of ideas in the mind. External objects can never be directly perceived. This is representative realism of the Sautrāntikas<sup>1</sup>.

#### YOGĀCĀRA SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM (VIJÑĀNAVĀDA)

Some Yogācāras maintain that there are no external objects, and that they are nothing but mere ideas of the mind. They advance the following arguments. First, the forms of ideas can serve all practical purposes of our life. Therefore, the forms of external objects are redundant. They do not serve any useful purpose. The law of parsimony of hypotheses demands that the forms of ideas only should be admitted. Secondly, the so-called perceptions of external objects are like dreams. Both are alike ideas. Dreams are not produced by external objects. So perceptions also are not produced by external objects. Berkeley also gives this argument against the existence of external objects. External objects produce ideas in the mind and cease to exist, and therefore the past objects cannot be perceived. The Yogācāras urge that this argument is childish. We do perceive external objects. It is a fact of experience. The perceptual character of the experience cannot be argued out of existence. External objects are perceived. Therefore, they are real. There is no causal relation between external objects and their ideas. If external objects were perceptible because they produced ideas in the mind, then the sense-organs also would be perceptible because

<sup>1</sup>Ibid, 9.

they produce ideas in the mind. But they are not perceptible. Fourthly, the so-called external objects and their ideas are always perceived at the same time. Because they are invariably perceived together, therefore they are identical with each other. The blue object and the sensation of blue are always perceived together. They can never be perceived apart from each other. Therefore they are identical with each other. Berkeley also gives this argument. The sensible objects can never be perceived apart from their sensations or ideas. They are, therefore, identical with each other. Fifthly, an external object is either an atom or an aggregate of atoms. It is not an atom. An atomic thing cannot produce the idea of a gross object. It is not an aggregate of atoms. The aggregate of atoms is either different or non-different from atoms. If it is different from atoms, it cannot be their aggregate. If it non-different from atoms, it cannot produce the idea of a gross object. So an external object does not exist. So ideas alone exist. There is neither subject nor object. There are cognitions alone, which are self-existent and self-aware. Cognitions are self-luminous. They apprehend themselves. They do not apprehend external objects. Cognitions appear to be distinguished into subjects and objects. But the appearance is illusory.<sup>1</sup>

#### SAUTRĀNTIKA CRITICISM OF YOGĀCĀRA SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM

The Sautrāntika offers the following criticisms of the Yogācāra Subjective Idealism. First, invariably simultaneous perception of objects and ideas does not prove their identity. Objects are known. Ideas or cognitions are modes of knowing them. Śaṅkara urges that cognitions are the means of knowing objects, which are their ends. An object cannot be perceived through the eyes without the aid of light. But the object is not identical with light. Secondly, cognitions are internal or subjective, while objects are external and objective. They do not occupy the same space and the same time.

<sup>1</sup>SDS., Ch. II, pp. 34-40.

Therefore they cannot be identical with each other. Thirdly, if objects were identical with cognitions, then a blue object would be known as 'I am blue,' and not as 'this is blue.' If it be urged that an internal cognition appears to be an external object, this argument is not valid. External objects are not existent. Therefore internal ideas cannot appear as external objects. This argument is as absurd as the statement 'Vasumitra appears to be like the son of a barren mother !' Fourthly, the appearance of duality of subject (cognition) and object is said to be illusory. This argument involves a vicious circle. The illusoriness of duality of cognition and object proves their identity. And the identity of cognition and object proves the illusoriness of their duality. This is mutual dependence or argument in a circle. We do perceive external objects, and react upon them. Our activities of life depend upon perceptions of external objects, which are undoubted. So the reality of external objects cannot be denied. Fifthly, consciousness is common to cognitions of different objects. But the differences among cognitions are due to external objects. Cognitions appear occasionally. The occasional appearance of different cognitions must be due to adventitious conditions in the form of external objects. If there were no external objects, there would be homogeneous consciousness and there would not be variety of cognitions. The variety of cognitions is due to the variety of external objects. Cognitions of colours, sounds, odours, tastes, temperatures, and the like must be due to external objects. Therefore external objects exist.<sup>1</sup>

#### YOGĀCĀRA ABSOLUTE IDEALISM

According to Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, the Yogācāras, one, eternal, pure consciousness (*viññaptimātratā*)—is the absolute reality. It is the ground of the *Ālayaviññāna*, the All-Conserving Mind. This Cosmic Mind evolves into the individual subjects or minds and objects of the world under the influence of dispositions. Subjects and objects are transformations of



the eternal principle of pure consciousness. Empirical subjects and empirical objects are false imaginative constructions like dreams. The eternal pure consciousness is transformed into the apparent subjects and objects. The All-Conserving Mind is the intermediate principle between the one, eternal, pure consciousness and the multiplicity of empirical subjects and objects. The Alayavijñāna is the constantly changing stream of consciousness, which is transformed into visual consciousness, auditory consciousness, gustatory consciousness, olfactory consciousness, and tactual consciousness, on the one hand, and into the sense-data, colours, sounds, tastes, odours, and temperatures. Thus all cognitions and objects of cognitions are transformations of the one, eternal, pure consciousness. This is Absolute Idealism of the Yogācāras.<sup>1</sup>

#### THE MĀDHYAMIKA ŚŪNYAVĀDA

Nāgārjuna was an exponent of the Mādhyamika doctrine of Śūnyavāda. He maintains that the Reality is essenceless, predicateless, and indefinable. It is beyond all intellectual categories. It is beyond time, space, rest, motion, substance, quality, relation, causality, self, not-self, whole, part, and the like. It is unthinkable and indescribable. All categories are fraught with self-contradiction. The Reality is not void. It is absolute. It is neither existent, nor non-existent, nor both, nor neither. It may be indicated by the word 'śūnya'. It is the Absolute. It cannot be thought by intellect. It can be grasped by intuition. Thus Nāgārjuna was not a Nihilist. But he was an Absolutist. According to him the Absolute is the ontological reality. External objects and internal cognitions have only empirical reality. They are phenomena only, which become extinct in the Absolute. Illusions, dreams, reveries and the like have only illusory reality.

#### ŚAṂKARA'S ABSOLUTE IDEALISM

Śaṅkara, the great protagonist of the Advaita Vedānta, maintains that the Absolute (Brahman) alone is the ontological reality. It is not essenceless, as Nāgārjuna holds. It is one,

<sup>1</sup>HIP., vol. II, p. 483-88.

eternal, pure Being, Consciousness, and Bliss. Subject-object-less consciousness constitutes its essence. Transcendental bliss also forms its essence. It is devoid of difference. It is beyond time, space, and causality. It is non-temporal, non-spatial, and non-causal. It is non-dual. It is one. It is the ground of the individual selves. It is the ground of world-appearance. The individual selves have empirical reality only. Their individuality is destroyed when they realize their absoluteness or identity with the Brahman. The world-appearance is false. It appears to be real to the intellect infected with nescience (avidyā). When avidyā is destroyed by intuition of Brahman, the multiform world-appearance vanishes. This is the doctrine of Absolute Idealism or Absolutism advocated by Śaṅkara and his followers.

#### RĀMĀNUJA'S OBJECTIVE IDEALISM.

Rāmānuja, an exponent of qualified non-dualism, maintains that the Brahman or Absolute, and individual selves are real and inseparable from one another. They form an organic unity. The Brahman has internal difference. It is a Unity-in-difference. It is the Substance (viśeṣaya). The finite souls and the world are its adjectives (viśeṣaṇa) or modes (prakara). There is an inseparable relation (aprthaksiddhi) between Brahman and the souls and the world. They constitute the body of Brahman, which is their Soul. Brahman is God. He has infinite auspicious qualities. He is the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world. He is the Moral Governor. He is the Inner Controller of all finite selves and finite objects. Thus the finite souls and the world are real in and through God. There is no consciousness without a subject and without an object. This is Rāmānuja's doctrine of Objective Idealism. This doctrine closely resembles Hegel's Objective Idealism.

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